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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three self-contained chapters that contribute to the research fields
of monetary and international macroeconomics. The chapters cover questions on business
cycle stabilization policy in monetary unions, on the effects of unconventional monetary
policy instruments, and on the macroeconomic impact of demographic change. Common
to all three of these topics is their high relevance for economic policy in the recent past
and ongoing present, on which I elaborate in the following.
Chapters 2 and 3 share the joint theme of studying business cycle policy in situations
where the conduct of monetary policy is constrained, either due to membership of a
monetary union or when the main monetary policy rate cannot be reduced any further in
proximity of the zero lower bound on interest rates.
Chapter 2 addresses questions related to the conduct of stabilization policy in mone-
tary unions. The recent experiences of the euro area after 2010 revived both the scientific
and the public debate about which additional policy instruments are required in a mon-
etary union, where national central banks are no longer capable to pursue individual
monetary policies to accommodate country-specific shocks. As a result, cross-country
imbalances between member countries can no longer be reduced by exchange rate ad-
justments. The last years witnessed the emergence of a consensual view that, amongst
other reforms, more coordination of national fiscal policies is needed. Farhi and Werning
(2017) provide a theoretical justification for the implementation of fiscal transfers between
the member countries of a currency union in a very general framework, based on earlier
work by, amongst others, Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) or Ferrero (2009). Due to the severe
moral hazard problems and the numerous political constraints that are associated with
cross-country transfers, their implementation is still protracted.
Complementing a fiscal transfer system, so-called fiscal devaluation policies can be part
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
of the response to reduce imbalances in a monetary union. The term of fiscal devaluation
refers to policies that aim at affecting international relative prices, i.e. the terms of trade
and the real exchange rate, in a similar way as the nominal exchange rate does. The
idea goes back to Keynes (1931) and has been brought back to the scientific and public
debate by Farhi, Gopinath and Itskhoki (2014), who show that the effects of the nominal
exchange rate on the allocation of an economy can be replicated entirely using a sufficient
number of tax instruments.
The research in Chapter 2 contributes to this debate. Specifically, I study optimal mon-
etary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian 2-country open economy framework, which
I use to assess to what degree tax policies can substitute for the role of a flexible ex-
change rate in a monetary union. To this end, I describe the conduct of optimal policy
in response to country-specific shocks and provide welfare comparisons between various
policy scenarios. I show that even under a minimum set of fiscal instruments being a
member of a monetary union does not have to be unduly painful. The optimal use of a
single tax instrument per country already reduces the welfare costs of giving up exchange
rate flexibility significantly. Fiscal devaluation policies are not only viable, but can be
observed as the optimal policy response to country-specific shocks in such a setting –
even in presence of several competing objectives for the tax instrument. These objectives
are, besides replicating the effects of a flexible exchange rate system, in particular the
financing of government expenditures in the least distortionary way and the stabilization
of firms’ marginal costs in order to avoid welfare-reducing price dispersion.
As the main goal of fiscal devaluation policies is to affect relative goods prices, they
are usually centred on adjustments of value added taxes (VAT), which are therefore also
in the focus of my analysis in Chapter 2. The intuition for the effect of the simplest form
of such a VAT-based fiscal devaluation policy is that, say, an increase of the domestic
relative to the foreign VAT rate induces firms to charge higher prices for goods sold at
home, resulting in higher prices of domestic imports relative to exports, for the latter are
subject to the relatively reduced foreign VAT. Comparable to a nominal devaluation, this
fiscal devaluation policy leads to a deterioration of the terms of trade.
The model framework features staggered price setting and it differentiates between
the case where prices are sticky only in the country of the producer, such that the law
of one price holds internationally, and the case where firms are capable of pricing-to-
market, implying an additional sticky price friction for imported goods. This distinction
is important, as the welfare costs of fixed exchange rates as well as the capabilities of fiscal
policy to reduce these costs depend decisively on the pricing scheme. The model allows
for home bias and asymmetries between the countries along several dimensions, such as
3country size, the degree of competition, and the size of the public sector. Optimal policy
is characterized using a Ramsey approach. This procedure involves finding sequences for
the policy instruments that support the welfare-maximizing competitive equilibrium.
I calibrate the model to characteristics of the euro area and then address the research
question along the two dimensions of welfare and conduct of policy. In terms of welfare, I
find that optimal fiscal policy reduces the welfare costs of pegged exchange rates by 86% in
case the law of one price holds and by 69% in case of pricing-to-market, by only adjusting
the VAT rates of both countries. The order of magnitude of these results is highly robust
to changes in the parametrization and also if payroll taxes are used instead of the VAT.
In terms of the conduct of optimal policy, I show that for a broad set of different shock
processes, fiscal devaluations are an optimal policy response to country-specific shocks in
a monetary union. The results imply the policy recommendation that whenever it were
optimal to devalue the currency of a country in a monetary union, optimal fiscal policy
is to increase the VAT of that country relative to the VAT rates of the other countries in
the union.
Chapter 3 adds to the understanding of the effects of unconventional monetary policy
instruments that become relevant in situations where the adjustment of conventional
tools, i.e. the main policy rate, is not feasible or not sufficient to fulfil the objectives
of the central bank. The most important unconventional monetary policy measures are
large scale asset purchase programmes and forward guidance. The latter type of policy
refers to the way how central banks manage market expectations about the future stance
of their policy. The analysis of forward guidance stands in the focus of Chapter 3.
Unconventional policies became highly relevant in the aftermath of the financial crisis
of 2007 and 2008, when the main monetary policy rates in both the United States and
Europe fell to levels close to their effective lower bound. Despite highly accommodative
conventional policy, the economies of both currency areas ran into danger of deflationary
spirals. To avoid such an adverse situation, unconventional policies were applied on a
massive scale. In the recent past, the Federal Reserve System already started tapering
its asset purchases and began to increase the federal funds rate in line with the ongoing
recovery of the US economy. The European Central Bank however continues to maintain
their highly accommodative policy stance for the time being.
An important role of scientific research is to assess the success and effectiveness of these
types of policies. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) provide an early theoretical analysis
of the effects of forward guidance in a basic New Keynesian framework. Assuming full
commitment of the central bank, they show that this type of policy is highly effective in the
conventional model. Even small announcements about future reductions of the policy rate
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lead to massive responses of output and inflation today. In this canonical model, whose
basic structure is also widely applied by central banks in models for policy analysis, such
an announcement can suffice to terminate a deflationary contractionary episode at the
zero lower bound immediately. Recent empirical studies emphasize however that New
Keynesian models massively overstate the effects of forward guidance announcements on
the economy. Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2015) coined this mismatch between
theoretical predictions and empirical evidence the forward guidance puzzle.
The research in Chapter 3, which is joint work with Christian Bredemeier and Andreas
Schabert, provides a solution to this puzzle that is motivated by novel empirical findings.
We offer empirical evidence that liquidity premia, measured by spreads between assets
that are similar in terms of safety, but different in the degree of liquidity services they of-
fer, rise systematically in response to accommodative forward guidance statements of the
US Federal Reserve. The measure for highly liquid near-money assets are US Treasuries.
Nagel (2016) shows that these feature a liquidity premium compared to other assets due
to their unique feature of being eligible to serve as collateral for obtaining liquidity from
the central bank. The fact that forward guidance leads to changes of liquidity premia
implies that announcements of future policy rate changes are passed-through only imper-
fectly to other market interest rates that are more relevant for savings and investment
decisions of the private sector than the federal funds rate. After establishing this empirical
finding, we show that a New Keynesian model that features endogenous liquidity premia
delivers responses to forward guidance events that are substantially smaller than in the
conventional New Keynesian model.
To analyse the response of liquidity premia, we apply the method by Gu¨rkaynak, Sack
and Swanson (2005) to extract and quantify the surprise component of policy announce-
ments in press releases after meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
using daily data between 1990 and 2016. We examine the responses of various spreads,
which have been suggested in the literature to measure liquidity premia, to the sur-
prise components and we also construct a common liquidity factor that is based on these
spreads, as in Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero and Kiyotaki (2017). All of these liquid-
ity measures increase systematically after FOMC announcements that financial markets
consider to be accommodative.
To incorporate endogenous responses of liquidity spreads into the model, we add a
stylized banking sector to a New Keynesian model with an explicit specification of central
bank operations. Banks are required to hold reserves from the central bank to meet the
liquidity demands of their depositors. Reserves can only be obtained in open market
operations against assets that are eligible to serve as collateral, namely Treasuries, where
5the central bank controls the price of money by setting the policy rate. Returns on eligible
assets then follow the policy rate closely, whereas interest rates on non-eligible assets, such
as corporate bonds, tend to be higher due to a liquidity premium.
The intuition for adjustments of liquidity premia in this model framework can be given
as follows. By announcing a lower future monetary policy rate, the central bank announces
to provide more means of payment for a given amount of collateral. Thereby, the central
bank increases the liquidity value of assets, which are eligible for open-market operations.
In an arbitrage-free equilibrium, non-eligible assets then have to provide a relatively higher
return, such that the interest rate spread between these asset classes, i.e. the liquidity
premium, increases. These less liquid assets serve as the actual store of wealth for the
agents in the economy. The return on these assets directly affects consumption-savings
decisions via a classical Euler equation. As the announced policy accommodation leads
to an increase of the liquidity premium, the response of aggregate demand is dampened
compared to the conventional New Keynesian model, where liquidity premia are absent.
We are able to show analytically in our model that forward guidance leads to a rise in
the liquidity premium and to moderate increases of output and inflation. In a subsequent
quantitative analysis, we calibrate the model to US data, in order to match the response of
liquidity premia to forward guidance that we observe in our empirical analysis. Compared
to the predictions of the standard New Keynesian model without a liquidity premium, we
find the immediate output effects in response to forward guidance in our model to be seven
times smaller. The order of magnitude of our results is well in line with empirical evidence
from VAR-models. Moreover, also in opposition to the conventional New Keynesian
model, the impact responses of output and inflation do not increase with the time horizon
of the forward guidance.
Chapter 4 addresses another topic of highest relevance for policy making. While
Chapters 2 and 3 study economic phenomena at business cycle frequency, this chapter
adopts a longer perspective by contributing to the literature on the macroeconomic effects
of demographic change.
Demographic change, understood as the combination of increased life expectancies and
low fertility rates that lead to population ageing, particularly in developed countries, is
considered to be a key economic driving force in the course of this century. The population
age structure of a society has considerable effects on aggregate savings and investment,
the composition of consumption demand, or factor prices (see, for instance, Krueger and
Ludwig, 2007). The ongoing debate about secular stagnation (see Summers, 2013 and
Eggertsson and Mehrotra, 2014) discusses demographic change and the resulting excess
savings in the developed world as one possible explanation for the present low levels of
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interest rates. As a consequence, central banks may be forced to set their policy rates at
levels close the zero lower bound in order to ensure stable prices and full employment. The
long-term development of the population age structure can therefore also have immediate
impact on the relevance of the policies discussed in Chapter 3. It is hence of decisive
importance to consider the consequences of demographic change thoroughly.
The research in Chapter 4, which is joint work with Max Groneck, contributes to the
analysis of demographic change by focussing on its effect on the relative prices of different
types of goods and services. The results imply a direct relation between demographic
change and real exchange rates. This chapter is linked to Chapter 2 by emphasizing the
role of international relative prices in a different context.
The starting point of our analysis is that preferences for different categories of goods
change over the life cycle, which we document using micro data for the United States.
We then show that demographic change raises demand for non-tradable old-age related
services relative to tradable consumption goods. This demand shift increases the relative
price of non-tradables and thereby causes real exchange rates to appreciate. The anal-
ysis therefore relates to the literature on structural determinants of real exchange rates,
originally initiated by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). We argue that age-related
changes in demand affect prices because of imperfect intersectoral factor mobility. In
the main part of the chapter, we analyse the relation between demographic change and
relative prices empirically and we also test the relevance of imperfect factor mobility for
the transmission of the effects.
The intuition for the mechanism that we consider is the following. The higher demand
of elderly people for non-traded services relative to people in working age implies an
increase in overall demand for those goods due to population ageing. At the same time,
the old-age population has lower saving rates than younger cohorts, such that aggregate
savings of an ageing society decline, while aggregate consumption increases. Likewise this
rise in spending is also biased towards non-tradable goods. If the additional demand for
non-traded services of an ageing society is not associated with an equally strong increase of
supply, the relative price of non-tradables increases. We claim that persistent imperfect
intersectoral mobility of production factors hampers a reallocation of factor inputs to
the non-tradable sector. Since we are concentrating on OECD countries with highly
developed capital markets and since the production of non-traded services tends to be
labour-intensive, labour market rigidities are – as we show – most important.
To demonstrate the relationship between sectoral prices and population ageing for-
mally, we construct a stylized small open economy model with overlapping generations
(OLG) and two production sectors. The model allows us to discuss conditions under
7which demand effects in general translate into changes of relative prices. We use the
model to illustrate the intuition of the effects and to provide guidance for the empirical
test of the mechanism.
The basic econometric specification arises from the theoretical model and shows that
the relative price of non-tradables depends on the old-age dependency ratio. To analyse
whether imperfect labour mobility is relevant for the transmission of the effect, we in-
troduce interactions of indices of labour market rigidity with the OADR. We construct a
panel of 15 OECD countries that are followed from 1970 to 2009. Our estimation strat-
egy explicitly takes into account the non-stationarity and cross-sectional dependence of
the data. To this end, we use methods by Pesaran (2006) and Kapetanios, Pesaran and
Yamagata (2011). Our results indicate a significant link between population ageing and
relative sectoral prices. According to our main estimate, up to one fifth of the average
increase in relative prices between 1970 and 2009 can be attributed to population ageing.
We are able to identify labour market rigidity as the driving force for the transmission of
this demand effect by showing that countries with more rigid labour markets experience
stronger price effects. Various robustness checks underpin the validity of our findings and
demonstrate the importance of labour market frictions relative to other possible channels.
Further results widen the analysis to the whole population age structure.
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
Optimal Fiscal Substitutes for the
Exchange Rate in a Monetary Union
This chapter is based on Kaufmann (2016).1
2.1 Introduction
Freely floating exchange rates are generally regarded as an important shock absorber
for countries facing macroeconomic turmoil. Giving up this instrument by joining a
monetary union (MU) or committing to a peg clearly reduces the abilities of business cycle
stabilization policy in reacting to country-specific shocks, as an independent monetary
policy is no longer feasible anymore. The fixed exchange rate regime of the European
Monetary Union is also blamed for the slack or even missing recovery of some southern
European countries in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.
Within a monetary union, fiscal policies can take up the role of the exchange rate,
since taxes can in principle affect international relative prices, namely the terms of trade
and the real exchange rate, in a similar fashion as the exchange rate does. Policies of this
type are referred to as fiscal devaluations. Setting a theoretical benchmark, Farhi et al.
(2014) show that the effects of the nominal exchange rate on the allocation of an economy
can be replicated entirely using a sufficient number of tax instruments. Following a related
approach, Adao, Correia and Teles (2009) conclude that the exchange rate regime can be
1I wish to thank Andreas Schabert, Klaus Adam, Christian Bredemeier, Andrea Ferrero, Mathias Hoff-
mann, Mathias Klein, Michael Krause, Morten Ravn, Dominik Sachs, Thomas Schelkle, Mirko Wiederholt
as well as conference and seminar participants at Deutsche Bundesbank, the European Winter Meeting of
the Econometric Society (Edinburgh), the European Economic Association (Geneva), the Spring Meeting
of Young Economists (Lisbon), the German Economic Association (Augsburg), and University of Cologne
for helpful comments and suggestions.
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completely irrelevant for stabilization policy.
In this chapter, I show that even under a minimum set of fiscal instruments being
in a monetary union does not have to be unduly painful. In a common New Keynesian
2-country open economy framework, the optimal use of only one tax instrument per
country reduces the welfare costs of giving up exchange rate flexibility in a MU already
significantly. Fiscal devaluation policies are not only feasible, but can be identified as the
optimal policy response to country-specific shocks.
As their aim is to affect relative goods prices, fiscal devaluation policies are usually
centred around adjustments of the value added tax (VAT). The intuition for the simplest
form of a fiscal devaluation policy is that, say, an increase of the domestic relative to the
foreign VAT rate induces firms to charge higher prices for goods sold at home, resulting
in higher prices of domestic imports relative to exports, for the latter are subject to the
relatively reduced foreign VAT.2 Comparable to a nominal devaluation, this fiscal devalu-
ation policy accordingly leads to a deterioration of the terms of trade. As shown by Farhi
et al. (2014), reproducing the depreciation of the real exchange rate that would emerge
simultaneously under a nominal devaluation, but not under this VAT-based fiscal deval-
uation, and stabilizing internal prices of domestically produced goods that are distorted
by the change in the VAT requires additional instruments, though.
The model that is used in this chapter features 2 countries with complete international
capital markets and staggered price setting a la` Calvo (1983). I differentiate between the
case where prices are sticky in the country of the producer only such that the law of one
price (LOOP) holds internationally, and the case where firms are capable of pricing-to-
market (PTM), implying an additional sticky price friction for imported goods.3 This
is important as the welfare costs of fixed exchange rates as well as the capabilities of
fiscal policy to reduce these costs depend decisively on the pricing scheme. The model
allows for home bias and asymmetries between the countries along several dimensions,
such as country size, the degree of competition, and the size of the public sector. Each
country has a fiscal authority, whose objective is to finance a given amount of public
spending by collecting distortionary taxes and issuance of debt. Each authority controls
its own VAT rate that is payable by firms and that is levied on all goods sold within
a country. Optimal policy is characterized using a Ramsey approach. This procedure
involves to find sequences for the policy instruments that support the welfare-maximizing
2In most legislations, including those of both the EU and the US, export revenues are exempted from
the VAT, but are subject to the taxation rules of the buyer’s country.
3In case of a flexible exchange rate regime, these two pricing schemes are also referred to as producer
currency pricing and local currency pricing. Regarding the high empirical relevance of both schemes and
a recent overview of the literature on international price setting, see Burstein and Gopinath (2014).
2.1. INTRODUCTION 11
competitive equilibrium.
Calibrating the model to characteristics of the euro area, I find that optimal fiscal
policy reduces the welfare costs of pegged exchange rates by 86% in case the law of one
price holds and by 69% in case of pricing-to-market. The order of magnitude of these
results is highly robust to changes in the parametrization and also if payroll taxes are
used instead of the VAT.
Besides analysing the welfare effects, I describe the conduct of optimal stabilization
policy depending on the exchange rate regime and the way prices are set. In general, under
flexible exchange rates, taxes aim to finance public expenditures in the least distortionary
way. At the same time, they can be used to stabilize the marginal costs of firms and,
hence, inflation via the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This trade-off involves a further
dimension in case of a monetary union, where taxes can additionally substitute for the
role of the nominal exchange rate, e.g., by inducing expenditure switching effects. In this
way, optimal fiscal policy can compensate at least partially for the loss of country-specific
monetary policy as a stabilization instrument, thereby bringing the economy closer to the
efficient allocation.
In a monetary union, I find that optimal fiscal policy is indeed engaged actively in
replicating the flexible exchange rate allocation. Optimal policy favours replicating the
behaviour of the terms of trade under a free float over reproducing the response of the
real exchange rate, in line with the intuition given above. In situations where a nominal
devaluation of a region were optimal, optimal fiscal policy in a MU is a relative increase
of the VAT of that region, i.e., to conduct a fiscal devaluation. Although the transmission
of fiscal policy is different under LOOP and PTM due to the limited pass-through of tax
changes on prices in the latter case, this finding is independent of the pricing scheme.
Simulating the economy under both exchange rate regimes yields correlations between
the hypothetical optimal exchange rate response and the ratio of VAT rates in the MU of
81% when the LOOP holds and of 59% under PTM.
The reaction of the level of tax rates depends on the specific types of shocks, though.
In case of shocks for which an efficient response could be attainable under flexible exchange
rates (I consider productivity, government spending, and demand preference shocks), repli-
cating the effects of the exchange rate does not conflict with marginal cost stabilization—
an instance of ”divine coincidence” for fiscal policy under fixed exchange rates. This
manifests in correlations between tax rate increases in the MU and the counterfactual
nominal devaluations of about 90%. Translated into a general policy recommendation,
a MU member should increase its VAT whenever its currency should be devaluated and
vice-versa. In case of mark-up shocks, optimal policy needs to trade-off the objective of
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stabilizing firms’ marginal costs with the incentive to replicate the effect of the exchange
rate. Correlations between the hypothetical exchange rate and taxes also depend on the
origin of the shock in this instance.
This chapter contributes to the literature on optimal stabilization policy for monetary
unions in a New Keynesian framework.4 Benigno (2004) offers a description of optimal
monetary policy in a 2-country setting. He finds that inflation should be stabilized at the
level of the union, with a higher weight attached to the country with more rigid prices.
The efficient response is generally not achievable, though. Lombardo (2006) builds on
the model of Benigno, focusing in particular on the role of different degrees of imperfect
competition for monetary policy. Beetsma and Jensen (2005) add fiscal policy to the model
in the form of lump-sum financed government spending that enters households’ utility. In
this setting, optimal monetary policy is still used to stabilize aggregate inflation, while
fiscal policy aims at affecting cross-country inflation differentials. Using a similar fiscal
setting, Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) study optimal policy in a monetary union consisting
of a continuum of small open economies.
The closest antecedent to this chapter is by Ferrero (2009). In his model, fiscal policy
also needs to finance an exogenous stream of government spending by distortionary taxes
and debt. Optimal policy is described by targeting rules using a linear-quadratic approach.
The focus of the paper lies on the question how far simple policy rules can approximate
optimal policy in a monetary union. My analysis assesses how far optimal fiscal policy
can reduce the welfare costs of a fixed exchange rate regime. I further show that fiscal
devaluation policies can be an optimal policy response to country-idiosyncratic shocks.
To this end, I generalize the modelling framework of Ferrero (2009) by adding PTM, by
allowing for asymmetries between countries, and by comparing policy scenarios that differ
in terms of the exchange rate regime and the availability of fiscal policy as a stabilization
device.
This chapter further contributes to the literature on fiscal devaluations. Besides the
work of Farhi et al. (2014), this entails, amongst others, Lipinska and von Thadden (2012),
and Engler, Ganelli, Tervala and Voigts (2017), who study the quantitative effects of tax
swaps from direct (payroll taxes) to indirect taxation (VATs). In general, this literature
studies the economic effects of given fiscal policies, but it does not provide a normative
analysis. I show that in fixed exchange rate regimes it is not only feasible, but indeed
optimal to use fiscal devaluations as a substitute for the exchange rate.
4Noteworthy, a monetary union always makes the economy worse off in this literature, as its sole focus
lies on the cost-side of giving up flexible exchange rates. For an overview of other (beneficial) aspects of
monetary unions, see Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010), and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010).
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the open economy
model. The setup of the Ramsey policy problem is described in Section 2.3, while Section
2.4 features a description of the calibration of the model to the euro area. All results
are provided in Section 2.5, with a description of the steady state in Section 2.5.1, the
analysis of welfare costs of giving up exchange rate flexibility in 2.5.2, and results on
optimal policy conduct in 2.5.3. A conclusion including a discussion of the results is given
in Section 2.6.
2.2 The Model
The model economy consists of two countries or regions i, labelled as the core (i = H)
and the periphery (i = F ), that can form a monetary union. The world population of
households (indexed by h) and firms (indexed by k) each sums up to one, of which a
fraction n ∈ (0, 1) of households and firms lives in the core and a fraction 1 − n in the
periphery. In each region, households choose consumption of domestic and foreign goods,
supply labour, which is mobile only within the region, and trade assets internationally.
Firms demand labour to produce tradable goods under monopolistic competition. Price
setting is subject to a Calvo-type friction. International prices are either set according
to the law of one price or taking into account local market conditions. Fiscal authori-
ties levy distortionary taxes and issue debt to finance an exogenously given amount of
public spending. Depending on whether the countries form a monetary union, there are
two separate or one single central bank, whose policy instrument is the nominal interest
rate. The economy operates at the cashless limit. Periphery variables are denoted by an
asterisk (∗). The following exposition focuses on the core region; the periphery economy
is modelled symmetrically.
2.2.1 Households
A representative household h living in region H derives utility from consumption and
disutility from work effort. The consumption bundle Ct(h) consists of tradable goods
only and is defined as a composite index over domestic- and foreign-produced consumption
goods,
Ct(h) =
[
γ
1
ξ
HCHt(h)
ξ−1
ξ + γ
1
ξ
FCFt(h)
ξ−1
ξ
] ξ
ξ−1
, (2.1)
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with ξ > 0 being the Armington elasticity of substitution between core and periphery
goods, and γH = 1− γF ∈ (0, 1) the share of domestic goods in the consumption bundle.
If γH > n, a home bias in preferences exists. Consumption of domestic and imported goods
by household h itself is given via Dixit-Stiglitz aggregators over imperfectly substitutable
individual varieties k,
CHt(h) =
[(
1
n
) 1
ρ
∫ n
0
CHt(k, h)
ρ−1
ρ dk
] ρ
ρ−1
, (2.2)
CFt(h) =
[(
1
1− n
) 1
ρ∗
∫ 1
n
CFt(k, h)
ρ∗−1
ρ∗ dk
] ρ∗
ρ∗−1
, (2.3)
where ρ, ρ∗ > 1 are the elasticities of substitution between the varieties in each country.
To express specialization of countries in production, the elasticity of substitution between
varieties within a country is assumed to be greater than between goods of different origin,
i.e. ρ > ξ.
The corresponding price indices can be shown to equal:
Pt =
[
γHP
1−ξ
Ht + γFP
1−ξ
F t
] 1
1−ξ
, (2.4)
PHt =
[(
1
n
)∫ n
0
PHt(k)
1−ρ dk
] 1
1−ρ
, (2.5)
PFt =
[(
1
1− n
)∫ 1
n
PFt(k)
1−ρ∗ dk
] 1
1−ρ∗
. (2.6)
Pt denotes the core’s consumer price index (CPI), PHt the producer price index (PPI) of
core goods, and PFt the price index of imported goods. Given the definitions of the price
indices, it is easy to show that consumer expenditures are given by PtCt(h) = PHtCHt(h)+
PFtCFt(h) with PHtCHt(h) =
∫ n
0
PHt(k)CHt(k, h)dk and PFtCFt(h) =∫ 1
n
PFt(k)CFt(k, h)dk. Consumption demand functions are characterized by:
CHt(h) = γH
(
PHt
Pt
)−ξ
Ct(h), CFt(h) = γF
(
PFt
Pt
)−ξ
Ct(h), (2.7)
CHt(k, h) =
1
n
(
PHt(k)
PHt
)−ρ
CHt(h), CFt(k, h) =
1
1− n
(
PFt(k)
PFt
)−ρ∗
CFt(h). (2.8)
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Each household h maximizes the utility function
U0(h) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ζct
Ct(h)
1−σ
1− σ −
Nt(h)
1+η
1 + η
]
, (2.9)
subject to the flow budget constraint
PtCt(h) + Et {Qt,t+1 [Dt+1(h) +Bt+1(h)]} ≤ WtNt(h) +Dt(h) +Bt(h) + Πt(h), (2.10)
where ζct denotes a demand preference shock, Nt(h) labour supply, Wt the wage rate, and
Πt(h) the profit share of a well-diversified portfolio of firms in possession of household h.
Asset markets are complete within and across countries. Qt,t+1 is the period t price of one
unit of domestic currency in a particular state of period t+1, normalized by the probability
of occurrence of that state, i.e., the stochastic discount factor. Accordingly, EtQt,t+1 is
the price of an asset portfolio that pays off one unit of domestic currency in every state of
period t+ 1 and, therefore, equals the inverse of the risk-free gross nominal interest rate,
Rt = 1/EtQt,t+1. Dt+1(h) is the quantity of an internationally-traded state-contingent
private asset portfolio denominated in domestic currency, while Bt+1(h) denotes holdings
of government debt. It is assumed without loss of generality that sovereign debt of country
i can be held only by agents of that country.
The first-order conditions of the household’s problem imply the Euler equation,
Qt,t+1 = β
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1(h)
Ct(h)
)−σ
Pt
Pt+1
, (2.11)
as well as an intratemporal consumption-leisure trade-off, given by
Nt(h)
η
ζctCt(h)
−σ =
Wt
Pt
. (2.12)
Besides, the following transversality conditions hold:
lim
s→∞
Et [Qt,sDt+s(h)] = 0 and lim
s→∞
Et [Qt,sBt+s(h)] = 0, (2.13)
where Qt,s =
∏s
z=tQt,z denotes the stochastic discount factor from period s to period t.
Foreign households behave analogously and in particular hold a quantity D∗t+1(h) of
the internationally-traded asset portfolio. From the periphery’s perspective, the stochastic
discount factor is priced as
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Qt,t+1 = β
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1(h)
C∗t (h)
)−σ
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
Et
Et+1
, (2.14)
where P ∗t is the CPI of the periphery, and Et is the nominal exchange rate, which is defined
as the price of one unit of periphery currency in terms of core currency (Et = [H]/[F ]).
An increase in Et accordingly implies a nominal devaluation of the core region. In case the
countries form a monetary union, the exchange rate is fixed at unity (E = 1). Combining
(2.11) and (2.14) yields the well-known condition of international risk sharing that links
consumption of the two countries and determines their (real) exchange rate:
qt =
ζc∗t
ζct
(
C∗t (h)
Ct(h)
)−σ
κ. (2.15)
The real exchange rate is defined as the nominal exchange rate weighted ratio of the
CPIs, qt = (EtP
∗
t )/Pt, while κ = q0(C0/C
∗
0)
−σ is a positive constant that depends on
preferences and the initial asset distribution. As pointed out, among others, by Faia and
Monacelli (2004), κ = 1 if markets are complete, the initial net foreign indebtedness is
zero (Dt+1(h) = D
∗
t+1(h) = 0 ∀h), and preferences are symmetric across countries.
2.2.2 Firms and Price Setting Assumptions
In the core a continuum of firms k ∈ [0, n] operates under monopolistic competition. Each
firm produces a variety k according to the production plan
Yt(k) = AtN
α
t (k), (2.16)
where Yt(k) is total supply of variety k, At a country-specific stochastic productivity level,
and Nt(k) the firm’s labour demand. Labour is the sole input of production, and α is the
input elasticity of production. Labour supply by households is perfectly mobile across
firms within the country, but immobile between countries. Total demand for the good
produced by firm k is given by the demand of domestic (CHt(k)) and foreign (C
∗
Ht(k))
households as well as public demand by the domestic government (Gt(k)):
Yt(k) =
∫ n
0
CHt(k, h) dh+
∫ 1
n
C∗Ht(k, h) dh+Gt(k). (2.17)
The period t profit function of firm k reads
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Πt(k) = (1− τ vt )PHt(k)
[∫ n
0
CHt(k, h) dh+Gt(k)
]
+ (1− τ v∗t )EtP ∗Ht(k)
∫ 1
n
C∗Ht(k, h) dh−WtNt(k), (2.18)
where P ∗Ht(k) is the price of core good k abroad. τ
v
t and τ
v∗
t are country-specific value-
added taxes (VAT) in region H and F respectively. As common in existing tax systems,
τ vt is levied on all goods sold within the Home country, but not on exports. The latter
are taxed at the border with the foreign VAT rate τ v∗t .
Price setting of firms is impaired by Calvo-type price stickiness. Each period t, a firm
can adjust prices with probability 1−θ, independent of the date of previous price changes.
With probability θ the firm has to maintain last period’s prices. Optimal prices are set
as to maximize the net present value of future profits
∞∑
s=t
θs−tEt [Qt,sΠs(k)] (2.19)
subject to the production technology and demand. Prices always include taxes. The
price of domestic goods sold within the core, PHt(h), is always set in domestic currency.
The setting of export prices for the periphery, P ∗Ht(k), is conducted according to the
assumption of either the law of one price or pricing-to-market.
Law of One Price (LOOP)
Under this pricing scheme, firms set a price for their good in domestic currency, while the
price in the other region satisfies the law of one price, adjusted for tax rates:
(1− τ v∗t )EtP ∗Ht(k) != (1− τ vt )PHt(k)
⇔ P ∗Ht(k) =
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
1
Et
PHt(k). (2.20)
Following Farhi et al. (2014), this expression is derived from the assumption that one unit
of sales should yield the same revenue to the firm, independent of the origin of the buyer.
(2.20) implies complete and immediate pass-through of both exchange rates and taxes on
international prices. A relative increase of the core’s VAT rate has the same effect on
prices abroad as a nominal devaluation.
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The optimality condition for the price set in period t, PHt(k), is derived in Appendix
2.A.1 and reads
Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,s
(
PHt(k)
PHs
)−1−ρ
Ys
PHs
[
ρ
ρ− 1µsMCHs(k)− (1− τ
v
s )PHt(k)
]
= 0, (2.21)
where MCHt(k) = Wt/
[
αAtN
α−1
t (k)
]
denotes marginal costs, and µt a stochastic mark-
up shock. The equation shows the standard result that the optimal price is set equal to
a mark-up over a weighted average of current and future marginal costs.
Pricing-to-Market (PTM)
Under the alternative assumption of PTM, firms set separate prices at home, PHt(k), and
abroad, P
∗
Ht(k), each of them subject to a Calvo friction. As a result, there is only limited
direct pass-through of exchange rates and taxes on international prices, and the law of
one price can be violated. Optimal price setting is now described by two conditions, also
derived in Appendix 2.A.1:
Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,s
(
PHt (k)
PHs
)−1−ρ
(nCHs +Gs)
PHs
[
ρ
ρ− 1µsMCHs(k)− (1− τ
v
s )PHt (k)
]
= 0,(2.22)
Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,s
(
P
∗
Ht(k)
P ∗Hs
)−1−ρ
C∗Hs
P ∗Hs
[
ρ
ρ− 1µsMCHs (k)− (1− τ
v∗
s )EsP
∗
Ht(k)
]
= 0.(2.23)
A devaluation of the domestic currency has the same effect on the firm’s pricing
decision for exports as a reduction in marginal costs, since every unit sold abroad leads to
higher revenues than selling on the domestic market. Note that reducing the periphery’s
VAT rate τ v∗ induces, ceteris paribus, the same effect on import prices in the periphery
as a rise in Et.
Foreign Firms
Foreign firms are modelled symmetrically. Under the LOOP, they set a price P
∗
Ft(k) at
which periphery goods are sold in F . The price at which goods are sold internationally
is again determined by the law of one price, adjusted for taxes:
PFt(k) =
(1− τ v∗)
(1− τ v) EtP
∗
Ft(k). (2.24)
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In case of PTM, firms in the periphery can also set separate prices for their domestic
and the international market. Optimal prices are implicitly given by:
Et
∞∑
s=t
θ∗s−tQ∗t,s
(
P
∗
Ft (k)
P ∗Fs
)−1−ρ∗
((1− n)C∗Fs +G∗s)
P ∗Fs
·
[
ρ∗
ρ∗ − 1µ
∗
sMC
∗
Fs(k)− (1− τ v∗s )P ∗Ft (k)
]
= 0, (2.25)
Et
∞∑
s=t
θ∗s−tQ∗t,s
(
P Ft(k)
PFs
)−1−ρ∗
CFs
P ∗Fs
·
[
ρ∗
ρ∗ − 1µ
∗
sMC
∗
Fs(k)−
(1− τ vs )
Es
P Ft(k)
]
= 0, (2.26)
where MC∗Ft(k) = W
∗
t /
[
αA∗tN
∗α−1
t (k)
]
.
2.2.3 Monetary and Fiscal Authorities
The public sector consists of separate fiscal authorities and central banks at the country
level. The policy instruments of the central banks are their nominal interest rates, Rt
and R∗t . If the regions share the same currency, only one central bank for the union as a
whole exists, whose policy instrument is denoted by RMUt .
The task of the fiscal authorities is to finance an exogenously given stochastic amount
of public spending Gt. In each country, government spending consists of an index of
locally produced goods only,
Gt =
[(
1
n
)∫ n
0
Gt(k)
ρ−1
ρ dk
] ρ
ρ−1
, (2.27)
with corresponding demand functions for each variety k, given by
Gt(k) =
1
n
(
PHt(k)
PHt
)−ρ
Gt. (2.28)
These expenditures are financed by distortionary value-added taxes and state-contingent
public debt. The budget constraint of the domestic government reads
PHtGt +Bt ≤ EtQt,t+1Bt+1 + τ vt
∫ n
0
PHt(k)
(∫ n
0
CHt(k, h) dh+Gt(k)
)
dk
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+τ vt
∫ 1
n
∫ n
0
PFt(k)CFt(k, h) dh dk. (2.29)
Note that the VAT is not only levied on domestically produced goods, but also on imports
CFt.
2.2.4 Aggregation and Equilibrium
Due to symmetry among agents within a country, households and firms, respectively, will
in each situation come to the same decisions. In the process of aggregation, one can,
therefore, drop indices h and k.
By the law of large numbers, today’s PPIs consist of the prices set today and last
period’s price index, weighted with the probabilities of adjustment and non-adjustment,
respectively. As shown in Appendix 2.A.2, the law of motion for PHt can be expressed as
p˜Ht =
PHt
PHt
=
(
1− θpiρ−1Ht
1− θ
) 1
1−ρ
, (2.30)
where piHt = PHt/PHt−1 denotes the PPI inflation rate of domestically produced goods in
H.
(2.21) gives an expression for the Phillips curve of core goods inflation under the LOOP.
In order to solve the model, it is required to rewrite the Phillips curve in a recursive way,
which avoids the use of infinite sums. To do so, I follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2006)
and restate (2.21)by defining two auxiliary variables, X1Ht and X2Ht (for a derivation,
see Appendix 2.A.3), such that
ρ
ρ− 1µtX1Ht = X2Ht, (2.31)
where
X1Ht = p˜
−1−ρ
Ht YtmcHt + θβEt
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ pi1+ρHt+1
pit+1
(
p˜Ht
p˜Ht+1
)−1−ρ
X1Ht+1, (2.32)
X2Ht = p˜
−ρ
HtYt (1− τ vt ) + θβEt
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ piρHt+1
pit+1
(
p˜Ht
p˜Ht+1
)−ρ
X2Ht+1, (2.33)
with pit = Pt/Pt−1 being the CPI inflation rate of the core, and mcHt = MCHt/PHt being
real marginal costs.
The resource constraint of the economy can be obtained by integrating the production
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function (2.16) over firms. The result differs depending on whether pricing follows the
law of one price or firms can engage in pricing-to-market:5
AtnN
α
t = ∆Ht (nCHt + (1− n)C∗Ht +Gt) (2.34)
AtnN
α
t = ∆Ht (nCHt +Gt) + ∆
∗
Ht(1− n)C∗Ht (2.35)
The first equation holds under the LOOP, the latter one under PTM. ∆Ht and ∆
∗
Ht are
indices of price dispersion that render inflation costly in efficiency terms. They are defined
as
∆Ht =
1
n
∫ n
0
(
PHt (k)
PHt
)−ρ
dk, (2.36)
∆∗Ht =
1
n
∫ n
0
(
P ∗Ht (k)
P ∗Ht
)−ρ
dk. (2.37)
Their laws of motion are given by
∆Ht = (1− θ)p˜−ρHt + θpiρHt∆Ht−1, (2.38)
∆∗Ht = (1− θ)p˜∗−ρHt + θpi∗ρHt∆∗Ht−1. (2.39)
As clarified by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2006), price dispersion is irrelevant for the
allocation if the non-stochastic (steady state) level of inflation is zero and only a first-
order approximation to the equilibrium conditions is used.
An equilibrium in this economy is characterized by prices and quantities that fulfil
the optimality conditions of households and firms in both countries such that all markets
clear, given stochastic processes for all shocks, and sequences for the policy instruments.
Goods markets under LOOP and markets for private assets clear at the international
level; goods markets under PTM, government bond, and labour markets clear at national
levels. A complete list of all equilibrium conditions under both LOOP and PTM is given
in Appendix 2.B.
The following definition of the terms of trade will be useful for the rest of the analysis.
The terms of trade indicate how much of exports the economy has to give for one unit of
imports,
5For derivations, see Appendix 2.A.4.
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zt =
PFt
PHt
(LOOP )
=
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
FDt
Et
P ∗Ft
PHt
, (2.40)
where the second equality sign holds under the law of one price. In this case of complete
pass-through only, exchange rate and tax adjustments translate directly into changes
of the terms of trade. The formula shows that under LOOP an increase of H’s VAT
relative to F ’s has the same effect on zt as a nominal devaluation. The term FDt =
(1− τ v∗t )/(1− τ vt ) will, therefore, also be referred to as the fiscal devaluation factor.
In case of pricing-to-market, the pass-through of the exchange rate and taxes on the
terms of trade is limited by their effect on PFt and PHt. The price setting conditions
(2.23) and (2.26) make clear that the tax rates can have the same effect on import prices
as the nominal exchange rate. The speed of pass-through depends on the degree of price
stickiness, with the law of one price and, so, the second part of (2.40) only holding in the
long-run. The short-run efficacy of fiscal devaluation policies to affect the terms of trade
will, therefore, be higher under LOOP than under PTM.
2.3 The Ramsey Problem
Optimal monetary and fiscal policy is determined using a Ramsey approach. This proce-
dure involves finding the sequences of the available policy instruments that support the
welfare-maximizing competitive equilibrium. All policy authorities can credibly commit
to their announced policies, and I assume full cooperation between all entities. The ob-
jective of the Ramsey planner is a utilitarian world welfare function that weights utility
of core and periphery households according to their population size:
W0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
n
(
ζct
C1−σt
1− σ −
N1+ηt
1 + η
)
+ (1− n)
(
ζc∗t
C∗1−σt
1− σ −
N∗1+ηt
1 + η
)}
. (2.41)
If prices were flexible, the optimal policy problem could be described by maximizing
(2.41) subject to one implementability and one resource constraint for each country only.
Using this so-called primal approach to the Ramsey problem, proposed by Lucas and
Stokey (1983) also in the context of optimal stabilization policy, the planner directly
chooses an equilibrium allocation, from which prices and instruments can be backed out
afterwards. In presence of a sticky price friction, this reduction of the problem to just
two constraints per country is generally not possible anymore, as the Phillips curves now
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effectively constrain the evolution of prices.6 The dual approach to the Ramsey problem,
which involves choosing prices and instruments directly, has to be used instead.
In the following analysis, I compare optimal policy under various scenarios to assess
the consequences of being in a monetary union. The scenarios differ by the type of
price setting (LOOP vs. PTM) and by the availability of different policy instruments:
flexible exchange rates vs. monetary union, and monetary and fiscal policy vs. monetary
policy only. In all of these scenarios, the dual solution to the policy problem is found by
maximizing (2.41) subject to the relevant equilibrium conditions, described in Appendix
2.B. If fiscal policy is an instrument to the Ramsey planner, the time path of the VAT
rates, {τ vt , τ v∗t }∞t=0, has to ensure solvency of the fiscal authorities in both countries. To
this end, the problem is augmented with the intertemporal fiscal budget constraints of
both countries. As an example, I describe the solution to the Ramsey problem by means
of its first-order conditions for the case of a monetary union, where the law of one price
holds, with fiscal policy in detail in Appendix 2.C.7
2.4 Calibration
I calibrate the model to characteristics of the euro area using quarterly data between
2001:1 and 2014:4 from Eurostat. In the calibration, the core (region H) comprises Aus-
tria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Slovakia. The periphery
(region F ) consists of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. This leads to a popu-
lation share of the core of 60%; hence, n = 0.6. In total, these 12 countries cover 98% of
euro area GDP in 2014.
The discount factor β is set to 0.99, which is the standard value in the business-cycle
literature for quarterly data, implying an annual real interest rate of about 4% in steady
state. Risk aversion and the inverse Frisch elasticity are both set equal to 2, also following
conventions of the literature. A mild home bias in demand preferences of 20% exists in
both countries, yielding γH = 1.2n = 0.72 and γ
∗
F = 1.2(1 − n) = 0.48. Following
estimates by Feenstra, Luck, Obstfeld and Russ (2014), I set the Armington elasticity
between goods of different origin to ξ = 1.2. Initial international private debt in steady
state is set to match the average trade balance surplus relative to GDP of the core of 2%
between 2001 and 2014.
The elasticities of substitution between individual goods varieties, ρ and ρ∗, are set
6The work of, for instance, Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004), and Faia and Monacelli (2004) is also
subject to this issue.
7Solutions to all other scenarios are available on request.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Parameter Core Periphery
Size of region n = 0.6 (1− n) = 0.4
Discount factor β = 0.99
Risk aversion σ = 2
Inverse Frisch elasticity η = 2
Home bias γH = 0.72 γ
∗
F = 0.48
Armington elasticity (Home-Foreign goods) ξ = 1.2
Elasticity of substitution between varieties ρ = 6 ρ∗ = 4
Labor input elasticity of production α = 1
1 – Probability of price adjustment θ = 0.75 θ∗ = 0.75
Gov. spending ratio to GDP in steady state G/Y = 0.21 G∗/Y ∗ = 0.19
Annual gov. debt to GDP ratio in steady state B/Y = 0.78 B∗/Y ∗ = 1.08
to match aggregate mark-ups. Høj, Jimenez, Maher, Nicoletti and Wise (2007) provide
estimates for several OECD countries that suggest a mark-up of 1.2 in the core and 1.3 in
the periphery, which implies ρ = 6 and ρ∗ = 4. The labour input elasticity of production
is set to one, which implies that the production technology is linear in labour. Following
empirical evidence by ECB (2005), the probability of price stickiness is set to θ, θ∗ = 0.75
so that price contracts last on average 4 quarters.8 Cross-country evidence by Druant,
Fabiani, Kezdi, Lamo, Martins and Sabbatini (2012) confirms that the frequency of price
adjustments is similar across core and periphery countries.
The ratio of government spending to GDP in steady state (G/Y ) is set to the average
values between 2001 and 2014, which are 21% for the core and 19% for the periphery. The
government debt to GDP ratio in annualized steady state (B/Y ) matches the 2010-2014
average debt-to-GDP-ratios of the core (78%) and the periphery (108%). This calibration
requires a steady state primary surplus relative to quarterly GDP of 3.1% in the core and
of 4.3% in the periphery. Balanced public budgets imply steady state VAT rates of 24.6%
and 22.6%, respectively. Table 2.1 summarizes all parameter values.
The evolution of the economy outside steady state is driven by region-specific stochas-
tic processes for productivity At and government spending Gt, the demand preference
shocks ζct , and the mark-up shocks µt in both countries. All but the mark-up shocks are
modelled as AR(1)-processes, while the latter are assumed to be white noise.9 Persis-
8The average time until a firm gets a chance to adjust its price is given by 1/ (1− θ), as Calvo-type
price stickiness implies a Poisson process, where time until next adjustment is an exponentially-distributed
random variable.
9Allowing the mark-up shock to follow an AR(1)-process as well yields persistence parameters of
(µt, µ
∗
t ) close to zero and does not affect the moments of the other processes significantly, which is in line
with results of Smets and Wouters (2003).
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Table 2.2: Shock Processes
Parameter Core Periphery
Persistence of productivity shocks (ϕA, ϕA∗) 0.9301 0.9434
Persistence of demand preference shocks (ϕC , ϕC∗) 0.8135 0.8990
Persistence of government spending shocks (ϕG, ϕG∗) 0.7731 0.6439
Std. dev. of productivity shocks (σA, σA∗) 0.0034 0.0032
Std. dev. of demand preference shocks (σC , σC∗) 0.0139 0.0209
Std. dev. of government spending shocks (σG, σG∗) 0.0071 0.0194
Std. dev. of mark-up shocks (σµ, σµ∗) 0.0057 0.0140
Notes: Parameters calibrated to match autocorrelations and standard deviations of GDP, government
spending, private consumption, and wage data between 2001:1 and 2014:4.
tence and Variance of the shocks are calibrated to match autocorrelations and standard
deviations of seasonally adjusted and quadratically detrended data on GDP, government
spending, private consumption, and average wage rates of the core and periphery between
2001:1 and 2014:4. The resulting parameters are given in Table 2.2. Details on the used
data, including the target moments, are shown in Appendix 2.D.
2.5 Results
The solution to the Ramsey problem, calibrated to the euro area, is assessed quantitatively
next. Section 2.5.1 provides a brief description of the steady state. Section 2.5.2 analyses
to what extent optimal fiscal policy reduces the welfare costs of giving up flexible exchange
rates within the European Monetary Union. The conduct and mechanisms of optimal
policy are subsequently described in Section 2.5.3.
2.5.1 The Allocation in Steady State
Gross inflation rates in all sectors, domestic goods and imports, are equal to one in the
Ramsey-optimal steady state, since price dispersion that would arise otherwise impairs an
efficient bundling of individual goods. Given this result, optimal price setting of domestic
firms in steady state when the LOOP holds is described by
ρ
ρ− 1
1
(1− τ v)MCH = PH , (2.42)
while under PTM the following condition for export prices additionally holds:
ρ
ρ− 1
1
(1− τ v∗)
1
E
MCH = P
∗
H . (2.43)
26 CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL POLICY IN A MONETARY UNION
Combining (2.42) and (2.43) immediately yields the law of one price (2.20). Hence, there
are no long-run deviations from the law of one price, which would distort the composition
of consumption between domestic and imported goods.
Also visible from (2.42) and (2.43), the distortions that render the long-run allocation
different from its first-best level are the reduction in activity due to monopolistic compe-
tition and the necessity to use distortionary taxation to finance public expenditures. As
taxes have to be positive in steady state, they cannot be used for mark-up elimination.
Instead, taxes exacerbate the wedge driven by the mark-up between prices and marginal
costs. The steady state is, therefore, in general not efficient.
2.5.2 The Welfare Costs of Giving up Exchange Rate Flexibility
The welfare comparison of the various policy scenarios is discussed next. The welfare
measure used to assess the scenarios is units of steady state consumption that households
are willing to give up in order to live in the deterministic steady state economy instead
of a stochastic economy—that is a percentage amount of steady state consumption ωEI
satisfying
1
1− β
{
n
([
C
(
1 + ωEI
)]1−σ
1− σ −
N1+η
1 + η
)
+ (1− n)
([
C∗
(
1 + ωEI
)]1−σ
1− σ −
N∗1+η
1 + η
)}
!
= WE,I0 ,
where WE,I0 is the expected net present value of aggregate welfare as defined by (2.41) for
a given exchange rate regime E ∈ {MU,FLEX} and a given set of policy instruments I ∈
{MP,MFP}. To evaluate welfare, the model is solved by a second-order approximation
to the policy functions and simulated for T = 1000 periods.10 I average the welfare
measure over J = 100 simulations with different stochastic seeds to obtain ergodic means.
Results are given in Table 2.3. The evaluated scenarios differ along 3 dimensions. A
first distinction is made in terms of the pricing scheme, law of one price or pricing-to-
market. Second, the two columns, headed MU and FLEX, indicate whether the exchange
rate regime is a monetary union or flexible. Third, rows mark if only monetary policy is
available for stabilization purposes (abbreviated by MP) or if both monetary and fiscal
policy can be used (MFP). To allow for comparisons between these scenarios, the un-
derlying steady state is calibrated to be identical across all 8 scenarios. This implies for
10I use the Dynare toolbox to solve the model. The second-order simulations are obtained using the
pruning algorithm proposed by Kim, Kim, Schaumburg and Sims (2008).
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the MP scenarios that VAT rates in steady state have to be set on the optimal values
obtained under MFP.
Table 2.3: Welfare Costs of Fixed Exchange Rates
(A) Benchmark
LOOP MU FLEX Difference
Monetary Policy (MP) 10−2 ∗ -5.1612 -4.5269 0.6343
Monetary+Fiscal Policy (MFP) 10−2 ∗ -4.4485 -4.3582 0.0903
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 85.76%
PTM
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -5.1593 -5.0605 0.0988
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -4.9095 -4.8785 0.0310
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 68.66%
(B) Productivity, Preference, Gov. Spending Shocks
LOOP
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -4.1227 -3.6759 0.4468
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -3.7696 -3.6983 0.0713
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 84.03%
PTM
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -4.1212 -4.0689 0.0523
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -4.0826 -4.0593 0.0233
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 55.42%
(C) Mark-up Shocks
LOOP
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -0.9617 -0.7742 0.1875
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -0.6064 -0.5868 0.0194
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 89.58%
PTM
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -0.9613 -0.9148 0.0465
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -0.7505 -0.7428 0.0077
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 83.43%
Notes: Welfare measure: consumption equivalents between deterministic and stochastic world economy.
Exchange rate regime either monetary union (MU) or flexible (FLEX). Panel (A): productivity, demand
preference, government spending, & mark-up shocks in both countries. Panel (B): all but mark-up shocks.
Panel (C): mark-up shocks only. Second-order approximation to policy functions. T = 1000, J = 100.
As is well-known, absolute numbers calculated for the welfare costs of business cycles
are in general small in representative agent models.11 The focus of this analysis, yet, lies
on the comparison across different scenarios, which yields significant outcomes. Results for
the benchmark calibration are given in Panel (A) of the table. Under LOOP and exclusive
11An exemption is the analysis of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2016), which relies on downward nominal
wage rigidity.
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availability of monetary policy, households are willing to give up ωMUMP = 5.16 ∗ 10−2% of
steady state consumption (hereafter c%) to avoid living in the stochastic economy of a
monetary union and ωFLEXMP = 4.53 ∗ 10−2c% with flexible exchange rates. The difference
between these two numbers, ∆ωMP = ω
MU
MP − ωFLEXMP = 0.63 ∗ 10−2c%, given in the
last column, shows the welfare costs of giving up exchange rate flexibility in a monetary
union. Allowing for the VAT rates of both countries as a stabilization tool reveals that
fiscal policy is almost irrelevant under flexible exchange rates—welfare costs are reduced
from ωMUMFP = 4.45 ∗ 10−2c% to ωFLEXMFP = 4.36 ∗ 10−2c%. By contrast, fiscal policy is an
effective instrument in a monetary union: welfare costs of entering a MU are reduced by
85.76% from ∆ωMP = 0.63 ∗ 10−2c% to ∆ωMFP = 0.09 ∗ 10−2c%.
Engel (2011) shows that optimal exchange rate volatility is lower in presence of pricing-
to-market since in this case exchange rate movements do not directly translate into changes
of international relative prices as they would under the LOOP. Instead, exchange rate
changes merely distort price mark-ups of firms, thereby leading to inefficient deviations
from the law of one price.12 Welfare costs of fixed exchange rate regimes are, therefore,
strictly lower with PTM than under LOOP, a point also raised by Corsetti (2008). Ad-
ditionally, as shown in Section 2.2, fiscal policy can potentially be much more effective
in manipulating the terms of trade when the LOOP holds due to the assumption of full
pass-through than under PTM. To take into account the effect of the pricing scheme on
the welfare costs of exchange rate pegs on the one hand, and to avoid an overestimation
of the beneficial effect of fiscal policy because of full pass-through on the other hand,
the reduction of welfare costs is studied next for the case of PTM. The welfare costs of
entering a MU are now about ∆ωMP = 0.099∗10−2c% under monetary policy only, which
is about 6.4 times smaller than when the law of one price holds. Adding fiscal policy to
the set of instruments also helps to reduce welfare costs considerably by 68.66%. Hence,
even under PTM, fiscal policy is capable of reducing the welfare costs of fixed exchange
rates substantially.
The two bottom panels, (B) and (C), of Table 2.3 decompose the shocks into those,
for which the efficient response is attainable by the use of monetary policy only when
the law of one price holds and exchange rates are fully flexible (productivity, demand
preferences, and government spending shocks), and the mark-up shocks, which cannot be
fully stabilized. While the size of the welfare costs in the various cases naturally depends
on the type and number of shocks considered, the percentage reduction of the welfare
12Under very specific conditions, it can even be optimal to completely stabilize the nominal exchange
rate in presence of PTM, as shown by Devereux and Engel (2003). Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) emphasize
that this extreme result holds only under a restrictive set of assumptions. Among these are one period
in advance price stickiness and the absence of home bias.
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costs of the fixed exchange rate regime is of comparable magnitude as in the benchmark
(Panel A). Under the law of one price, using the tax instruments for stabilization policy
purposes reduces the welfare costs of the monetary union by 84% in Panel (B) and by
almost 90% in presence of the mark-up shocks. Under pricing-to-market, the reduction
in welfare costs depends to a larger extent on the type of shock. Allowing for active fiscal
policy reduces welfare costs by 55.42% in Panel (B) and by 83.43% in Panel (C). The
cause for the effective stabilization of mark-up shocks can directly be understood from
the firms’ first-order conditions (2.21) to (2.23). The VAT rates can directly offset the
effect of the mark-up shocks µt on the firms’ price setting.
Various sensitivity checks confirm that the results of Table 2.3 are very robust to
changes in the parametrization of the model. Table 2.7 in Appendix 2.E provides results,
where standard deviations of all shocks are doubled compared to the benchmark calibra-
tion. Increasing the shock size naturally raises the shares of steady state consumption
that households are willing to give up to avoid living in the stochastic economy. The
percentage reduction of the welfare costs of fixed exchange rates by using fiscal policy,
however, remains virtually the same. Optimal exchange rate volatility and the costs of
pegs also depend on the structural parameters of the model. For instance, Lombardo and
Ravenna (2014) and Faia and Monacelli (2008) emphasize the role of trade openness for
the exchange rate, while De Paoli (2009) analyses the impact of the Armington elastic-
ity. Results in Table 2.8 show that the findings of this section regarding the reduction of
welfare costs are qualitatively fully maintained for changes in all structural parameters as
well as the amount of government spending and debt.
Instead of VAT rates, policymakers could in principle also use payroll taxes as the fiscal
instrument to substitute for the effect of the exchange rate.13 A change in the labour tax
implies that the prices of all goods produced within a country are affected equally, while
changes of the domestic VAT alter only prices of goods sold at home, but not of exports.
To analyse whether these differences influence the capability of fiscal policy to reduce the
welfare costs of a fixed exchange rate regime, I repeat the welfare analysis of Table 2.3
with a payroll tax in each country levied on firms instead of a VAT.
Table 2.9 in Appendix 2.E presents the results of that exercise. To ensure compara-
bility, I use the same calibration as before. Most importantly, the reduction of welfare
costs by the additional use of fiscal policy remains to be high with payroll taxes. Under
13If a payroll tax τnt is levied on the employers, profits of firm k become
Πt(k) = (1− τvt )PHt(k) [nCHt(k, h) +Gt(k)] + (1− τv∗t )EtP ∗Ht(k)C∗Ht(k, h)− (1 + τnt )WtNt(k).
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the benchmark calibration, welfare costs of a peg can be reduced by about 60% under the
LOOP and by 80% under PTM. The relatively smaller reduction of welfare costs under
the LOOP is driven by the low reduction for productivity, demand preference, and govern-
ment spending shocks in Panel (B) of 41% only compared to 84% with VATs. The main
reason for these different results is that, in opposition to VATs, payroll tax changes do
not directly pass through on the terms of trade via the law of one price (recap equations
2.20 and 2.40). In case of mark-up shocks, on the other hand, the welfare costs of fixed
exchange rates can be avoided almost completely—by 99% under LOOP and 97% under
PTM. A change in the domestic payroll tax suffices to neutralize the effect of a domestic
mark-up shock, while with VATs the rates of both countries would have to adjust for
stabilization of the shock along all relevant margins.
In sum, these results suggest that optimal use of only one fiscal instrument per country
could substantially reduce welfare costs in the euro area that arise from the fixed exchange
rate regime.
2.5.3 Optimal Fiscal Substitutes for the Exchange Rate
This section describes the conduct of optimal policy and shows how taxes should be used
to substitute for the nominal exchange rate inside the euro area. Optimal fiscal policy
in the monetary union depicts a fiscal devaluation policy: in case it would be optimal to
devalue the exchange rate of a region, it is optimal to increase its VAT relative to the
other region of the monetary union.
Dynamic Response to a Productivity Shock
To gain intuition for the findings of the welfare analysis, Figure 2.1 compares the impulse
response to a 1% productivity shock in the core under LOOP in the monetary union (solid
lines) with the counterfactual response under flexible exchange rates (dashed diamond
lines). As shown by Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010), the latter case constitutes the
benchmark of ”divine coincidence” in open economies, where stabilizing PPI inflation by
monetary policy in both regions is sufficient to obtain the efficient allocation in presence
of the shock.
The increase of productivity implies that it is efficient to produce a larger share of
world output in the core. Yt increases strongly, while Y
∗
t declines on impact (Panel 1).
To induce the required expenditure-switching towards core goods, the terms of trade of
the core have to deteriorate (i.e. zt has to increase). According to (2.40), this can be
achieved by changes of the PPIs (PHt,P
∗
Ft), by nominal or by fiscal devaluation. As long
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Figure 2.1: Productivity Shock in Core, LOOP
Notes: Comparison of impulse responses to 1% productivity shock in the core under the law of one
price. Solid lines: monetary union. Dashed diamond lines: flexible exchange rate. Blue lines: core.
Red lines: periphery. Unit of y-axis is % deviation from steady state (p.p. deviation in Panels 3 & 6).
X-axis indicates quarters after impulse.
as exchange rates are flexible (dashed diamond lines), this shift in the terms of trade
is generated by the nominal exchange rate due to its feature of immediate pass-through
under LOOP (see Panel 8), while PPI inflation rates are kept constant to avoid welfare-
reducing price dispersion among goods (Panel 4). The adjustment of the exchange rate
leads to strong effects on the prices of imports (Panel 5). As imports behave as under
flexible prices, inflation in that sector does not have to be minimized to avoid welfare
losses. The VAT rates are basically unused under flexible Et (Panels 6 and 9) since the
efficient response to the shock can in this case be brought about by monetary policy alone.
These dynamics change altogether in the monetary union (solid lines). Monetary
policy on its own is not able to reach the efficient response any more. The reaction of the
nominal interest rate is now in between the responses of core and periphery under flexible
exchange rates, which implies a rate too low for the periphery and rate too high for the
core (Panel 3). As a consequence, deviations of PPI inflation from steady state are now
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slightly larger than under exchange rate flexibility. The reaction is somewhat stronger
in the periphery due to its relatively lower weight in the welfare function of the Ramsey
planner. Even though Et is now fixed, the efficient response of the terms of trade can again
be reached (the brown solid and dashed lines in Panel 8 cover up each other perfectly).
The way the reaction of the terms of trade is induced is completely different, though. The
VAT rates are now used actively to substitute for the effect of Et on the terms of trade.
Panel 9 shows that the response of the fiscal devaluation factor, FDt, in the monetary
union is very close to the counterfactual flexible exchange rate response. On impact, 93%
of the response of zt in the monetary union are due to a fiscal devaluation policy. Only the
remaining 7% are due to changes in PPIs. To implement the fiscal devaluation, the VAT
of the core increases, while the VAT of the periphery decreases. Besides its effect on the
terms of trade, these tax responses at the same time help to stabilize firm mark-ups. The
increase of τ vt supports monetary policy in fighting back deflationary pressures in the core
that arise from the increased productivity, while the decrease of τ v∗t reduces inflationary
pressures in the periphery, which are the result of the relatively loose monetary policy for
that region.
Under the free floating regime, the real exchange rate qt depreciates because the deval-
uation of the core’s currency dominates the relative increase of the core’s CPI (Panel 7).
In the monetary union, the real exchange rate appreciates instead. The fiscal devaluation
also increases the CPI of the core relative to the periphery by making core imports more
expensive, but the relative currency value between the regions now remains fixed. As a
result, in case of the monetary union consumption in the periphery increases by more
than in the core due to international risk sharing (Panel 2).
Taken together, the optimal fiscal devaluation policy focusses on replicating the be-
haviour of the terms of trade under flexible exchange rates to induce exenditure switching
effects, but it does not reproduce the response of the real exchange rate that affects lev-
els of consumption via the international risk sharing condition (2.15). The policymaker
thereby favours production efficiency over an efficient allocation of aggregate consumption
in the monetary union. Adressing the latter would require an additional instrument to
affect the real exchange rate. Farhi et al. (2014) show that a consumption subsidy payable
to households could succeed to that task. They also prove that a complete replication
of the allocation under flexible exchange rates lacks even further instruments. A payroll
subsidy to firms would be needed to stabilize internal prices of domestically produced
goods, which are distorted by the VAT, while a labour income tax levied household would
be required to neutralize distortions by the consumption subsidy on wages.14
14Depending on the specific model setting, still more instruments may be required. See also Adao et
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Figure 2.2: Productivity Shock in Core, PTM
Notes: Comparison of impulse responses to 1% productivity shock in the core under pricing-to-market.
Solid lines: monetary union. Dashed diamond lines: flexible exchange rate. Blue lines: core. Red
lines: periphery. Unit of y-axis is % deviation from steady state (p.p. deviation in Panels 3 & 6).
X-axis indicates quarters after impulse.
Figure 2.2 compares impulse responses of the monetary union with the flexible ex-
change rate scenario for the case of pricing-to-market. Engel (2011) shows for the case
of flexible exchange rates and PTM that CPI inflation (as the weighted average of PPI
and import price inflation) instead of PPI inflation only ought to be stabilized, since the
import sector is now also subject to a sticky price friction. However, avoiding inflation
and closing output gaps is not sufficient to obtain the efficient allocation, because devi-
ations of the terms of trade from their efficient level and deviations from the law of one
price can still occur. These wrong price signals translate into inefficient shifts in the level
and composition of consumption between the regions. Accordingly, in opposition to the
LOOP case, the response to the productivity shock under flexible exchange rates and
PTM does not reach the efficient allocation.
al. (2009) on that point.
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Beginning the description with the case of flexible exchange rates again (dashed di-
amond lines), PPI inflation is more pronounced under PTM, but import inflation is de-
cisively weaker, leading to a terms of trade deterioration which falls short of its efficient
response. Under PTM, zt rises by 0.36% in the first quarter, while the efficient response
under the LOOP renders 1%. Expenditure switching from periphery to core is, therefore,
not sufficient. The reason for the dampened reaction of the terms of trade is that exchange
rate pass-through on international prices is now limited by the sticky price friction in the
import sector, visible in the low co-movement between zt and Et (Panel 8). Policymakers
generate a weaker devaluation of the nominal exchange rate under PTM (0.7% on impact)
than under LOOP (1.1% on impact), for they now have to trade off the costs of additional
import price dispersion against the benefits of deteriorated terms of trade due to higher
import prices PFt. Taxes have a comparable effect on prices as monetary policy (confer
equations 2.22 and 2.26 for the perspective of the core). Increasing the domestic VAT,
τ vt , dampens the deflationary pressure on the core’s PPI, but incentivizes higher import
prices also. As long as exchange rate flexibility is given, taxes are used only to a limited
extent for stabilization purposes.
In the monetary union (solid lines), the response of the terms of trade under flexible
exchange rates can again be replicated entirely by fiscal policy. The VAT rates are used
to induce the same price setting behaviour as the flexible exchange rate would. Relative
VAT rates, i.e. the fiscal devaluation factor, are highly correlated with the counterfactual
exchange rate (Panel 9), in order to shift relative prices and to reduce deviations from
the law of one price. On impact, FDt even overshoots the response of Et by 7%. The
pass-through of these tax changes on prices and the terms of trade remains, however,
limited again.
Fiscal policy in the monetary union is successful in replicating the path of the terms
of trade under flexible exchange rates, but again the fiscal devaluation policy does not
keep track of the respective real exchange rate path. Since CPIs are implicitly stabilized
under PTM, qt barely moves in the monetary union (Panel 7), leading to almost perfectly
correlated reactions of consumption in the core and periphery because of international
risk sharing. Under flexible exchange rates instead, the real exchange rate follows the
depreciation of Et closely. Consumption in the core, hence, increases by more than in the
periphery in this case.
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Business-Cycle Properties of the Ramsey Allocations
In this section, I show to what extent the findings and intuitions obtained under the
productivity shock generalize to the other shocks as well. To do so, I analyse second
moments of key variables, generated from simulated business cycle data.
Table 2.4 presents correlations between the counterfactual flexible exchange rate and
various tax measures in the monetary union for both types of price setting and different
types of shocks. Correlations are calculated with the fiscal devaluation factor, FDt, and
with the tax rates in levels, τ vt and τ
v∗
t .
Table 2.4: Correlations between Exchange Rates and Taxes
LOOP Benchmark No Mark-up Shocks Mark-up, Core Mark-up, Periphery
Corr(Et, FDt) 0.81 0.89 0.52 0.52
Corr(Et, τ
v
t ) 0.03 0.81 0.43 -0.49
Corr(Et, τ
v∗
t ) -0.41 -0.91 0.40 -0.50
PTM
Corr(Et, FDt) 0.59 0.89 0.86 0.65
Corr(Et, τ
v
t ) 0.11 0.88 0.90 -0.73
Corr(Et, τ
v∗
t ) -0.31 -0.86 0.93 -0.69
Notes: Correlations between tax measures obtained in monetary union scenario and counterfactual flex-
ible exchange rate. Columns indicate shock processes used for simulation: ’Benchmark’ includes pro-
ductivity, demand preference, government spending, & mark-up shocks in both countries. ’No Mark-up’
includes all but mark-up shocks. Last two columns include mark-up shocks in the respective region only.
Second-order approximation to policy functions. T = 1000, J = 100.
The correlation between FDt and Et is generally found to be high. In the benchmark
scenario with all shocks, it reads 81% when the LOOP holds and 59% under PTM. It is
even higher at 89% for both pricing schemes when looking at the productivity, demand
preference, and government spending shocks, and it ranges between 52% and 86% for the
mark-up shocks. These results indicate that the policymaker actively uses fiscal policy to
replicate the path of the terms of trade in absence of a flexible exchange rate.
The results regarding tax rates in levels do not allow for general conclusions in the
benchmark scenario, both under the LOOP and PTM.15 A more detailed inspection re-
veals that the correlations—and, hence, the exact conduct of tax policy—depend deci-
sively on the type of shocks. With the productivity, demand preference, and government
spending shocks, the correlations with taxes under the LOOP (PTM) read 81% (88%)
and -91% (-86%), respectively. Whenever it were optimal to devalue the exchange rate
of a region in the monetary union, its VAT ought to be increased, while the tax of the
15The asymmetry between the correlations of τvt and τ
v∗
t is mainly driven by the different shock sizes
in core and periphery.
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other (re-valuing) region should decrease. Fiscal devaluation policies as outlined in the
introduction can accordingly be observed, independent of the type of price setting.
Under mark-up shocks, the tax responses additionally depend on the origin of the
shock. The VAT rates of both regions are now positively correlated with the exchange
rate of that region which experiences a mark-up shock.16 In response to a positive mark-up
shock, e.g., in the core, it is efficient to shift production to the periphery, which requires
an appreciated exchange rate (i.e. a decline of Et) for the core. The optimal response
in a monetary union is to decrease taxes in both regions. Under the LOOP, this policy
attenuates the higher mark-up in the core and fosters the expenditure-switch by reducing
prices for periphery goods, while still taking heed of solvency of the fiscal authority. In
order to achieve a decline of FDt nevertheless, the VAT of the periphery should decline
by less than its core counterpart. Under PTM, it is clear from (2.23) that a rise in τ v∗t
aimed at replicating the decline in Et, would even exacerbate the mark-up distortion for
the periphery’s import goods. τ v∗t , therefore, also declines instead, which explains the
positive correlation of τ v∗t with Et.
Altogether, policymakers in the monetary union always adjust the ratio of tax rates
between the regions to induce relative price shifts in a similar fashion as the exchange
rate would. The behaviour of tax rates in levels and their correlation with the exchange
rate crucially depends on the type of shocks.
Table 2.5 compares standard deviations of international relative prices and of taxes in
the monetary union and the flexible exchange rate regime, for both types of price setting
and different shock compositions. The following observations stand out.
In all scenarios, standard deviations of the terms of trade, zt, in the monetary union
are found to be close to their counterpart under flexible exchange rates, e.g. 1.69% versus
1.68% in the benchmark with LOOP. The volatility of real exchange rates, instead, differs
markedly between MU and FLEX. This indicates a generalization of the finding, obtained
from the productivity shock, that optimal fiscal devaluation policies focus on replicating
the time path of the terms of trade, but not of the real exchange rate.
Confirming Engel’s (2011) result, nominal exchange rate volatility is in all panels found
to be lower under PTM than under the LOOP, at least by a factor of two.
Also in line with the results obtained from the analysis of the productivity shock,
volatilities of the fiscal devaluation factor are smaller under flexible exchange rates than
in the monetary union in all scenarios. In the benchmark (Panel A), the volatility increases
from 0.26% to 1.19% when the LOOP holds and from 1.33% to 1.67% under PTM. The
16Note that Et denotes the exchange rate from the perspective of the core. Correlations are, therefore,
negative for a mark-up shock in the periphery.
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Table 2.5: Standard Deviations over the Business-Cycle
(A) Benchmark
LOOP qt zt Et FDt τ
v
t τ
v∗
t
Monetary Union (MU) 0.89 1.69 1.19 1.46 1.73
Flexible Exchange Rate (FLEX) 0.49 1.68 1.84 0.26 1.52 1.53
PTM
Monetary Union 0.11 1.29 1.67 1.43 1.95
Flexible Exchange Rate 0.69 1.27 0.81 1.33 1.43 1.87
(B) Productivity, Preference, Gov. Spending Shocks
LOOP
Monetary Union 0.75 1.44 1.00 0.32 0.46
Flexible Exchange Rate 0.46 1.42 1.58 0.17 0.11 0.09
PTM
Monetary Union 0.10 1.21 0.56 0.26 0.17
Flexible Exchange Rate 0.63 1.19 0.77 0.15 0.09 0.13
(C) Mark-up Shocks
LOOP
Monetary Union 0.47 0.87 0.64 1.43 1.67
Flexible Exchange Rate 0.14 0.88 0.89 0.19 1.52 1.53
PTM
Monetary Union 0.03 0.39 1.57 1.41 1.94
Flexible Exchange Rate 0.28 0.39 0.39 1.33 1.42 1.86
Notes: Standard deviations are measured in percentage points. Exchange rate regime either monetary
union (MU) or flexible (FLEX). Panel (A): productivity, demand preference, government spending, &
mark-up shocks in both countries. Panel (B): all but mark-up shocks. Panel (C): mark-up shocks only.
Second-order approximation to policy functions. T = 1000, J = 100.
volatility of the tax rates itself is found to be of similar size in the MU as well as the
FLEX scenario in Panel (A). The decomposition into the different shock types in Panel
(B) and (C) reveals that this is primarily driven by the mark-up shocks, for the latter
require an active fiscal policy response even under flexible exchange rates. In case of
the productivity, demand preference, and government spending shocks, the intuition,
obtained from the impulse responses, is restored that taxes are used only mildly under
flexible exchange rates, but intensely in the monetary union.
The volatility of tax rates is of the same order of magnitude as the volatility of Et. In
the benchmark of panel (A), this implies that taxes on average do not have to fluctuate
more than about 2 percentage points for an optimal policy response to the business cycle—
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thereby rendering fiscal devaluations as a practically implementable policy option.17
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter analyses to what extent fiscal policy can compensate for the absence of nomi-
nal exchange rate adjustment in a monetary union in terms of business cycle stabilization.
Various Ramsey-optimal policy scenarios are studied in a New Keynesian 2-region model,
calibrated to the euro area, that differ regarding the exchange rate regime and the avail-
ability of fiscal policy for stabilization purposes. Optimal use of only one tax instrument
per country enables policymakers to reduce the welfare costs of giving up flexible exchange
rates in a monetary union by up to 86% when the law of one price holds for traded goods,
and up to 69% when different prices can be set for the regions. Fiscal devaluations arise as
an outcome of optimal fiscal policy. Whenever a nominal exchange rate devaluation were
optimal for a region, a relative increase of the region’s VAT is the optimal fiscal policy in
the monetary union. In particular in case of mark-up shocks, policymakers face a trade-off
between replicating the effects of the nominal exchange rate and stabilizing firms’ costs,
however. Optimal fiscal policy in the monetary union focusses on the reproduction of the
flexible exchange rate path of the terms of trade, but not of the real exchange rate. The
policymaker thereby favours production efficiency over an efficient allocation of aggregate
consumption in the monetary union.
A practical challenge is that fiscal policy, as considered in the model, requires tax
changes at a business cycle frequency, whose implementation surely poses political econ-
omy issues. However, first steps in direction of a unified VAT framework for all member
states of the European Union are already taken that will facilitate a higher degree of
coordination in fiscal policy in future.18
The analysis of optimal policy studies the relevant benchmark of full cooperation
between the central bank(s) and the fiscal authorities at the region level. It remains open
to future research to analyse the strategic interactions between these different authorities,
17Naturally, the standard deviations of both exchange rates and taxes increase with the size of the
underlying shocks. The seemingly small volatility of Et found in the simulations, nevertheless, does not
need to be entirely unrealistic. The model provides an optimal policy response that reacts to changes in
fundamentals only, compared to actual exchange rate data, which notoriously entails a sizeable amount
of unexplainable volatility. Regarding this point, see also the vast literature on the ”exchange rate
disconnect” puzzle following Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001).
18See in particular European Council Directive 2006/112/EC, which lays down a common system of
value added tax regulation for the EU. It covers aspects such as the tax base, the allowed number
of reduced tax rates besides the standard rate, and also defines which types of goods are eligible for
exemptions. It further regulates which country’s rate applies to imported goods, and even directs upper
and lower bounds for tax rates.
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e.g., in form of a dynamic Nash game.
The chapter focuses on VAT-based fiscal devaluation policies. Further research could
also study the optimality of more general fiscal devaluation policies in the sense of tax
swaps from direct to indirect taxation (e.g. an increase in the VAT, paired with a reduction
of payroll taxes of employers), which can be revenue neutral to public budgets. An analysis
of such policies is, however, impeded in the present class of models due to an indeterminacy
between consumption and income taxes. The inclusion of another, untaxed, production
factor could possibly remedy this issue.
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Appendix 2.A Derivations for Section 2.2
2.A.1 Optimal Firm Price Setting
In order to derive the conditions for optimal price setting, one first needs to derive an
aggregate demand equation Yt(k) for firm k. Consider (2.17), which can be rewritten as
Yt(k) = nCHt(k) + (1− n)C∗Ht(k) +Gt(k)
=
1
n
(
PHt(k)
PHt
)−ρ
(nCHt +Gt) +
(1− n)
n
(
P ∗Ht(k)
P ∗Ht
)−ρ
C∗Ht. (2.44)
In the first line, I integrated over households using the fact that agents within a country
behave identically. In the second line, I applied consumption demand functions (2.8) of
both households and the domestic government.
Law of One Price: Using the law of one price (2.20) and the fact that the law also
holds for price indices under the given structure, (2.44) reduces to
Yt(k) =
1
n
(
PHt(k)
PHt
)−ρ
Yt, (2.45)
where Yt = nCHt + (1− n)C∗Ht +Gt. By means of the law of one price again and (2.45),
firm profits (2.18) change to
Πt(k) = (1− τ vt )PHt(k)
1
n
(
PHt(k)
PHt
)−ρ
Yt −WtNt(k). (2.46)
The optimal price PHt(k) is then determined by maximizing the expected present
discounted value of profits subject to the production technology (2.16) and demand (2.45):
maxLLOOP
PHt(k),Ns(k)
= Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,sPHs
{[
(1− τ vs )
1
n
(
PHt (k)
PHs
)1−ρ
Ys − wsNs (k)
]
+mcHs(k)
[
AsNs (k)
α − 1
n
(
PHt (k)
PHs
)−ρ
Ys
]}
,
where wt = Wt/PHt is the producer real wage. The associated first-order conditions are:
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∂LLOOP
∂PHt (k)
= Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,s
(
PHt (k)
PHs
)−1−ρ
Ys
{
(1− τ vs ) (1− ρ)
PHt (k)
PHs
+mcHs(k)ρ
}
= 0,
∂LLOOP
∂Ns (k)
= Etθs−tQt,sPHs
[−ws +mcHs(k)αAsNs (k)α−1] = 0.
Combining the two conditions and rearranging the result yields the optimal pricing con-
dition under LOOP (2.21).
Pricing-to-Market: The price setting problem of the firm under PTM implies max-
imizing profits (2.18) subject to (2.16) and (2.44):
maxLPTM
PHt(k),P
∗
Ht(k),Ns(k)
= Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,s
{
(1− τ vs )PHt (k)
1
n
(
PHt (k)
PHs
)−ρ
[nCHs +Gs]
+ (1− τ v∗s )EsP ∗Ht (k)
1
n
(
P
∗
Ht (k)
P ∗Hs
)−ρ
(1− n)C∗Hs −WsNs (k)
+MCHs(k)
[
AsNs (k)
α − 1
n
(
PHt (k) (k)
PHs
)−ρ
[nCHs +Gs]− (1− n)
n
(
P
∗
Ht (k)
P ∗Hs
)−ρ
C∗Hs
]}
.
The associated first-order conditions are:
∂LPTM
∂PHt (k)
= Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,s
(
PHt (k)
PHs
)−1−ρ
[nCHs +Gs]
·
{
(1− τ vs )
PHt (k)
PHs
− ρ
ρ− 1
MCHs(k)
PHs
}
= 0,
∂LPTM
∂P
∗
Ht (k)
= Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,s
(
P
∗
Ht (k)
P ∗Hs
)−1−ρ
C∗Hs
·
{
(1− τ v∗s )Es
(
P
∗
Ht (k)
P ∗Hs
)
− ρ
ρ− 1
MCHs(k)
P ∗Hs
}
= 0,
∂LPTM
∂Ns (k)
= Etθs−tQt,s
[−Ws +MCHs(k)AsαNs (k)α−1] = 0.
Combining the conditions and rearranging the results yields the optimal pricing conditions
under PTM, (2.22) and (2.23).
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2.A.2 Evolution of Price Indices
Price index (2.5) can be written as
nP 1−ρHt =
∫ nθ
0
P 1−ρHt−1 (k) dk +
∫ n
nθ
P
1−ρ
Ht (k) dk
⇔ nP 1−ρHt = nθP 1−ρHt−1 + n (1− θ)P
1−ρ
Ht
⇔ 1 = θpiρ−1Ht + (1− θ)
(
PHt
PHt
)1−ρ
⇔ p˜Ht = PHt
PHt
=
(
1− θpiρ−1Ht
1− θ
) 1
1−ρ
,
which is (2.30) in the main text. Similar expressions hold for P ∗Ft and, under PTM, also
for PFt and P
∗
Ht.
2.A.3 Recursive Phillips Curves
The recursive form of a Phillips curve is derived here by way of example for the PPI of
home goods under the LOOP. The optimal pricing condition (2.21) can be written as
ρ
ρ− 1µsEt
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,s
(
PHt
PHt
)−1−ρ
YsmcHs = Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,s
(
PHt
PHt
)−ρ
Ys (1− τ vs )
ρ
ρ− 1µtX1Ht = X2Ht
with
X1Ht = Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,sYs
(
PHt
PHs
)−1−ρ
mcHs
=
(
PHt
PHt
)−1−ρ
YtmcHt + Et
∞∑
s=t+1
θs−tQt,s
(
PHt
PHs
)−1−ρ
YsmcHs
=
(
PHt
PHt
)−1−ρ
YtmcHt
+θEtQt,t+1
(
PHt
PHt+1
)−1−ρ
Et+1
∞∑
s=t+1
θs−t−1Qt+1,s
(
PHt+1
PHs
)−1−ρ
YsmcHs
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=
(
PHt
PHt
)−1−ρ
YtmcHt + θEtQt,t+1
(
PHt
PHt+1
)−1−ρ
X1Ht+1
and
X2Ht = Et
∞∑
s=t
θs−tQt,sYs
(
PHt
PHs
)−ρ
(1− τ vs )
=
(
PHt
PHt
)−ρ
Yt (1− τ vt ) + θEtQt,t+1
(
PHt
PHt+1
)−ρ
X2Ht+1.
Inserting the definition of the stochastic discount factor (2.11) and the law of motion of
the PPI (2.30) yields equation (2.32) and (2.33) in the text.
Corresponding expressions for PPIs and import price indices under PTM can be de-
rived accordingly from (2.22), (2.23), (2.25), and (2.26).
2.A.4 Aggregate Resource Constraint
To derive the aggregate resource constraints, combine production (2.16) with demand
(2.44), and integrate over firms:
AtN
α
t (k) =
1
n
(
PHt (k)
PHt
)−ρ
(nCHt +Gt) +
1
n
(
P ∗Ht (k)
P ∗Ht
)−ρ
(1− n)C∗Ht
At
∫ n
0
Nαt (k) dk =
1
n
∫ n
0
(
PHt (k)
PHt
)−ρ
dk (nCHt +Gt)
+
1
n
∫ n
0
(
P ∗Ht (k)
P ∗Ht
)−ρ
dk (1− n)C∗Ht.
As (PHt(k)/PHt) = (P
∗
Ht(k)/P
∗
Ht) if the law of one price holds, this reduces to (2.34) under
LOOP, but to (2.35) under PTM.
The law of motion for price dispersion emerges from (2.36) as follows:
∆Ht =
1
n
∫ n
0
(
PHt (k)
PHt
)−ρ
dk
=
1
n
[
n (1− θ)
(
PHt
PHt
)−ρ
+ n (1− θ) θ
(
PHt−1
PHt
)−ρ
+ . . .
]
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= (1− θ)
∞∑
j=0
θj
(
PHt−j
PHt
)−ρ
= (1− θ)
(
PHt
PHt
)−ρ
+ (1− θ)
∞∑
j=1
θj
(
PHt−j
PHt
)−ρ
= (1− θ)
(
PHt
PHt
)−ρ
+ θ
(
PHt−1
PHt
)−ρ
(1− θ)
∞∑
j=1
θj−1
(
PHt−j
PHt−1
)−ρ
= (1− θ) p˜−ρHt + θpiρHt∆Ht−1.
Appendix 2.B Competitive Equilibrium
This appendix lists equilibrium conditions for the cases of LOOP and PTM. All prices
are expressed in relative terms.
2.B.1 Law of One Price
Let pHt = PHt/Pt and p
∗
Ft = P
∗
Ft/P
∗
t be the PPI-CPI ratios, and wt = Wt/PHt and
w∗t = W
∗
t /P
∗
Ft the producer real wages. A competitive equilibrium under the LOOP and
autonomous monetary policy in both countries is a set of sequences {Ct, CHt, CFt, C∗t ,
C∗Ht, C
∗
Ft, Yt, Y
∗
t , Nt, N
∗
t , qt, pHt, p
∗
Ft, wt, w
∗
t , pit, pi
∗
t , piHt, pi
∗
Ft, ∆Ht, ∆
∗
Ft, p˜Ht, p˜
∗
Ft, X1Ht,
X2Ht, X1
∗
Ft, X2
∗
Ft}∞t=0, satisfying
• Demand for Home and Foreign goods:
CHt = γHp
−ξ
HtCt , CFt = γF
(
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗Ftqt
)−ξ
Ct
C∗Ht = γ
∗
H
(
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
qt
)−ξ
C∗t , C
∗
Ft = γ
∗
Fp
∗−ξ
F t C
∗
t
• Euler equations and international risk sharing:
1
Rt
= βEt
[
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
1
pit+1
]
1
R∗t
= βEt
[
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
1
pi∗t+1
]
qt = κ
ζc∗t
ζct
(
C∗t
Ct
)−σ
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• Labour supply:
Nηt C
σ
t = ζ
c
twtpHt
N∗ηt C
∗σ
t = ζ
c∗
t w
∗
t p
∗
Ft
• Aggregate demand:
Yt = nCHt + (1− n)C∗Ht +Gt
Y ∗t = nCFt + (1− n)C∗Ft +G∗t
• Resource constraints:
AtnN
α
t = ∆HtYt
A∗t (1− n)N∗αt = ∆∗FtY ∗t
• Phillips curves:
ρ
ρ− 1µtX1Ht = X2Ht,
X1Ht = p˜
−1−ρ
Ht Yt
wt
AtαN
α−1
t
+ θβEt
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ pi1+ρHt+1
pit+1
(
p˜Ht
p˜Ht+1
)−1−ρ
X1Ht+1
X2Ht = p˜
−ρ
HtYt (1− τ vt ) + θβEt
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ piρHt+1
pit+1
(
p˜Ht
p˜Ht+1
)−ρ
X2Ht+1
ρ∗
ρ∗ − 1µ
∗
tX1
∗
Ft = X2
∗
Ft
X1∗Ft = p˜
∗−1−ρ∗
Ft Y
∗
t
w∗t
A∗tαN
∗α−1
t
+ θ∗βEt
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ pi∗1+ρ∗Ft+1
pi∗t+1
(
p˜∗Ft
p˜∗Ft+1
)−1−ρ∗
X1∗Ft+1
X2∗Ft = p˜
∗−ρ∗
Ft Y
∗
t (1− τ v∗t ) + θ∗βEt
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ pi∗ρ∗Ft+1
pi∗t+1
(
p˜∗Ft
p˜∗Ft+1
)−ρ∗
X2∗Ft+1
• Consumer price indices:
1 = γHp
1−ξ
Ht + γF
(
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗Ftqt
)1−ξ
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1 = γ∗H
(
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
qt
)1−ξ
+ γ∗Fp
∗1−ξ
F t
• Evolution of PPIs:
p˜Ht =
(
1− θpiρ−1Ht
1− θ
) 1
1−ρ
p˜∗Ft =
(
1− θ∗ (pi∗Ft)ρ
∗−1
1− θ∗
) 1
1−ρ∗
• Evolution of price dispersion:
∆Ht = (1− θ) p˜−ρHt + θpiρHt∆Ht−1
∆∗Ft = (1− θ∗) p˜∗−ρ
∗
Ft + θ
∗ (pi∗Ft)
ρ∗ ∆∗Ft−1
• Evolution of relative prices:
pHt
pHt−1
=
piHt
pit
,
p∗Ft
p∗Ft−1
=
pi∗Ft
pi∗t
,
given the transversality conditions, sequences of the policy instruments {Rt, R∗t , τ vt , τ v∗t }∞t=0
and of the shocks {At, A∗t , µt, µ∗t , ζct , ζc∗t , Gt, G∗t}∞t=0.
If the two countries form a monetary union, the equation defining R∗t drops out.
Instead, an expression that restricts the evolution of the real exchange rate needs to be
added:
qt
qt−1
=
pi∗t
pit
.
2.B.2 Pricing-to-Market
Let pFt = PFt/Pt and p
∗
Ht = P
∗
Ht/P
∗
t be the import-price-to-CPI ratios. A competitive
equilibrium under PTM and autonomous monetary policy in both countries is a set of
sequences {Ct, CHt, CFt, C∗t , C∗Ht, C∗Ft, Nt, N∗t , qt, Et, pHt, pFt, p∗Ht, p∗Ft, wt, w∗t , pit, pi∗t ,
piHt, piFt, pi
∗
Ht, pi
∗
Ft, ∆Ht, ∆HF , ∆
∗
Ht, ∆
∗
Ft, X1Ht, X2Ht, X1Ft, X2Ft, X1
∗
Ht, X2
∗
Ht, X1
∗
Ft,
X2∗Ft}∞t=0, satisfying
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• Demand for Home and Foreign goods:
CHt = γHp
−ξ
HtCt , CFt = γFp
−ξ
F tCt
C∗Ht = γ
∗
Hp
∗−ξ
Ht C
∗
t , C
∗
Ft = γ
∗
Fp
∗−ξ
F t C
∗
t
• Euler equations and international risk sharing:
1
Rt
= βEt
[
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
1
pit+1
]
1
R∗t
= βEt
[
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ
1
pi∗t+1
]
qt = κ
ζc∗t
ζct
(
C∗t
Ct
)−σ
• Labour supply:
Nηt C
σ
t = ζ
c
twtpHt
N∗ηt C
∗σ
t = ζ
c∗
t w
∗
t p
∗
Ft
• Resource constraints:
AtnN
α
t = ∆Ht (nCHt +Gt) + ∆
∗
Ht (1− n)C∗Ht
A∗t (1− n)N∗αt = ∆∗Ft ((1− n)C∗Ft +G∗t ) + ∆FtnCFt
• Phillips curves:
ρ
ρ− 1X1Ht = X2Ht
X1Ht =
(
1− θpiρ−1Ht
1− θ
) ρ+1
ρ−1
(nCHt +Gt)
wt
AtαN
α−1
t
+θβEt
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ pi1+ρHt+1
pit+1
(
1− θpiρ−1Ht
1− θpiρ−1Ht+1
) ρ+1
ρ−1
X1Ht+1
X2Ht =
(
1− θpiρ−1Ht
1− θ
) ρ
ρ−1
(nCHt +Gt) (1− τ vt )
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+θβEt
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ piρHt+1
pit+1
(
1− θpiρ−1Ht
1− θpiρ−1Ht+1
) ρ
ρ−1
X2Ht+1
ρ
ρ− 1X1
∗
Ht = X2
∗
Ht
X1∗Ht =
(
1− θpi∗ρ−1Ht
1− θ
) ρ+1
ρ−1
C∗HtEt
pHt
qtp∗Ht
wt
AtαN
α−1
t
+θβEt
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ pi∗1+ρHt+1
pit+1
(
1− θpi∗ρ−1Ht
1− θpi∗ρ−1Ht+1
) ρ+1
ρ−1
X1∗Ht+1
X2∗Ht =
(
1− θpi∗ρ−1Ht
1− θ
) ρ
ρ−1
C∗HtEt (1− τ v∗t )
+θβEt
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ pi∗ρHt+1
pit+1
(
1− θpi∗ρ−1Ht
1− θpi∗ρ−1Ht+1
) ρ
ρ−1
X2∗Ht+1
ρ∗
ρ∗ − 1X1
∗
Ft = X2
∗
Ft
X1∗Ft =
(
1− θ∗pi∗ρ∗−1Ft
1− θ∗
) ρ∗+1
ρ∗−1
((1− n)C∗Ft +G∗t )
w∗t
A∗tαN
∗α−1
t
+θ∗βEt
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ pi∗1+ρ∗Ft+1
pi∗t+1
(
1− θ∗pi∗ρ∗−1Ft
1− θ∗pi∗ρ∗−1Ft+1
) ρ∗+1
ρ∗−1
X1∗Ft+1
X2∗Ft =
(
1− θ∗pi∗ρ∗−1Ft
1− θ∗
) ρ∗
ρ∗−1
((1− n)C∗Ft +G∗t ) (1− τ v∗t )
+θ∗βEt
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ pi∗ρ∗Ft+1
pi∗t+1
(
1− θ∗pi∗ρ∗−1Ft
1− θ∗pi∗ρ∗−1Ft+1
) ρ∗
ρ∗−1
X2∗Ft+1
ρ∗
ρ∗ − 1X1Ft = X2Ft
X1Ft =
(
1− θ∗piρ∗−1Ft
1− θ∗
) ρ∗+1
ρ∗−1
CFt
Et
qtp
∗
Ft
pFt
w∗t
A∗tαN
∗α−1
t
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+θ∗βEt
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ pi1+ρ∗Ft+1
pi∗t+1
(
1− θ∗piρ∗−1Ft
1− θ∗piρ∗−1Ft+1
) ρ∗+1
ρ∗−1
X1Ft+1
X2Ft =
(
1− θ∗piρ∗−1Ft
1− θ∗
) ρ∗
ρ∗−1
CFt
Et
(1− τ vt )
+θ∗βEt
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ piρ∗Ft+1
pi∗t+1
(
1− θ∗piρ∗−1Ft
1− θ∗piρ∗−1Ft+1
) ρ∗
ρ∗−1
X2Ft+1
• Consumer price indices:
1 = γHp
1−ξ
Ht + γFp
1−ξ
F t
1 = γ∗Hp
∗1−ξ
Ht + γ
∗
Fp
∗1−ξ
F t
• Evolution of price dispersion:
∆Ht = (1− θ)
(
1− θpiρ−1Ht
1− θ
) ρ
ρ−1
+ θpiρHt∆Ht−1
∆∗Ht = (1− θ)
(
1− θpi∗ρ−1Ht
1− θ
) ρ
ρ−1
+ θpi∗ρHt∆
∗
Ht−1
∆∗Ft = (1− θ∗)
(
1− θ∗ (pi∗Ft)ρ
∗−1
1− θ∗
) ρ∗
ρ∗−1
+ θ∗ (pi∗Ft)
ρ∗ ∆∗Ft−1
∆Ft = (1− θ∗)
(
1− θ∗ (piFt)ρ
∗−1
1− θ∗
) ρ∗
ρ∗−1
+ θ∗ (piFt)
ρ∗ ∆Ft−1
• Evolution of relative prices:
pHt
pHt−1
=
piHt
pit
,
pFt
pFt−1
=
piFt
pit
,
p∗Ht
p∗Ht−1
=
pi∗Ht
pi∗t
,
p∗Ft
p∗Ft−1
=
pi∗Ft
pi∗t
• Evolution of the real exchange rate
qt
qt−1
=
Et
Et−1
pi∗t
pit
,
given the transversality conditions, sequences of the policy instruments {Rt, R∗t , τ vt , τ v∗t }∞t=0
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and of the shocks {At, A∗t , µt, µ∗t , ζct , ζc∗t , Gt, G∗t}∞t=0, and an initial E−1 = 1. Unlike with
the LOOP, the nominal exchange rate is itself a relevant argument to the equilibrium.
If the two countries form a monetary union, the equation defining R∗t drops out, and
the nominal exchange rate is fixed, i.e. Et = 1 ∀t.
Appendix 2.C The Ramsey Problem
2.C.1 Derivation of the Intertemporal Fiscal Budget Constraint
Integrating (2.29) over h and k, and dividing by Pt yields
bt = EtQt,t+1pit+1bt+1 + st, (2.47)
where bt = Bt/Pt is real debt and the primary surplus reads
st =
1
Pt
[τ vt n (PHtCHt + PFtCFt)− (1− τ vt )PHtGt] .
Repeatedly iterating on (2.47) using successive future terms of it, beginning in period
t = 0, yields the present-value fiscal budget constraint
b0 = E0
T∑
t=0
Q0,tpi0,tst + E0Q0,T+1pi0,T+1bT+1,
where pi0,T+1 = PT+1/P0 is the product of inflation rates between t = 0 and t = T + 1.
Imposing the transversality condition
lim
T→∞
E0Q0,T+1pi0,T+1bT+1 = 0
and using the definition of Q0,t, one ends up with
ζc0C
−σ
0 b0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtζctC
−σ
t st.
2.C.2 The Lagrangian of the Ramsey Problem
The scenario under study assumes the law of one price, the availability of fiscal policy as
an instrument, and that the countries form a monetary union. The objective of the policy
planner is, hence, to find sequences
{
RMUt , τ
v
t , τ
v∗
t
}∞
t=0
.
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V = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
n
(
ζct
C1−σt
1− σ −
N1+ηt
1 + η
)
+ (1− n)
(
ζc∗t
C∗1−σt
1− σ −
N∗1+ηt
1 + η
)
+ΛHζctC
−σ
t
[
τ vt n
(
pHtCHt +
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗FtqtCFt
)
− (1− τ vt ) pHtGt
]
+ΛF ζc∗t C
∗−σ
t
[
τ v∗t (1− n)
[
p∗FtC
∗
Ft +
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
qt
C∗Ht
]
− (1− τ v∗t ) p∗FtG∗t
]
+λ1t
[
γHp
−ξ
HtCt − CHt
]
+ λ2t
[
γF
(
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗Ftqt
)−ξ
Ct − CFt
]
+λ3t
[
γ∗H
(
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
qt
)−ξ
C∗t − C∗Ht
]
+ λ4t
[
γ∗Fp
∗−ξ
F t C
∗
t − C∗Ft
]
+λ5t [N
η
t C
σ
t − ζctwtpHt] + λ6t [N∗ηt C∗σt − ζc∗t w∗t p∗Ft]
+λ7t [AtnN
α
t −∆Ht (nCHt + (1− n)C∗Ht +Gt)]
+λ8t [A
∗
t (1− n)N∗αt −∆∗Ft (nCFt + (1− n)C∗Ft +G∗t )]
+λ9t
[
ρ
ρ− 1µtX1Ht −X2Ht
]
+λ10t
[
p˜−1−ρHt (nCHt + (1− n)C∗Ht +Gt)
wt
αAtN
α−1
t
+θβ
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ pi1+ρHt+1
pit+1
(
p˜Ht
p˜Ht+1
)−1−ρ
X1Ht+1 −X1Ht
]
+λ11t
[
p˜−ρHt (nCHt + (1− n)C∗Ht +Gt) (1− τ vt )
+θβ
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ piρHt+1
pit+1
(
p˜Ht
p˜Ht+1
)−ρ
X2Ht+1 −X2Ht
]
+λ12t
[
ρ∗
ρ∗ − 1µ
∗
tX1
∗
Ft −X2∗Ft
]
+λ13t
[
p˜∗−1−ρ
∗
Ft (nCFt + (1− n)C∗Ft +G∗t )
w∗t
αA∗tN
∗α−1
t
+θ∗β
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ pi∗1+ρ∗Ft+1
pi∗t+1
(
p˜∗Ft
p˜∗Ft+1
)−1−ρ∗
X1∗Ft+1 −X1∗Ft
]
+λ14t
[
p˜∗−ρ
∗
Ft (nCFt + (1− n)C∗Ft +G∗t ) (1− τ v∗t )
+θ∗β
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ pi∗ρ∗Ft+1
pi∗t+1
(
p˜∗Ft
p˜∗Ft+1
)−ρ∗
X2∗Ft+1 −X2∗Ft
]
+λ15t
[
γHp
1−ξ
Ht + γF
(
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗Ftqt
)1−ξ
− 1
]
+ λ16t
[
γ∗H
(
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
qt
)1−ξ
+ γ∗Fp
∗1−ξ
F t − 1
]
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+λ17t
[(
1− θpiρ−1Ht
1− θ
) 1
1−ρ
− p˜Ht
]
+ λ18t
(1− θ∗pi∗ρ∗−1Ft
1− θ∗
) 1
1−ρ∗
− p˜∗Ft

+λ19t
[
κ
ζc∗t
ζct
(
C∗t
Ct
)−σ
− qt
]
+λ20t
[
(1− θ) p˜−ρHt + θpiρHt∆Ht−1 −∆Ht
]
+ λ21t
[
(1− θ∗) p˜∗−ρ∗Ft + θ∗pi∗ρ
∗
Ft ∆
∗
Ft−1 −∆∗Ft
]
+λ22t
[
pHt
pHt−1
− piHt
pit
]
+ λ23t
[
p∗Ft
p∗Ft−1
− pi
∗
Ft
pi∗t
]
+ λ24t
[
qt
qt−1
− pi
∗
t
pit
]}
−ΛHζc0C−σ0 b0 − ΛF ζc∗0 C∗−σ0 b∗0.
2.C.3 First-order Conditions for t ≥ 1
The solution to the optimal policy problem can be described by the first-order conditions
with respect to all Lagrange multipliers and with respect to all endogenous variables of
the model:
• W.r.t. Ct :
0 = nHζ
c
tC
−σ
t − ΛHζct σC−σ−1t st + λ1tγHp−ξHt + λ2tγF
(
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗Ftqt
)−ξ
+ λ5tN
η
t σC
σ−1
t
+
σ
Ct
[
λ10t θβ
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ pi1+ρHt+1
pit+1
(
p˜Ht
p˜Ht+1
)−1−ρ
X1Ht+1
− λ10t−1θ
ζct
ζct−1
(
Ct
Ct−1
)−σ
pi1+ρHt
pit
(
p˜Ht−1
p˜Ht
)−1−ρ
X1Ht
]
+
σ
Ct
[
λ11t θβ
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ piρHt+1
pit+1
(
p˜Ht
p˜Ht+1
)−ρ
X2Ht+1
−λ11t−1θ
ζct
ζct−1
(
Ct
Ct−1
)−σ
piρHt
pit
(
p˜Ht−1
p˜Ht
)−ρ
X2Ht
]
+ λ19t κ
σ
Ct
ζc∗t
ζct
(
C∗t
Ct
)−σ
• W.r.t. CHt :
0 = ΛHζctC
−σ
t τ
v
t pHtnH − λ1t − λ7t∆HtnH + λ10t p˜−1−ρHt
nHwt
αAtN
α−1
t
+ λ11t p˜
−ρ
HtnH (1− τ vt )
• W.r.t. CFt :
0 = ΛHζctC
−σ
t τ
v
t
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗FtqtnH−λ2t−λ8t∆∗FtnH+λ13t p˜∗−1−ρ
∗
Ft
nHw
∗
t
αA∗tN
∗α−1
t
+λ14t p˜
∗−ρ∗
Ft nH (1− τ v∗t )
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• W.r.t. C∗t :
0 = nF ζ
c∗
t C
∗−σ
t − ΛF ζc∗t σC∗−σ−1t s∗t + λ3tγ∗H
(
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
qt
)−ξ
+ λ4tγ
∗
Fp
∗−ξ
F t + λ
6
tN
∗η
t σC
∗σ−1
t
+
σ
C∗t
[
λ13t θ
∗β
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ pi∗1+ρ∗Ft+1
pi∗t+1
(
p˜∗Ft
p˜∗Ft+1
)−1−ρ∗
X1∗Ft+1
−λ13t−1θ∗
ζc∗t
ζc∗t−1
(
C∗t
C∗t−1
)−σ
pi∗1+ρ
∗
Ft
pi∗t
(
p˜∗Ft−1
p˜∗Ft
)−1−ρ∗
X1∗Ft
]
+
σ
C∗t
[
λ14t θ
∗β
ζc∗t+1
ζc∗t
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ pi∗ρ∗Ft+1
pi∗t+1
(
p˜∗Ft
p˜∗Ft+1
)−ρ∗
X2∗Ft+1
−λ14t−1θ∗
ζc∗t
ζc∗t−1
(
C∗t
C∗t−1
)−σ
pi∗ρ
∗
Ft
pi∗t
(
p˜∗Ft−1
p˜∗Ft
)−ρ∗
X2∗Ft
]
− λ19t κ
σ
C∗t
ζc∗t
ζct
(
C∗t
Ct
)−σ
• W.r.t. C∗Ht :
0 = ΛF ζc∗t C
∗−σ
t τ
v∗
t
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
qt
nF−λ3t−λ7t∆HtnF+λ10t p˜−1−ρHt
nFwt
αAtN
α−1
t
+λ11t p˜
−ρ
HtnF (1− τ vt )
• W.r.t. C∗Ft :
0 = ΛF ζc∗t C
∗−σ
t τ
v∗
t p
∗
FtnF−λ4t−λ8t∆∗FtnF+λ13t p˜∗−1−ρ
∗
Ft
nFw
∗
t
αA∗tN
∗α−1
t
+λ14t p˜
∗−ρ∗
Ft nF (1− τ v∗t )
• W.r.t. pHt :
0 = ΛHζctC
−σ
t (τ
v
t nHCHt − (1− τ vt )Gt) + ΛF ζc∗t C∗−σt τ v∗t
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
nFC
∗
Ht
qt
−λ1tγHξp−ξ−1Ht Ct − λ3tγ∗H
(
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
qt
)−ξ
ξC∗t
pHt
− λ5t ζctwt
+λ15t γH (1− ξ) p−ξHt + λ16t γ∗H
(
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
qt
)1−ξ
(1− ξ)
pHt
+
λ22t
pHt−1
− λ22t+1β
pHt+1
p2Ht
• W.r.t. p∗Ft :
0 = ΛHζctC
−σ
t τ
v
t
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
qtnHCFt + Λ
F ζc∗t C
∗−σ
t (τ
v∗
t nFC
∗
Ft − (1− τ v∗t )G∗t )
−λ2tγF
(
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗Ftqt
)−ξ
ξCt
p∗Ft
− λ4tγ∗F ξp∗−ξ−1Ft C∗t − λ6t ζc∗t w∗t
54 CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL POLICY IN A MONETARY UNION
+λ15t γF
(
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗Ftqt
)1−ξ
(1− ξ)
p∗Ft
+ λ16t γ
∗
F (1− ξ) p∗−ξF t +
λ23t
p∗Ft−1
− λ23t+1β
p∗Ft+1
p∗2Ft
• W.r.t. qt :
0 = ΛHζctC
−σ
t τ
v
t
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗FtnHCFt − ΛF ζc∗t C∗−σt τ v∗t
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
q2t
nFC
∗
Ht
−λ2tγF
(
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗Ftqt
)−ξ
ξCt
qt
+ λ3tγ
∗
H
(
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
qt
)−ξ
ξC∗t
qt
+λ15t γF
(
(1− τ v∗t )
(1− τ vt )
p∗Ftqt
)1−ξ
(1− ξ)
qt
− λ16t γ∗H
(
(1− τ vt )
(1− τ v∗t )
pHt
qt
)1−ξ
(1− ξ)
qt
−λ19t +
λ24t
qt−1
− λ24t+1β
qt+1
q2t
• W.r.t. pit :
0 = −λ10t−1θ
ζct
ζct−1
(
Ct
Ct−1
)−σ
pi1+ρHt
pi2t
(
p˜Ht−1
p˜Ht
)−1−ρ
X1Ht
−λ11t−1θ
ζct
ζct−1
(
Ct
Ct−1
)−σ
piρHt
pi2t
(
p˜Ht−1
p˜Ht
)−ρ
X2Ht + λ
22
t
piHt
pi2t
+ λ24t
pi∗t
pi2t
• W.r.t. pi∗t :
0 = −λ13t−1θ∗
ζc∗t
ζc∗t−1
(
C∗t
C∗t−1
)−σ
pi∗1+ρ
∗
Ft
pi∗2t
(
p˜∗Ft−1
p˜∗Ft
)−1−ρ∗
X1∗Ft
−λ14t−1θ∗
ζc∗t
ζc∗t−1
(
C∗t
C∗t−1
)−σ
pi∗ρ
∗
Ft
pi∗2t
(
p˜∗Ft−1
p˜∗Ft
)−ρ∗
X2∗Ft + λ
23
t
pi∗Ft
pi∗2t
− λ
24
t
pit
• W.r.t. piHt :
0 = λ10t−1θ
ζct
ζct−1
(
Ct
Ct−1
)−σ
(1 + ρ) piρHt
pit
(
p˜Ht−1
p˜Ht
)−1−ρ
X1Ht
+λ11t−1θ
ζct
ζct−1
(
Ct
Ct−1
)−σ
ρpiρ−1Ht
pit
(
p˜Ht−1
p˜Ht
)−ρ
X2Ht
+λ17t
(
1− θpiρ−1Ht
1− θ
) ρ
1−ρ θ
1− θpi
ρ−2
Ht + λ
20
t θρpi
ρ−1
Ht ∆Ht−1 −
λ22t
pit
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• W.r.t. pi∗Ft :
0 = λ13t−1θ
∗ ζ
c∗
t
ζc∗t−1
(
C∗t
C∗t−1
)−σ
(1 + ρ∗)pi∗ρ
∗
Ft
pi∗t
(
p˜∗Ft−1
p˜∗Ft
)−1−ρ∗
X1∗Ft
+λ14t−1θ
∗ ζ
c∗
t
ζc∗t−1
(
C∗t
C∗t−1
)−σ
ρ∗pi∗ρ
∗−1
Ft
pi∗t
(
p˜∗Ft−1
p˜∗Ft
)−ρ∗
X2∗Ft
+λ18t
(
1− θ∗pi∗ρ∗−1Ft
1− θ∗
) ρ∗
1−ρ∗
θ∗
1− θ∗pi
∗ρ∗−2
Ft + λ
21
t θ
∗ρ∗pi∗ρ
∗−1
Ft ∆
∗
Ft−1 −
λ23t
pi∗t
• W.r.t. ∆Ht :
0 = −λ7t (nHCHt + nFC∗Ht +Gt)− λ20t + λ20t+1βθpiρHt+1
• W.r.t. ∆∗Ft :
0 = −λ8t (nHCFt + nFC∗Ft +G∗t )− λ21t + λ21t+1βθ∗pi∗ρ
∗
Ft+1
• W.r.t. p˜Ht :
0 = −λ10t
1 + ρ
p˜Ht
[
p˜−1−ρHt (nHCHt + nFC
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Ht +Gt)
wt
αAtN
α−1
t
+θβ
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ pi1+ρHt+1
pit+1
(
p˜Ht
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∗
Ht +Gt) (1− τ vt )
+θβ
ζct+1
ζct
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ piρHt+1
pit+1
(
p˜Ht
p˜Ht+1
)−ρ
X2Ht+1
]
+λ11t−1
ρ
p˜Ht
θ
ζct
ζct−1
(
Ct
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• W.r.t. p˜∗Ft :
0 = −λ13t
1 + ρ∗
p˜∗Ft
[
p˜∗−1−ρ
∗
Ft (nHCFt + nFC
∗
Ft +G
∗
t )
w∗t
αA∗tN
∗α−1
t
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α
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AtNαt
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Appendix 2.D Data Sources and Calibration Targets
All data is taken from Eurostat ( http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database).
Population shares of the core and periphery are calculated using time averages of total
population between 2001-2014 (variable name in source: [demo pjan]). Government debt
over GDP in steady state (G/Y ) is calculated as time average of general government con-
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solidated gross debt as percentage of GDP using annual data between 2010-2014 (variable
name in source: [gov 10dd edpt1]). Government spending and trade balance relative
to GDP in steady state are constructed analogously as time averages on quarterly data
between 2001:1 and 2014:4 (variables in source from category: [namq 10 gdp]).
Table 2.6: Empirical and Theoretical Second Moments
GDP Cons. Gov. Wage
Target Moments
Core:
Autocorrelation: 0.87 0.81 0.77
Std. Dev. (in p.p.): 1.67 0.96 1.07 0.99
Periphery:
Autocorrelation: 0.82 0.88 0.64
Std. Dev. (in p.p.): 2.06 1.78 2.42 1.78
Model-Generated Moments
Core:
Autocorrelation: 0.87 0.81 0.77
Std. Dev. (in p.p.): 0.88 1.17 1.12 1.39
Periphery:
Autocorrelation: 0.82 0.88 0.64
Std. Dev. (in p.p.): 1.11 2.11 2.54 1.96
Notes: Empirical target moments (upper panel) calculated using quarterly data from Eurostat for the
period 2001:1 to 2014:4. All series in logs, seasonally adjusted and quadratically detrended. Theoretical
moments (lower panel) from calibrated model (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Available policy instruments:
monetary policy at union level only.
The data series used to construct the calibration targets for GDP, consumption, and
government spending also stem from [namq 10 gdp]. The variable names are ”Gross do-
mestic product at market prices”, ”Final consumption expenditure of households”, and
”Final consumption expenditure of general government”. The raw series are not season-
ally adjusted and measured in current prices. Data on aggregate wages are proxied by
the labour cost index (LCI) for the business economy sector (variable name in source:
[lc lci r2 q]), which provides observations for all required countries but France. The
index is given at a quarterly frequency, not seasonally adjusted, and it takes on a value
of 100 in 2012. Before calculating the target moments (autocorrelations, standard devi-
ations) for the calibration, the log of all series is quadratically detrended and seasonally
adjusted. An overview of the second moments generated from the data and from the
model is given in Table 2.6.
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Appendix 2.E Sensitivity Analysis
Table 2.7: Welfare Costs of Fixed Exchange Rates – Increased Shock Size
(A) Benchmark
LOOP MU FLEX Difference
Monetary Policy (MP) 10−2 ∗ -21.059 -18.530 2.5295
Monetary+Fiscal Policy (MFP) 10−2 ∗ -18.219 -17.858 0.3604
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 85.75%
PTM
Monetary Policy (MP) 10−2 ∗ -21.052 -20.658 0.3938
Monetary+Fiscal Policy (MFP) 10−2 ∗ -20.058 -19.934 0.1235
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 68.64%
(B) Productivity, Preference, Gov. Spending Shocks
LOOP
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -17.069 -15.286 1.7827
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -15.654 -15.371 0.2836
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 84.09%
PTM
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -17.063 -16.854 0.2086
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -16.911 -16.818 0.0930
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 55.43%
(C) Mark-up Shocks
LOOP
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -3.8470 -3.0972 0.7498
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -2.4248 -2.3467 0.0781
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 89.58%
PTM
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -3.8454 -3.6595 0.1859
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -3.0018 -2.971 0.0308
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 83.43%
Notes: Welfare measure: consumption equivalents between deterministic and stochastic world economy.
Exchange rate regime either monetary union (MU) or flexible (FLEX). Panel (A): productivity, demand
preference, government spending, & mark-up shocks in both countries. Panel (B): all but mark-up
shocks. Panel (C): mark-up shocks only. Shock standard deviations in all scenarios doubled compared
to benchmark calibration. Second-order approximation to policy functions. T = 1000, J = 100.
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Table 2.9: Welfare Costs of Fixed Exchange Rates – Payroll Taxes
(A) Benchmark
LOOP MU FLEX Difference
Monetary Policy (MP) 10−2 ∗ -5.0352 -4.4208 0.6144
Monetary+Fiscal Policy (MFP) 10−2 ∗ -4.0039 -3.747 0.2569
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 58.20%
PTM
Monetary Policy (MP) 10−2 ∗ -5.0348 -4.9412 0.0936
Monetary+Fiscal Policy (MFP) 10−2 ∗ -4.006 -3.988 0.0180
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 80.77%
(B) Productivity, Preference, Gov. Spending Shocks
LOOP
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -4.0539 -3.6155 0.4385
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -3.8918 -3.6351 0.2567
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 41.45%
PTM
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -4.0531 -4.0023 0.0507
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -3.8749 -3.8582 0.0168
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 66.96%
(C) Mark-up Shocks
LOOP
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -0.9066 -0.7306 0.176
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -0.0453 -0.0442 0.0012
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 99.34%
PTM
Monetary Policy 10−2 ∗ -0.9071 -0.8642 0.0429
Monetary+Fiscal Policy 10−2 ∗ -0.0565 -0.0553 0.0012
Reduction of Welfare Costs: 97.11%
Notes: Payroll taxes as fiscal instrument instead of VATs. Welfare measure: consumption equivalents
between deterministic and stochastic world economy. Exchange rate regime either monetary union (MU)
or flexible (FLEX). Panel (A): productivity, demand preference, government spending, & mark-up shocks
in both countries. Panel (B): all but mark-up shocks. Panel (C): mark-up shocks only. Shock standard
deviations in all scenarios doubled compared to benchmark calibration. Second-order approximation to
policy functions. T = 1000, J = 100.
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Chapter 3
Interest Rate Spreads and Forward
Guidance
This chapter is based on joint work with Christian Bredemeier and Andreas Schabert.
3.1 Introduction
Ever since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 and with monetary policy rates close to
zero, forward guidance – the communication of central banks about the likely future course
of their policy stance – has gained considerable importance for the conduct of monetary
policy by major central banks, including the US Federal Reserve and the European Central
Bank. This way of expectations management aims at steering longer-term interest rates,
e.g., a flattening of the yield curve, by providing guidance about future real short-term
interest rates. Based on the New Keynesian paradigm, this should stimulate aggregate
demand today and may even break deflationary spirals at zero interest rates (see, e.g.,
Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). Recent empirical studies, however, emphasize that New
Keynesian models massively overstate the effects of forward guidance announcements,1
which has led Del Negro et al. (2015) to coin this the ”forward guidance puzzle”.2
In this chapter, we show that the puzzle is resolved when the effects of forward guidance
on those interest rates that are actually relevant for private sector consumption and
investment decisions, are taken into account. Our analysis is motivated by the empirical
observation that interest rates on various assets respond differently to forward guidance
announcements. For example, Del Negro et al. (2015) examine asset price effects around
1See, for example, Del Negro et al. (2015), Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2015), or Kiley (2016).
2Several contributions, for instance McKay, Nakamura and Steinsson (2016) or Del Negro et al. (2015),
have already addressed this puzzle.
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forward guidance announcements by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at
three dates in 2011 and 2012 with an explicit calendar-based forward guidance. At these
dates, the press releases state that the federal funds rate stays at low levels at least
through a period of 2 or 3 years ahead (see Appendix 3.A.1 for details). Extending the
list of asset prices examined by Del Negro et al. (2015), Table 3.1 presents changes in
asset prices in a one-day window around the three FOMC dates (as in Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). While the magnitude of the announcement effects varies
between dates due to expectations and economic conditions, the columns 2-4 show that
Treasury yields fall at all dates. As also found by Del Negro et al. (2015), corporate
bond yields (see columns 5-8) tend to fall by less compared to yields of treasuries with
the same maturity (and might even rise), implying that the corporate-treasury spreads
unambiguously increase.3 Since the underlying assets mainly differ by liquidity, but are
similar in terms of safety, as argued by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012),
forward guidance seems to alter liquidity premia.4 Given that borrowing and saving
decisions are typically related to interest rates on less liquid assets, the observation that
these interest rates respond to a smaller extent than treasury rates is indicative for forward
guidance to be less effective than suggested by New Keynesian models without a liquidity
premium.
Table 3.1: One-Day Changes of Asset Returns
Treasuries Corporate Bonds
Dates 3Y 5Y 10Y 3Y 5Y 10Y(A) 10Y(B)
2011-08-09 -12 -20 -20 -2 -11 -9 -7
2012-01-25 -5 -11 -7 -3 -5 1 -1
2012-09-13 -1 -5 -2 -2 -1 3 11
Notes: Table shows absolute changes of asset returns in a one-day window around selected FOMC
announcement (end-of-day minus day before). All numbers are given in basis points rounded to
integers. Maturity is measured in years (Y). Corporate Bond 10Y(A) and (B) refer to long-term
bonds with AAA and BAA rating, respectively.
In the first part of the chapter, we present an econometric analysis revealing that liquid-
ity premia rise systematically in response to stimulative forward guidance announcements.
3The forward guidance announcement on 2012-09-13 seems to have been anticipated by market par-
ticipants. In our econometric analysis in Section 2 that focusses on the identification of unanticipated
effects of forward guidance, we do not observe a clear reduction in futures rates, which we do for the first
two dates. This strongly points towards anticipation. It is therefore not surprising that rate changes are
less pronounced on 2012-09-13 compared to the other two dates.
4Similar findings are reported by Campbell, Evans, Fisher and Justiniano (2012) on the effect of
forward guidance in the period from 2007 to 2011.
3.1. INTRODUCTION 65
We apply the method of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) to extract a surprise component in the
announcements of FOMC meetings between 1990 and 2016,5 and examine how measures
of liquidity premia, which have been suggested in the literature, respond to the changes
in the anticipated future paths of the monetary policy instrument. Decomposing pol-
icy announcements into a target factor and a path factor, we find that changes in these
two factors affect interest rates in different ways and, in particular, that a stimulative
forward guidance shock increases interest rate spreads, which are suggested as measures
for liquidity premia by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Nagel (2016).
Furthermore, we construct a common liquidity factor, as Del Negro et al. (2017), and find
that it increases as well.
Based on this empirical evidence, the second part of the chapter presents a macroe-
conomic model that rationalizes the increase of liquidity premia after stimulative central
bank announcements. We show that this separation of the policy rate from interest rates
on stores of wealth substantially weakens the GDP response to these announcements, pro-
viding a solution to the forward guidance puzzle. To this end, we introduce an endogenous
liquidity premium to a New Keynesian model by accounting for differential pledgeability
of assets, as in Schabert (2015) and Williamson (2016). To understand why forward guid-
ance is so powerful in standard New Keynesian models, recall that current consumption
depends on all expected future real monetary policy rates in these models. For given
inflation expectations, an anticipated reduction of the short-term nominal policy rate for
one single period in, say, k periods ahead will, therefore, increase consumption in all k
periods before the interest rate change actually takes place, while the impact effect is –
counterfactually – predicted to grow with the horizon (larger k). A central assumption for
this effectiveness of monetary policy announcements is that interest rates that are relevant
for private agents’ intertemporal choices move – up to first order – one-for-one with the
monetary policy rate. This however neglects the empirical observation that other interest
rates, which are more relevant for private-sector transactions than the federal funds rate,
are separated by spreads that might change endogenously with the state of the economy
and with monetary policy (see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012 and Nagel,
2016).
By contrast, our model that features a liquidity premium allows the policy rate set
by the central bank to differ from other interest rates. We incorporate a stylized banking
sector in a New Keynesian model with an explicit specification of central bank operations.
5This method has widely been used to analyse the effects of monetary policy and forward guidance on
financial markets and has for instance, also been applied by Campbell et al. (2012), Swanson (2017), or
Gertler and Karadi (2015). Our results are qualitatively unchanged when we consider a sample ending
in 2008, i.e., a sample excluding the recent zero lower bound episode.
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Banks are required to hold reserves from the central bank to meet the liquidity demands of
their depositors. Reserves can only be obtained in open market operations against assets
that are eligible to serve as collateral (i.e., Treasury bills), where the central bank controls
the price of money by setting the policy rate.6 Thus, returns on eligible assets closely
follow the policy rate, whereas interest rates on non-eligible assets (such as corporate
debt) tend to be higher due to an (il-)liquidity premium. Given this separation, an
announcement of future policy rate reductions is passed-through to Treasury rates in a
more pronounced way than to interest rates on non-eligible assets, which serve as agents’
preferred store of wealth due to their higher returns.
We show analytically that a reduction of the policy rate accompanied with an an-
nouncement to keep future policy rates low leads to a rise in the liquidity premium and
moderate increases in output and inflation.7 We decompose these effects into those of the
reduction in the current policy rate and of the announcement of low future interest rates.
The reduction of the current policy rate in isolation has conventional effects also in our
model, i.e., it leads to surges in output, inflation, and consumption, while it also raises
the liquidity premium.8 The announcement of low future policy rates stimulates future
output and also induces the liquidity premium to rise already today, whereas it dampens
the immediate response of consumption and output.
The intuition for the rise of the liquidity premium in response to forward guidance
announcements is fairly simple. The monetary policy rate determines the price of money in
terms of eligible assets in our model. By announcing a lower future monetary policy rate,
the central bank thus announces to provide more means of payment against a given amount
of collateral. Thereby, the central bank increases the liquidity value (and hence the non-
pecuniary return) of assets that are eligible as collateral for open-market operations. In an
arbitrage-free equilibrium, non-eligible assets therefore have to provide a relatively higher
pecuniary return, such that the interest rate spread between these asset classes, i.e., the
liquidity premium, increases. Given that these less liquid assets actually serve as agents’
stores of wealth, their consumption-saving decisions are not directly related to the policy
rate, such that the rise in the liquidity premium tends to dampen aggregate demand and
output compared to a case where liquidity premia are absent.
6While we abstract from an interbank market for federal funds, the model features a federal reserve
treasury repo rate. We consider the latter as the policy rate, which is supported by the observation that
it hardly differs from the federal funds rate, see Bredemeier et al. (2017).
7Notably, the increase in the liquidity premium relates to the increase in risk premia due to forward
guidance in Caballero and Farhi (2017).
8The rise in the liquidity premium in response to a conventional, contemporaneous reduction in the
policy rate is in line with the results of empirical analysis where we identify reactions to forward guidance
controlling for changes in current policy rates which we find to increase liquidity premia.
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In a quantitative analysis, we calibrate our model for US data with the objective to
quantitatively match the response of the liquidity premium to an isolated forward guid-
ance announcement that we identified in our econometric analysis. We then study the
macroeconomic effects of announcements to keep the monetary policy rate 25 basis points
below steady state for one or two years, respectively. We find that such an announcement
triggers output to increase by about 0.1 percent relative to its steady state value from
the time of the announcement until the policy rate is raised again. Compared to the pre-
diction of a model version without a liquidity premium, which corresponds to a standard
New Keynesian model, we find the immediate output effects of the four-quarter forward
guidance in our model that features the liquidity premium to be seven times smaller.
Moreover, the length of the guidance period hardly affects the impact output response,
which again clearly differs from the prediction of a model version without liquidity premia.
Overall, this confirms that a standard New Keynesian model vastly overestimates the out-
put effects of forward guidance. By contrast, in our model with an endogenous liquidity
premium, the quantitative predictions align well with empirical evidence. Specifically,
Gertler and Karadi (2015) find that forward guidance has moderate and only delayed ex-
pansionary output effects, while the length of the guidance period hardly has any effect.
Quantitatively, the output effects are slightly larger than in our model but substantially
weaker than predicted by New Keynesian models.
This chapter relates to several empirical studies. The econometric analysis applied in
this chapter is based on the approach of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), who analyze the effects
of US monetary policy on asset prices using high-frequency data and show that forward
guidance is capable of affecting bond yields and stock prices. Campbell et al. (2012) and
Campbell, Fisher, Justiniano and Melosi (2016) extend this analysis to further assets and
also to private sector forecasts of inflation and unemployment. While Campbell et al.
(2012) find counterintuitive reactions of private sector expectations (for instance, unem-
ployment expectations rise after an announced interest rate reduction), the findings of
Campbell et al. (2016) are qualitatively consistent with predictions of the basic New Key-
nesian model. Quantitatively, though, the effects are considerably weaker than predicted
by the New Keynesian model. Del Negro et al. (2015) also analyze the effects of forward
guidance on forecasts and find that an announced 15 basis point decrease in short-term
rates in 4 quarters leads to increases in GDP growth forecasts by about 0.3 percentage
points. Gertler and Karadi (2015) analyze the effects of monetary policy shocks using a
high-frequency identification procedure in a VAR that includes quarterly US data on real
activity and various financial variables. Some of their results are suggestive for effects of
forward guidance, which seem, however, to be quantitatively limited. Bundick and Smith
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(2016) examine zero lower bound episodes and apply a high-frequency identification of
forward guidance changes in futures contracts, which they use as shocks in a VAR with
monthly data. D’Amico and King (2015) identify forward guidance shocks in their VAR
based on sign restrictions. All of these papers find that forward guidance about future
interest rate reductions tend to lead to moderate and gradual, rather than strong and
sudden, increases in output and inflation that peak after a few quarters. These effects
are consistent with the results of our quantitative analysis, but not with a standard New
Keynesian model that predicts much stronger effects that peak immediately after the
announcement.
The chapter further relates to theoretical studies that address the effects of forward
guidance on macroeconomic outcomes. Del Negro et al. (2015) handle the excess response
to policy announcements in the New Keynesian model by introducing a perpetual youth
structure, which leads to a higher discounting of future events and thereby reduces current
responses. McKay et al. (2016, 2017) show that the effects of forward guidance are
much more limited in a model with heterogeneous agents that face the risk of hitting a
borrowing constraint. A further set of papers by Carlstrom et al. (2015), Kiley (2016), and
Chung, Herbst and Kiley (2015) demonstrate that the effects are dampened when firms
are subject to sticky information instead of a direct sticky price friction, as this confines
the forward-lookingness of the Phillips curve. Relatedly, Wiederholt (2015) shows that
forward guidance has limited effects in a model where households have dispersed inflation
expectations. Campbell et al. (2016) differentiate between Delphic and Odyssean forward
guidance and find that the predictions of their medium scale model, in which government
bond holdings provide direct utility, do not reflect the forward guidance puzzle. Caballero
and Farhi (2017) construct a model where the economy is pushed to the zero lower bound
because of a shortage of safe assets. In this model, forward guidance does not foster
recovery, but only leads to increases in risk premia in their setting, which relates to the
rise in liquidity premia implied by our model.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides empirical
evidence on the response of liquidity premia on monetary policy announcements. Section
3.3 presents the model. We derive analytical results on forward guidance effects for a
simplified version and present impulse responses for a calibrated version of the model in
Section 3.4. A conclusion is given in Section 3.5.
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3.2 Empirical Effects of Forward Guidance on Liquidity
Premia
In this section, we document empirically that liquidity premia on near-money assets tend
to rise in response to forward guidance announcements that financial markets consider to
be accommodative. We explain how we measure the value of liquidity services of near-
money assets in the data in Section 3.2.1. In Section 3.2.2, we provide an analysis of asset
returns and interest rate spreads at all FOMC meeting dates between 1990 and 2016 using
the approach of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005). This method allows to separate the effects of
unanticipated forward guidance announcements from those of simultaneously announced
changes in other monetary policy instruments, such as the current federal funds rate or
asset purchase programmes. We apply this approach to identify the response of liquidity
premia to forward guidance.
3.2.1 Measurement of Liquidity Premia
We use various market-based measures of the value of liquidity services of near-money
assets by calculating interest rate spreads between assets that differ in the degree of
liquidity in financial markets, but feature similar characteristics in terms of safety and
maturity. In this way, we rule out that movements in the spreads are mainly determined
by differences in credit risk or term premia. As the measure for highly liquid near-money
assets, we use US-Treasuries at various maturities. Those can be seen as close substitutes
for money, as, typically, Treasuries are allowed to serve as collateral for obtaining liquidity
from the Federal Reserve system. The less liquid assets that we consider were suggested
and applied for this purpose in the related literature.
Specifically, we use the following spreads as measures of liquidity premia. Krishna-
murthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) state that the spread between high rated corporate
bonds and Treasuries is primarily driven by liquidity. We therefore use the spreads be-
tween high rated commercial papers and corporate bonds with maturities of 3 months
and 3, 5, and 10 years on the one hand and Treasuries of the same maturities on the
other hand. As some credit risk may remain even in very high rated corporate bonds,
we also follow Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) in using spreads between rel-
atively illiquid certificates of deposit (CD), which are very safe due to coverage by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Treasury bills at maturities of 3 and
6 months. Finally, we use the spread between the rate on 3-month general collateral
repurchase agreements (GC repos, hereafter) and the 3-month T-bill. Nagel (2016) con-
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siders this spread to be a particularly clean measure of the value of liquidity, as the repos
are secured by collateralization. We end up with 8 different spreads, for which we collect
daily data with observations ranging from January 1990 to September 2016. A detailed
description of the data set and the construction of the spreads is given Section 3.A.2 of
the appendix.
We acknowledge that these spreads also contain a small noise component, for instance
due to small remaining differences in credit risk or additional safety attributes of Trea-
suries as discussed by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). We therefore follow
Del Negro et al. (2017) and construct a factor model with all spreads to extract their
common component over time, which can be interpreted as a purified liquidity premium.
This further yields the advantage of having one single summary measure for the value of
liquidity. We calculate the liquidity factor for a sample from 1990-01-02 to 2016-09-16
using principle component analysis. To account for missing values in our data, we employ
a method by Stock and Watson (2002) that relies on an expectation maximization algo-
rithm.9 To give the resulting factor ft a quantitative interpretation as a measure of the
liquidity premium in basis points, we assume that ft is related to the liquidity premium
LPt by
LPt = a+ bft, (3.1)
where a and b are unknown parameters. We apply the same assumptions as Del Negro
et al. (2017) to obtain values for a and b. First, we assume that the average value of
the liquidity premium before the outbreak of the financial crisis in July, 2007 equals 46
basis points. This number is a long-run estimate for the liquidity value of Treasuries by
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) for a sample from 1926 to 2008. Second,
Del Negro et al. (2017) argue that the asset in their sample with the highest spread to
Treasuries at the peak of the crisis (a BBB rated bond, whose credit risk is hedged by a
credit default swap) was essentially illiquid. The average size of this spread of 342 basis
points in the last quarter of 2008 therefore gives a value for the liquidity premium at this
time. Using these two assumptions, we can construct a daily time series for the liquidity
premium in equation (3.1) that we plot in Figure 3.5 in the Appendix. The mean value of
the liquidity premium in the figure reads 54 basis points with a standard deviation of 49
basis points (see also Table 3.4 in the Appendix). For a very short period at the height
of the financial crisis, the premium rises up to values of about 450 basis points.10 There
9As a robustness check for our treatment of missing values, we also calculated the common factor for
the maximum balanced sample of our data, which ranges from 1997-01-02 to 2013-06-28. We find that
the common factor is very similar to the one estimated on the whole data set.
10The focus of the analysis by Del Negro et al. (2017) lies on this episode in the end of 2008 as well as
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are only a few days with a negative value for the liquidity premium in the whole sample
of over 16 years, all of which occur in the first years of the 1990s. Figures 3.6 and 3.7
in the Appendix provide time series plots of all individual liquidity spreads along with a
linear projection of the common factor and a constant on each spread. They show that
the common liquidity factor captures a large part of the variation for the majority of the
series.
3.2.2 Regression Analysis
We now analyze the effect of forward guidance on the valuation of liquidity in financial
markets using the approach of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005). This approach takes into account
the following points. First, forward guidance announcements are usually given simultane-
ously with announcements about the federal funds rate or – at least in the years following
the financial crisis – asset purchases, which requires to separate the individual effects.
Second, since financial markets are forward looking, only unanticipated components of
the policy changes should matter for market interest rates and spreads and hence those
components need to be identified. Anticipated policy actions should already be priced
into the markets ex ante, therefore leading to only limited reactions after publication.
Ignoring this may mislead to concluding that a policy had no effect. Related to this issue,
a by words accommodative policy announcement can actually have negative effects on
markets when the press release was interpreted as bad news for the economy. Finally, the
Federal Reserve can affect markets by refraining from taking action in a situation, where a
policy adjustment was expected – i.e., also reactions on the non-appearance of a forward
guidance announcement can be informative for the effects of forward guidance if such
announcement had been expected by market participants. The method by Gu¨rkaynak et
al. (2005) addresses all of these identification issues and it allows to quantify the content
of forward guidance announcements. We extend their analysis to the time period from
January 1990 to September 2016 and to different types of assets and liquidity spreads.
The method extracts the surprise component of forward guidance announcements by
looking at the changes in futures rates around FOMC meetings. Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005)
show, based on work by Kuttner (2001), how federal funds and eurodollar futures data
can be used for this purpose. After constructing such monetary surprise measures for
futures with maturities between 1 and 12 months, we extract their first two principle
components. A transformation of these two factors allows us to give them a structural
interpretation. Following the terminology of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), we denote the first
its aftermath.
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one as the ”target factor”, which measures the unanticipated change in the current federal
funds rate, and the second one as the ”path factor”, which measures the unanticipated
change of expectations about the path of the federal funds rate.11 The path factor can
be interpreted as a quantitative measure of forward guidance. In a last step, we regress
the change of asset returns and our liquidity measures on the target and the path factor
to study the effects of forward guidance.
In detail, we collect daily data on federal funds futures that expire in the current and
the next 3 months as well as eurodollar futures with maturities of 6, 9 and 12 months
around all FOMC meetings between January 1990 and September 2016.12 Federal Funds
futures settle at a rate that is calculated as the average daily effective federal funds
funds rate for the delivery month. Changes of the current month futures rate will then
reflect adjustments in the expectations of market participants about the federal funds
rate in the rest of the month, while changes in futures rates with longer maturities reflect
expectation adjustments about the federal funds rate in the month when the contract
expires. In Appendix 3.A.3, we provide details on the futures data and we show how
rate changes at FOMC dates need to be scaled with respect to the day of the month at
which the meeting takes place, in order to extract the surprise component of the FOMC
press release for current and future monetary policy. We follow the related literature
to use eurodollar instead of federal funds futures for maturities of more than 6 months,
as Gu¨rkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2007) show that eurodollar futures provide a better
measure of market expectations about future federal funds rates at those longer horizons.
We compile the surprise changes of the various futures in a matrix X of size [T × v],
where T denotes the number of FOMC dates and v the number of different futures. Our
sample covers T = 237 FOMC dates in total and we use v = 5 futures with maturities of 1,
3, 6, 9, and 12 months. Each row of X measures the expectation changes about monetary
policy between the end-of-day value at the FOMC meeting date and the end-of-day value
at the day before for the v futures. We then assume that X can be described by a factor
model of the form
X = FΛ + , (3.2)
where F is a [T × f ] matrix of f < v unobserved factors, Λ is a [f × v] matrix of factor
11Swanson (2017) also uses the approach by Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), but estimates three factors, giving
the third one the interpretation to capture changes in asset purchase programmes. We also address the
separate effect of quantatitive easing policies in our analysis, though in a different way.
12Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) use intraday data with windows of 30 minutes around the FOMC meetings,
which is not available to us. Using data at this high frequencies reduces the risk of endogeneity problems
that can occur when other news of importance to financial markets are released at the day of the meeting.
They show, however, that all of their results are highly robust to the usage of daily data.
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loadings, and  a [T × v] matrix of white noise. Using the same selection of futures,
Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) show that X is appropriately described by 2 factors. We therefore
set f = 2 and, after demeaning and standardizing X, estimate two factors in F , named F1
and F2, by principle component analysis. Without further transformation, the factors F
are a statistical decomposition that explains a maximal fraction of the variance of X, but
they lack an economic interpretation. In order to give F a meaningful interpretation, we
follow Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) and rotate it according to
F˜ = FU, (3.3)
where U is a [2× 2] matrix, to obtain two new factors F˜1 and F˜2. In line with Gu¨rkaynak
et al. (2005), the elements of U are chosen such that the columns of F˜ remain orthogonal
to each other and that the second factor, F˜2, has no effect on the current federal funds
rate.13 This rotation implies that the unexpected change of the current target of the
federal funds rate is tightly linked to F˜1, while F˜2 covers all other aspects of FOMC
announcements that change the expectations about the path of the federal funds rate in
the next 12 months. Following Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), we name F˜1 the target factor
and F˜2 the path factor, where the latter constitutes our quantitative measure of forward
guidance shocks after FOMC meetings. We find the correlation between F˜1 and the first
column of X, which measures the surprises in the current federal funds rate target, to
be 0.93.14 To allow for an interpretation in basis points, we normalize the elements of
F˜ as in Campbell et al. (2012), such that an increase of 0.01 in F˜1 corresponds to a
surprise change of 1 basis point in the federal funds target and that an increase of 0.01 in
F˜2 corresponds to a surprise change of 1 basis point in the 12-months ahead eurodollar
futures rate.15
We now estimate the effect of the target and the path factor on the change of the asset
returns and liquidity spreads with the regression model
∆yt = β0 + β1F˜1,t + β2F˜2,t + β3qet + et, (3.4)
where ∆yt is the one-day change of an asset return or spread around the FOMC meeting
13Details on this transformation are given in Appendix 3.A.3.
14Notably, Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), who apply a different sample period. report the almost identical
value of 0.95.
15Given our estimate of the path factor, we can now rationalize our findings for the three dates discussed
in the introduction. On 2011-08-09, the path factor assumes a value equivalent to a -2.3 standard deviation
innovation, while the values on 2012-01-25 and 2012-09-13 read -1 and -0.4 standard deviations. This
indicates that the forward guidance given on the first date was the least expected announcement of the
three and thereby explains the relatively large response of asset returns and spreads on that date.
74 CHAPTER 3. INTEREST RATE SPREADS AND FORWARD GUIDANCE
at time t ∈ T , β0 is a constant, β1 and β2 are the coefficients on target and path factor,
respectively, and et is an error term. β3 is the coefficient on the dummy variable qet, which
takes a value of 1 at FOMC meetings with important decisions regarding quantitative
easing.16 This variable ensures that our results are not driven by these events, which were
shown, e.g. by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), to have affected financial
markets considerably.
Results for the asset returns are given in Table 3.2. The first row shows the effect of
a change in the current federal funds rate, as measured by the target factor, while the
second row shows the effect of a change in forward guidance, as measured by the path
factor. The coefficients can be interpreted in the following way. As an example, the return
on the 1 year Treasury increases by 0.62% to a 1% increase of the target factor (which
measures a 1% surprise increase of the current federal funds rate) and by 0.28% to a 1%
increase of the path factor (which implies a 1% surprise interest rate increase in one year).
For the Treasuries and the corporate bonds, the effect of changes in the current federal
funds rate is very strong and highly significant for short maturities, but becomes smaller
as the term to maturity increases. The opposite holds true for the effect of changes in
forward guidance. Coefficients are relatively small for maturities below one year and then
evolve hump-shaped over longer horizons with a peak at 5 years of remaining maturity.
These results are in line with previous findings by Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005), Campbell et
al. (2012), and Swanson (2017).17 The explanatory power of the regressions, as measured
by the R2-statistic, also evolves hump-shaped with especially high values of about 0.80
in case of the Treasuries with longer maturities. The certificates of deposit and the GC
repo react to the target factor in a similar fashion as the short-run commercial paper rate,
while the response to the path factor is relatively small and mostly insignificant due to
the relatively short maturities of these assets. The LIBOR does not react significantly
on changes either in the current federal funds rate or in forward guidance. The limited
relevance of monetary policy changes on bank rates is also reflected in relatively small
values of R2. Taken together, rates on Treasuries tend to react stronger to both F˜1 and
F˜2 than the rates on the various less liquid assets at the same maturity.
This finding is confirmed in Table 3.3, which shows the response of our liquidity
measures to the surprise changes in monetary policy. First and foremost, we present
16The variable qet takes a value of 1 at the following 6 dates. 2009-03-18: Announcement of QE1.
2010-11-03: Announcement of QE2. 2011-09-21: Announcement of ”Operation Twist” 2012-09-13: An-
nouncement of QE3. 2012-12-12: Announcement of additional long-term Treasury purchases. 2013-12-18:
Begin to taper asset purchases.
17The absolute size of the coefficients can, however, not be compared one-to-one with all papers of the
related literature due to differing unit normalizations of F˜1 and F˜2.
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results on the liquidity premium from our factor model (3.1). We find that the premium
reacts strongly on both, changes in the current and the expected path of the federal funds
rate. A 1% reduction of the current federal funds rate target increases the valuation of
liquidity by 0.41%, while the liquidity premium rises by 0.28% today to a 1%-reduction of
the expected federal funds rate over the next year. Accordingly, markets value the liquidity
property of near-money assets higher in response to all types of expansionary monetary
policy. This finding constitutes the main result of our empirical analysis. Regressions of
the individual spreads provide additional supportive evidence. In line with the relatively
stronger response of Treasuries, observed in Table 3.2, coefficients on the target and path
factor have a negative sign in the majority of cases. Also following the pattern of the asset
returns, the coefficients as well as the significance of forward guidance changes become
stronger for longer maturities, whereas the effect of the current federal funds rate on
liquidity spreads is particularly strong for shorter maturities.
Note that Tables 3.5 and 3.6 in the Appendix repeat the above analysis for a sample
excluding the recent zero lower bound episode (sample end in December 2008). Overall,
the results are similar.
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3.3 The Model
In this section, we present a macroeconomic New Keynesian model with an endogenous
liquidity premium for the analysis of forward guidance, which is based on Schabert (2015)
and Bredemeier, Juessen and Schabert (2017), from which we adopt most of the notation.
To endogenize the liquidity premium, we consider commercial banks that demand high
powered money, i.e., reserves, that are supplied by the central bank via open market
operations against eligible securities to serve withdrawals of demand deposits, which relate
to households’ goods market transactions. Our model distinguishes between several assets
in order to account for rates of return, which respond differently to forward guidance
shocks in the data. Decisively, assets differ with respect to liquidity, i.e. to their ability
to serve as substitutes for central bank money. The price of reserves equals the monetary
policy rate and is set by the central bank. The interest rate on eligible assets (i.e. Treasury
bills) is closely related to the policy rate, as they are close substitutes to central bank
money, whereas interest rates on non-eligible assets differ by a liquidity premium. Given
that the latter assets (rather than money or Treasury bills) actually serve as agents’
store of value, their real interest rates reflect private agents’ intertemporal consumption
and investment choices. To isolate the main mechanism, we neither model frictions that
justify the existence of banks nor other financial market frictions. In fact, the model is
constructed to feature only a single non-standard element in form of the liquidity premium.
In each period, the timing of events in the economy, which consists of households,
banks, intermediate goods producing firms, retailers, and the public sector unfolds as
follows: At the beginning of each period, aggregate shocks materialize. Then, banks
can acquire reserves from the central bank via open market operations. Subsequently,
the labor market opens, goods are produced, and the goods market opens, where money
is used as a means of payment. At the end of each period, the asset market opens.
Throughout the paper, upper case letters denote nominal variables and lower case letters
real variables.
3.3.1 Households
There is a continuum of infinitely lived and identical households of mass one. It maximizes
the expected sum of a discounted stream of instantaneous utilities ut = u (ct, nt),
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, nt) , (3.5)
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where u (ct, nt) = [ct
1−σ/ (1− σ)] − θn1+σnt /(1 + σn) with σ ≥ 1, σn, θ ≥ 0. ct denotes
consumption, nt working time, E0 the expectation operator conditional on the time 0
information set, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. Households can store
their wealth in shares of firms zt ∈ [0, 1] valued at the price Vt with the initial stock of
shares z−1 > 0. The budget constraint of the household reads(
Dt/R
D
t
)
+ Vtzt + Ptct + Ptτt ≤ Dt−1 + (Vt + Pt%t) zt−1 + Ptwtnt + Ptϕt, (3.6)
where Pt denotes the price level, wt the real wage rate, τt a lump-sum tax, %t dividends
from intermediate goods producing firms, ϕt profits from banks and retailers, and Dt
demand deposits that are offered by a banking sector at the price 1/RDt . We assume
that households rely on money for purchases of consumption goods, while we abstract
from purchases of goods via credit for simplicity. To purchase goods, households could
in principle hold cash, which is dominated by the rate of return of other assets. Instead,
we consider the demand deposits to serve the same purpose. Households typically hold
more deposits than necessary for consumption expenditures such that the goods market
constraint, which resembles a standard cash in advance constraint, can be summarized as
Ptct ≤ µDt−1, (3.7)
where Dt−1 ≥ 0 denotes holdings of bank deposits at the beginning of period t and
µ ∈ [0, 1] denotes an exogenously determined fraction of deposits withdrawn by the rep-
resentative household. Given that households can withdraw deposits at any point in
time, they have no incentive to hold non-interest-bearing money. Maximizing the objec-
tive (3.5) subject to the budget constraint (3.6), the goods market constraint (3.7), and
zt ≥ 0 for given initial values leads to the following first-order conditions for working time,
consumption, shares, and deposits:
−un,t = wtλt, (3.8)
uc,t = λt + ψt, (3.9)
βEt
[
λt+1R
q
t+1pi
−1
t+1
]
= λt, (3.10)
βEt
[
(λt+1 + µψt+1) pi
−1
t+1
]
= λt/R
D
t , (3.11)
where un,t = ∂ut/∂nt and uc,t = ∂ut/∂ct denote marginal (dis-)utility from labor and
consumption, Rqt = (Vt + Pt%t) /Vt−1 is the nominal rate of return on equity, and λt and
ψt denote the multipliers on the budget constraint (3.6) and the goods market constraint
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(3.7). Finally, the complementary slackness conditions that hold in the household’s opti-
mum are 0 ≤ µdt−1pi−1t − ct, ψt ≥ 0, ψt
(
µdt−1pi−1t − ct
)
= 0, where dt = Dt/Pt, as well
as (3.6) with equality and associated transversality conditions. Under a binding goods
market constraint (3.7) that implies ψt > 0, the deposit rate tends to be lower than the
expected return on equity (see 3.10 and 3.11), as demand deposits provide transaction
services.
3.3.2 Commercial Banks
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive banks i ∈ [0, 1]. A bank i receives demand
deposits Di,t from households and supplies risk-free loans to firms Li,t at the price 1/R
L
t .
Bank i further holds short-term government debt (i.e., treasury bills) Bi,t−1 and reserves
Mi,t−1 for withdrawals of deposits by households. The central bank supplies reserves
via open market operations either outright or temporarily under repurchase agreements.
The latter correspond to a collateralized loan offered by the central bank. In both cases,
treasury bills serve as collateral for central bank money, while the price of reserves in open
market operations in terms of treasuries (the repo rate) equals Rmt . Specifically, reserves
are supplied by the central bank only in exchange for treasuries ∆BCi,t, while the price of
money is the repo rate Rmt :
Ii,t = ∆B
C
i,t/R
m
t and ∆B
C
i,t ≤ Bi,t−1, (3.12)
where Ii,t denotes additional money received from the central bank. Hence, (3.12) de-
scribes a central bank money supply constraint, which shows that a bank i can acquire
reserves Ii,t in exchange for the discounted value of Treasury bills carried over from the
previous period Bi,t−1/Rmt . We abstract from modelling an interbank market for overnight
loans in terms of reserves and the associated (federal funds) rate and assume – consistent
with US data (see Bredemeier et al., 2017) – that the Treasury repo rate and the federal
funds rate are identical, implying that the central bank sets the repo rate Rmt . Reserves
are demanded by bank i to meet liquidity demands from withdrawals of deposits
µDi,t−1 ≤ Ii,t +Mi,t−1. (3.13)
By imposing the constraint (3.13), we implicitly assume that a reserve requirement is
either identical to the expected withdrawals or slack. Banks supply one-period risk-free
loans Li,t to firms at a period t price 1/R
L
t and a payoff Li,t in period t + 1. Thus,
RLt denotes the rate at which firms can borrow. Banks can further invest in short-term
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government bonds that are issued at the price 1/Rt, which are eligible for open market
operations. Given that bank i transferred T-bills to the central bank under outright sales
and that it repurchases a fraction of T-bills, BRi,t = R
m
t M
R
i,t, from the central bank, its
holdings of T-bills before it enters the asset market equal Bi,t−1 + BRi,t − ∆BCi,t and its
money holdings equal Mi,t−1 −Rmt MRi,t + Ii,t. Hence, bank i’s profits PtϕBi,t are given by
Ptϕ
B
i,t =
(
Di,t/R
D
t
)−Di,t−1 −Mi,t +Mi,t−1 − Ii,t (Rmt − 1) (3.14)
− (Bi,t/Rt) +Bi,t−1 −
(
Li,t/R
L
t
)
+ Li,t−1.
Notably, the aggregate stock of reserves only changes with the central bank money supply,∫ 1
0
Mi,tdi =
∫ 1
0
(Mi,t−1 + Ii,t − MRi,t)di, and is fully backed by Treasury bills, whereas
demand deposits can be created by the banking sector subject to (3.13). Banks maximize
the sum of discounted profits, Et
∑∞
k=0 pt,t+kϕ
B
i,t+k, where pt,t+k denotes the stochastic
discount factor pt,t+k = β
kλt+k/λt, subject to the money supply constraint (3.12), the
liquidity constraint (3.13), the budget constraint (3.14), and the borrowing constraints
lims→∞Et[pt,t+kDi,t+s/Pt+s] ≥ 0, Bi,t ≥ 0, and Mi,t ≥ 0. The first-order conditions with
respect to deposits, T-bills, corporate and interbank loans, money holdings, and reserves
can be written as
1
RDt
= βEt
λt+1
λt
1 + µκi,t+1
pit+1
, (3.15)
1
Rt
= βEt
λt+1
λt
1 + ηi,t+1
pit+1
, (3.16)
1
RLt
= βEt
λt+1
λt
pi−1t+1, (3.17)
1 = βEt
λt+1
λt
1 + κi,t+1
pit+1
, (3.18)
κi,t + 1 = Rmt (ηi,t + 1) , (3.19)
where ηi,t and κi,t denote the multipliers on the money supply constraint (3.12) and the liq-
uidity constraint (3.13), respectively. Further, the following complementary slackness con-
ditions hold in the bank’s optimum i.) 0 ≤ bi,t−1pi−1t −Rmt ii,t, ηi,t ≥ 0, ηi,t
(
bi,t−1pi−1t −Rmt ii,t
)
=
0, and ii.) 0 ≤ ii,t+mi,t−1pi−1t −µdi,t−1pi−1t , κi,t ≥ 0, κi,t
(
ii,t +mi,t−1pi−1t − µdi,t−1pi−1t
)
= 0,
where di,t = di,t/Pt, mi,t = Mi,t/Pt, bi,t = Bi,t/Pt, and ii,t = Ii,t/Pt, and the associated
transversality conditions.
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3.3.3 Production Sector
The production sector of the economy consists of intermediate goods producing firms,
which sell their goods to monopolistically competitive retailers that are subject to a
Calvo-type sticky price friction. The retailers sell a differentiated good to bundlers, who
assemble final goods using a Dixit-Stiglitz technology.
The intermediate goods producing firms are identical, perfectly competitive, owned
by the households, and produce an intermediate good ymt with labor nt according to the
production function
ymt = n
α
t ,
with the labor elasticity of production α. They sell the intermediate good to retailers at
the price Pmt . We neglect retained earnings and assume that firms rely on bank loans to
finance wage outlays before goods are sold. The firms’ loan demand satisfies
Lt/R
L
t ≥ Ptwtnt. (3.20)
Firms are committed to fully repay their liabilities, such that bank loans are default risk-
free. The problem of a representative firm can then be summarized as maxEt
∑∞
k=0 pt,t+k%t+k,
where %t denotes real dividends %t = (P
m
t /Pt)n
α
t −wtnt−lt−1pi−1t +lt/RLt , subject to (3.20).
The first-order conditions for loan and labor demand are then given by
1 + γt = R
L
t Et[pt,t+1pi
−1
t+1], (3.21)
Pmt /Ptαn
α−1
t = (1 + γt)wt, (3.22)
where γt denotes the multiplier on the loan demand constraint (3.20). Given that we
abstract from financial market frictions, the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies here, such
that the multiplier γt equals zero. This can immediately be seen from combining the
banks’ loan supply condition (3.17) with the firm’s loan demand condition (3.21), which
implies γt = 0. Hence, the loan demand constraint (3.20) is slack, such that the firm’s
labor demand (3.22) will be undistorted and read Pmt /Pt = wt/
(
αnα−1t
)
.
Monopolistically competitive retailers, indexed with k ∈ [0, 1] buy intermediate goods
ymt at the price P
m
t to relabel them to a good yk,t. The latter are sold at a price Pk,t to per-
fectly competitive bundlers. Only a random fraction 1− φ of the retailers is able to reset
their price Pk,t in an optimizing way each period., while the remaining retailers of mass
φ have to keep the price of the previous period, Pk,t = Pk,t−1. The problem of a price ad-
justing retailer reads maxP˜k,t Et
∑∞
s=0 φ
sβsφt,t+s
((
Πsk=1P˜k,t/Pt+s
)
−mct+s
)
yk,t+s, where
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marginal costs are mct = P
m
t /Pt. The first-order condition can be written as Z˜t =
ε
ε−1Z
1
t /Z
2
t , where Z˜t = P˜t/Pt, Z
1
t = ξtc
−σ
t ytmct + φβEtpi
ε
t+1Z
1
t+1 and Z
2
t = ξtc
−σ
t yt +
φβEtpi
ε−1
t+1Z
2
t+1.
The perfectly competitive bundlers combine the various yk,t to the final consumption
good yt using the technology y
ε−1
ε
t =
∫ 1
0
y
ε−1
ε
k,t dk, where ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between the different varieties. The cost minimizing demand for each good is given by
yk,t = (Pk,t/Pt)
−ε yt. The bundlers sell the final good yt to the households at the price Pt,
which can be written as the consumer price index (CPI) P 1−εt =
∫ 1
0
P 1−εk,t dk.
The evolution of this price index equals 1 = (1− φ) Z˜1−εt + φpiε−1t . In a symmetric
equilibrium, ymt =
∫ 1
0
yk,tdk and yt = atn
α
t /st will hold, where st =
∫ 1
0
(Pk,t/Pt)
−ε dk is
an index of price dispersion that evolves according to st = (1− φ)Z˜−εt + φst−1 (pit)ε for a
given s−1.
3.3.4 Public Sector
The public sector consists of a government and a central bank. The government issues
one-period bonds BTt and obtains potential profits of the central bank Ptτ
m
t . Revenues
beyond those used to repay debt from last period are transferred to the households in a
lump-sum fashion, Ptτt, to balance the budget. The government budget constraint is then
given by (
BTt /Rt
)
+ Ptτ
m
t = B
T
t−1 + Ptτt.
Given that one period equals one quarter in our setting, this debt corresponds to 3-month
Treasury bills. Government debt is held by banks in the amount of Bt and by the central
bank in the amount of BCt , such that B
T
t = Bt + B
C
t . Following Schabert (2015), we
assume that the supply of Treasury bills is exogenously determined by a constant growth
rate Γ
BTt = ΓB
T
t−1, (3.23)
where Γ > β. (3.23) describes the supply of money market instruments that the central
bank declares eligible. There is only short-term government debt in the model for simplic-
ity. To appropriately account for the role of long-term Treasury debt, which in particular
have been purchases by the US Federal reserve in their large scale asset purchase pro-
grammes, we would specify them as partially eligible for central bank operations. It can
be shown in a straightforward way that the associated yields would then behave like a
combination of the T-bill rate and corporate debt rate.
The central bank supplies money in exchange for Treasury bills either outright, Mt,
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or under repos MRt . At the beginning of each period, the central bank’s stock of Trea-
suries equals BCt−1 and the stock of outstanding money equals Mt−1. It then receives an
amount ∆BCt of Treasuries in exchange for newly supplied money It = Mt−Mt−1 +MRt .
After repurchase agreements are settled, its holdings of Treasuries and the amount of
outstanding money are reduced by BRt and by M
R
t , respectively. Before the asset mar-
ket opens, where the central bank can reinvest its payoffs from maturing securities in
T-bills BCt , it holds an amount equal to B
C
t−1 + ∆B
C
t − BRt . Its budget constraint
is thus given by
(
BCt /Rt
)
+ Ptτ
m
t = ∆B
C
t + B
C
t−1 − BRt + Mt − Mt−1 −
(
It −MRt
)
,
which after substituting out It, B
R
t , and ∆B
C
t using ∆B
C
t = R
m
t It, can be simpli-
fied to
(
BCt /Rt
) − BCt−1 = Rmt (Mt −Mt−1) + (Rmt − 1)MRt − Ptτmt . Following cen-
tral bank practice, we assume that interest earnings are transferred to the government,
Ptτ
m
t = B
C
t (1− 1/Rt) + (Rmt − 1)
(
Mt −Mt−1 +MRt
)
, such that holdings of Treasuries
evolve according to BCt −BCt−1 = Mt−Mt−1. Restricting the initial values to BC−1 = M−1
leads to the central bank balance sheet
BCt = Mt. (3.24)
Regarding the implementation of monetary policy, we assume that the central bank sets
the policy rate Rmt following a Taylor-type feedback rule, while respecting the zero lower
bound:
Rmt = max
{
1;
[
Rmt−1
]ρR [Rm (pit
pi
)ρpi (yt
y˜t
)ρy]1−ρR
exp
(
εmt ·
K∏
k=1
εmt,t−k
)}
, (3.25)
where y˜t is the efficient level of output, ρpi ≥ 0, ρy ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ρR < 1, Rm ≥ 1, and
εmt denotes a contemporaneous monetary policy shock. Following Lase´en and Svensson
(2011),
∏
εmt,t−k describes a series of anticipated policy shocks, which materialize in period
t, but were announced in period t− k, that are used to model forward guidance.
The target inflation rate pi is controlled by the central bank and is assumed to equal
the growth rate of Treasuries Γ. This assumption is made for convenience only and is not
associated with a loss of generality, as the central bank can implement its inflation targets
even if pi 6= Γ, as shown in Schabert (2015). Finally, the central bank fixes the fraction
of money supplied under repurchase agreements relative to money supplied outright at
Ω ≥ 0 : MRt = ΩMt. For the subsequent analysis, Ω will be set at a sufficiently large
value to ensure that central bank money injections It are non-negative.
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3.3.5 Equilibrium Properties
Given that households, firms, retailers, and banks behave in an identical way, we can omit
indices. A definition of the rational expectations equilibrium can be found in Appendix
3.B. It should be noted that the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies here as financial
markets are frictionless. The main difference to a standard New Keynesian model is the
money supply constraint (3.12), which ensures that reserves are fully backed by Treasuries.
The model in fact reduces to a New Keynesian model with a conventional cash-in-advance
constraint if the money supply constraint (3.12) is slack, which is summarized in Definition
3 in Appendix 3.B.18
In our model, rates of return on non-eligible assets (i.e., corporate debt and equity)
exceed the policy rate and the Treasury rate by a liquidity premium if (3.12) is binding.
This is the case when the central bank supplies money at a lower price than households are
willing to pay, Rmt < R
IS
t , where R
IS
t denotes the nominal marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution of consumption
RISt = uc,t/βEt (uc,t+1/pit+1) , (3.26)
which measures the marginal valuation of money by the private sector.19 For Rmt < R
IS
t ,
households thus earn a positive rent and are willing to increase their money holdings.
Given that access to money is restricted by holdings of Treasury bills, the money sup-
ply constraint (3.12) is then binding. To see this, compare (3.15) with (3.11) to get
Et[
λt+1+µψt+1
λt
pi−1t+1] = Et[
λt+1
λt
(1 + κt+1µ) pi−1t+1], which is satisfied if κt = ψt/λt. Hence, the
equilibrium versions of the conditions (3.18) and (3.19) imply (ψt + λt) /λt = R
m
t (ηt + 1)
and βpi−1t+1 (λt+1 + ψt+1) = λt, which can – by using the equilibrium version of condition
(3.9) – be combined to
ηt =
(
RISt /R
m
t
)− 1. (3.27)
Condition (3.27) implies that the money supply constraint (3.12) is binding, i.e. ηt > 0,
if the central bank sets the policy rate Rmt below R
IS
t . Given that short-term Treasuries
and money are close substitutes, the T-bill rate Rt relates to the expected future policy
rate, which can be seen from combining (3.16) with (3.18) and (3.19), Rt · Etς1,t+1 =
Et[R
m
t+1 · ς1,t+1], where ς1,t+1 = λt+1 (1 + ηt+1) /pit+1. Thus, the Treasury bill rate equals
18It should be noted that a binding money supply constraint does not imply that monetary policy is
inferior compared to a regime, where money is supplied in an unbounded way, as shown by Schabert
(2015).
19Agents are willing to spend RISt − 1 to transform one unit of an illiquid asset, i.e. an asset that is
not accepted as a means of payment today and delivers one unit of money tomorrow, into one unit of
money today.
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the expected policy rate up to first order,
Rt = EtR
m
t+1 + h.o.t., (3.28)
where h.o.t. represents higher order terms. Notably, the relation (3.28) accords to the
empirical evidence provided by Simon (1990). The bank’s first order conditions (3.15),
(3.17), and (3.18) further imply that the deposit rate RDt exceeds one and is smaller
than the interest rates on loans to firms RLt when liquidity is positively valued, i.e., if
ψt > 0. Combining (3.17), with βEtpi
−1
t+1 (λt+1 + ψt+1) = λt (see 3.17) shows that the
loan rate RLt relates to the expected marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (1/R
L
t ) ·
Etς2,t+1 = Et[
(
1/RISt+1
) · ς2,t+1], where ς2,t+1 = (λt+1 + ψt+1) /pit+1. Likewise, (3.11) implies
that the expected rates of return on equity is related to the expected marginal rate
of intertemporal substitution: Etς2,t+1 = Et
[(
Rqt+1/R
IS
t+1
) · ς2,t+1]. Hence, the loan rate
equals to the expected marginal rate of intertemporal substitution up to first order,
RLt = EtR
IS
t+1 + h.o.t., (3.29)
as well as to the expected rate of return on equity, EtR
q
t+1 = EtR
IS
t+1+ h.o.t. Accordingly,
the spread between the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution and the monetary
policy rate, RISt −Rmt , captures how rates of return of non-eligible assets deviate from the
monetary policy rate and summarizes how interest rates in the current model differ from
those of a standard model. Accordingly, RISt − Rmt constitutes an endogenous liquidity
premium. When we derive analytical results in the subsequent section, we therefore focus
on the difference between RISt and R
m
t to unveil the main mechanism at work.
It should further be noted that as long as the nominal marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution RISt (rather than the policy rate R
m
t ) does not hit the zero lower bound, i.e.,
RISt > 1, the demand for money is well defined, as the liquidity constraints of households
(3.7) and banks (3.13) are binding. This can be seen by substituting out κt in the
equilibrium version of (3.18) with κt = ψt/λt and combining with the equilibrium version
of (3.9), which leads to
ψt = uc,t
(
1− 1/RISt
)
. (3.30)
Thus, (3.30) implies that the household’s liquidity constraint (3.7) as well as the bank’s
liquidity constraint (3.13) are binding if RISt is strictly larger than one. Notably, liquidity
might still be positively valued by households and banks, i.e., RISt > 1, even when the
policy rate is at the zero lower bound, Rmt = 1.
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3.4 The Effect of Forward Guidance in the Model
In this section, we examine the models’ predictions regarding the macroeconomic effects
of forward guidance. We begin with deriving some analytical results in Section 3.4.1.
Subsequently, we calibrate the model and study its quantitative predictions in Section
3.4.2. Throughout these sections, we separately analyze two versions of the model, which
differ with regard to the relation between the monetary policy rate and the marginal rate
of intertemporal substitution.
3.4.1 Analytical Results
We separately analyze the cases where the money supply constraint (3.12) is either bind-
ing, which leads to an endogenous liquidity premium, or where money supply is de-facto
unconstrained, implying that the policy rate Rmt equals the marginal rate of intertem-
poral substitution RISt . Technically, this means that we assume that the central bank
sets the policy rate in the long-run either below or equal to RIS = pi/β (where time
indices are omitted to indicate steady state values) and examine the local dynamics in
the neighborhood of the particular steady state.20 In a neighborhood of a steady state,
the equilibrium sequences are approximated by the solutions to the linearized equilibrium
conditions, where ât denotes relative deviations of a generic variable at from its steady
state value a : ât = log(at/a). To facilitate the derivation of analytical results, we assume
that outright money supply is negligible, Ω → ∞, which reduces the set of endogenous
state variables. We further assume for convenience that the central bank targets long-run
price stability pi = 1, which is further supported by the supply of eligible government debt
Γ = 121.
Definition 1. A rational expectations equilibrium for Ω → ∞, Γ = pi = α = 1, and
ρR,y = 0 is a set of convergent sequences {ĉt, pit, b̂t, R̂ISt , R̂mt }∞t=0 satisfying
ĉt = b̂t−1 − pit − R̂mt if Rmt < RISt , (3.31)
or ĉt ≤ b̂t−1 − pit − R̂mt if Rmt = RISt ,
σĉt = σEtĉt+1 − R̂ISt + Etpit+1, (3.32)
pit = βEtpit+1 + χ
[
(σn + σ) ĉt + R̂
IS
t
]
, (3.33)
20We further assume that shocks are sufficiently small such that the ZLB is never binding.
21Notably, the latter assumption is not necessary for the implementation of long-run price stability,
since the central bank can in principle adjust the share of short-term treasuries that are eligible for money
supply operations to implement the desired inflation target, as shown by Schabert (2015).
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b̂t = b̂t−1 − pit, (3.34)
where χ = (1− φ)(1− βφ)/φ for a monetary policy rate satisfying
R̂mt = ρpipit + ε̂
m
t +
K∑
k=1
ε̂mt,t−k, (3.35)
where ρpi ≥ 0, for a given b−1 > 0.
Consider first the case, where the money supply constraint (3.12) is not binding, such
that the policy rate equals the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution, Rmt = R
IS
t ,
and there is no liquidity premium. This will be the case if eligible assets are supplied
abundantly or if there are no collateral requirements in open market operations. Given
that condition (3.31) is then slack, the model reduces to a standard New Keynesian model
with a cash-in-advance constraint. This constraint implies that the policy rate affects the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and working time and therefore enters
the aggregate supply constraint (3.33). In this setting, forward guidance exerts the stark
effects that were criticized in the literature (see Del Negro et al., 2015), such as large initial
output and inflation effects as well as cumulative output responses that are growing in
the horizon of forward guidance.
In case the policy rate is set below the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution,
i.e. Rmt < R
IS
t , the money supply constraint and, hence, (3.31) is binding, which implies
a positive liquidity premium. As shown by Bredemeier et al. (2017), there exist unique
locally convergent equilibrium sequences, if but not only if
ρpi < [(1 + β)χ
−1 + 1− σ]/σ (3.36)
is satisfied. Condition (3.36) implies that an active monetary policy (ρpi > 1) is not
relevant for equilibrium determinacy and that the central bank can even peg the policy rate
(ρpi = 0) without inducing indeterminacy. It should further be noted that the sufficient
condition (3.36) is far from being restrictive for a broad range of reasonable parameter
values.
Forward guidance announcements of the FOMC in the last years stated to keep policy
rates at low levels for a specific period of time. To assess the effect of this kind of forward
guidance in our model, we consider the following simple experiment: The central bank
announces in period t to reduce the policy rate for the periods t and t+ 1. Formally, this
forward guidance consists of to components: a shock to the policy rate in t, i.e. ε̂mt < 0,
and a shock in t + 1 that is announced in t, i.e. ε̂mt+1,t < 0 and K = 1 in (3.35). For the
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linearized model given in Definition 1, we are able to present some analytical results for
this experiment that we summarize in the following proposition.22
Proposition 1. Suppose that Rmt < R
IS
t , σ = σn = 1, and ρpi < βχ
−1 which guarantees
that (3.36) is satisfied. The effect of a forward guidance announcement in period t that
reduces the monetary policy rate in t and t+ 1 can be separated into the partial effects of
a conventional monetary policy shock in t, ε̂mt < 0, and an in period t announced shock
for t+ 1, ε̂mt+1,t < 0.
1. The reduction of the policy rate R̂mt leads in period t to rise of consumption ĉt,
inflation pit, and in the liquidity premium R̂
IS
t − R̂mt .
2. The reduction of the policy rate R̂mt+1 in t+ 1, announced in period t, leads
(a) in period t to a fall of consumption ĉt, a rise of inflation pit, and a rise of the
liquidity premium R̂ISt − R̂mt , and
(b) in period t+ 1 to a rise of consumption ĉt+1, inflation pit+1 and in the liquidity
premium R̂ISt+1 − R̂mt+1.
3. In total, forward guidance leads to an increase of consumption ĉt, inflation pit and
the liquidity premium R̂ISt − R̂mt in both periods, t and t+ 1.
Proof. See Appendix 3.C.1.
In line with the evidence presented in Section 3.2, both reductions in the current
monetary policy rate as well as announced reductions in future policy rates lead to rising
liquidity premia in our model. The intuition for the spread responses in a period t + k
to a reduction in the monetary policy rate Rmt+k (see Case 1. and 2.(b) in Proposition 1)
is as follows. A temporary reduction in the policy rate increases the amount of money
available per unit of eligible asset held by private agents, such that contemporaneous
consumption increases (compared to previous and future consumption). To clear the
market for commodities, the real interest rate on (non-eligible) assets that serve as a
store of wealth declines. For an elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/σ that is not
too low (which is the case for σ = 1), the decline in the marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution is less pronounced than the fall in the policy rate, such that the liquidity
premium increases. For an announced reduction in the future policy rate the response
22Note that the parameter restriction ρpi < βχ
−1 is hardly restrictive, given that in our calibration
used in Section, βχ−1 = 19. 72 which is by far larger than values typically applied for ρpi of about 1.5.
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of the current liquidity premium (see Case 2.(a) in Proposition 1) can also easily be
understood. As eligible assets can be exchanged against a larger amount of reserves in
the subsequent period, the liquidity value of newly issued treasuries rises. Given that the
valuation of non-eligible assets is, in contrast, not directly affected by the policy measure,
agents’ demand for these asset fall, which tends to reduce their price. Hence, their current
interest rates increase (while the current policy rate is unchanged), such that the liquidity
premium rises.
This interest-rate increasing property of forward guidance has important implications
for its aggregate effects. The additional announcement of a reduction in tomorrow’s
monetary policy rate does not per-se re-enforce the expansionary effects of a reduction
in today’s policy rate. In fact, the rise in liquidity premia exerts a dampening effect on
today’s consumption, since upward pressure on the returns on non-eligible assets induces
households to postpone consumption. This prediction is in stark contrast to that of a
standard New Keynesian model where increased inflation today due to the announcement
of low future interest rates unambiguously reduces the relevant real interest rate since the
nominal rate is directly controlled by the central bank. This additional reduction in the
real interest rate reinforces increases in consumption and can make output responses to
forward guidance very strong (see Carlstrom et al. (2015) and our quantitative evaluations
below). While the standard New Keynesian model has been is criticized for predicting
effects of forward guidance which are too strong compared to empirical evidence (e.g.,
Gertler and Karadi, 2015), the dampening effect stemming from the responses of liquidity
premia helps matching empirical findings. We will evaluate this point more deeply in the
context of our quantitative results in Section 3.4.2.
3.4.2 Numerical Results
In this section, we describe the calibration of the model and present quantitative effects
of forward guidance. The model is calibrated to match the empirical response of the
liquidity premium to an announcement shock as analyzed in Section 3.2. Motivated by
forward guidance announcements of the FOMC in the last years that stated to keep
policy rates at low levels over a period of a 1 to 3 years, we study the effects of policy rate
reductions that last several quarters. We show that our model with the liquidity premium
generates moderate output and inflation effects that are substantially smaller than in a
model version without the liquidity premium, which corresponds to a conventional New
Keynesian model.
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Calibration
We calibrate the model to selected characteristics of the US economy and a period is
assumed to be one quarter. For a first set of parameters, we apply values that are
standard in the literature on business cycle analysis. The elasticity of substitution between
individual varieties of the intermediate goods producing firms  is set to 6, which implies
a steady state mark-up of 20%, the inverse Frisch elasticity σn is set to 2, and the labor
income share α is set to 2/3. Consistent with broad empirical evidence, the probability
that firms are not able to reset prices in the Calvo model is set to φ = 0.8, and the reaction
coefficients of the interest rate rule (3.25) are set to ρpi = 1.5, ρy = 0.05, and ρR = 0.8.
A second set of parameters is set to match mean observations in our data set from
Section 3.2 (January 1990 to September 2016). The rate of inflation and the policy rate in
steady state are set to the average values of the CPI inflation and the federal funds rate.23
The corresponding values are pi = 1.024261/4 and Rm = 1.03041/4. We calibrate the long-
run liquidity premium between Treasuries that are eligible for open market operations
and the less liquid assets that are non-eligible, η = RL/R − 1, to 53 basis points, which
is the mean value of the common liquidity factor from Section 3.2.1 between January
1990 and September 2016. This implies η = 0.001322, which requires a steady-state value
of RIS = 1.035861/4. Since RIS = pi/β in steady state, we set β = 0.9972 to achieve
this target. The growth rate Γ of the T-bills in (3.23) is set to the long-run inflation
rate, which roughly accords to the average T-bill growth rate in the pre crisis sample.
As in Bredemeier et al. (2017), we assume the ratio of money supplied under repos Ω to
equal 1.5 which is based on data about the mean fraction of repos to total reserves of
depository institutions in the US between 2003 and 2007. This value further ensures that
money injections by the central bank It are, in line with the data, always positive.
Finally, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1/σ is set to match the response
of the empirical liquidity premium factor, LPt, to an innovation in the path factor F˜2 as
presented in Section 3.2 with the response of a model-implied long-term liquidity premium,
η̂LTt =
∏q
s(R̂
L
t+s − R̂t+s)1/q. For σ = 1.5 and q = 4, the model generates an increase of
η̂LTt by 25 basis points to an (isolated) announced reduction of the policy rate R
m
t by 100
basis points in four quarters. This is close to the corresponding empirical response of the
common liquidity factor LPt by 28 basis points to a 1%-reduction of F˜2, where the latter
is normalized to the effect of a 100 basis point reduction of the expected policy rate in
one year.
23We use monthly data from FRED between January 1990 and December 2016 that we aggregate to
quarterly values as the basis for the long-run means. For the CPI we take the series [CPIAUCSL] and
for the federal funds rate we take the series [FEDFUNDS].
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For the policy experiments, we consider paths of the monetary policy rate announced
in advance. For this, it is convenient to assume that the contemporaneous shock, εmt ,
and all anticipated monetary policy shocks,
∏
εmt,t−k, in (3.25) are completely transitory
white-noise innovations that are identically and independently distributed as N(0, σ2m,k).
The assumption that all anticipated shocks are uncorrelated is innocuous in our analysis
and could be relaxed without consequences for the results. We model forward guidance a
path for the monetary policy rate
{
RmT+h
}H
h=1
in the upcoming H periods that the central
bank announces at the beginning of period T + 1, before which the economy is assumed
to rest in steady state. We then back out a sequence of present and anticipated future
monetary policy innovations εmT+1 =
{
εmT+1, ε
m
T+1+k,T+1
}K
k=1
that yields this desired interest
rate path. The calculation of the shocks is based on a procedure by Lase´en and Svensson
(2011) and Del Negro et al. (2015) that we adjust to our application. We provide details
in Section 3.C.2 of the appendix.
Impulse Responses to Forward Guidance
Figure 3.1 shows impulse responses to different forward guidance scenarios in our model
with the endogenous liquidity premium. The two scenarios shown in the figure are credible
announcements of the central bank to reduce the policy rate Rmt by 25 annualized basis
points for the next 4 and 8 quarters, respectively. This resembles recent forward guidance
experiences, where central banks stated to keep policy rates at low levels over a horizon of
about two years, and also relates to the VAR analyses of forward guidance by Gertler and
Karadi (2015). The central bank resets the policy rate to its steady state value after the
guidance period until quarter 10. After that, monetary policy is governed by the Taylor
rule (3.25), which then implies values in close proximity of the steady state. The assumed
path of the nominal interest rate can be seen in the upper left panel of Figure 3.1. The
interest rate reduction leads to a moderate increase of output by about 0.1%, see upper
right panel of the figure. Output remains close to this level until the end of the guidance
period. Once the policy rate increases, output experiences a brief dip before returning to
its steady state value.
The real policy rate (middle left panel) behaves similar to the nominal rate where
differences reflect the endogenous response of inflation. Inflation (middle right panel)
rises on impact by about 0.05 percentage points but it starts decreasing already before the
end of the guidance period. Households’ real marginal rate of intertemporal substitution,
RISt /pit+1 (lower left panel), which is related to private-sector interest rates via (3.29),
barely moves on impact and only experiences a negative spike at the end of the guidance
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Figure 3.1: Effects of Forward Guidance
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Notes: Impulse responses to forward guidance about policy rate Rmt announced before quarter 1 in
model with endogenous liquidity premium: production yˆt, inflation pˆit, real policy rate R
m
t /pit+1,
private-sector real rate RISt /pit+1, liquidity premium R
IS
t −Rmt . Y-axis: Deviations from steady state
in percent ( yˆt, pˆit) or in basis points (else). X-axis: quarters. Black line: Announced policy rate
reduction of 25 basis points in quarters 1 to 4. Blue circled line: Announced policy rate reduction of
25 basis points in quarters 1 to 8.
period, reflecting the change in consumption. The liquidity premium RISt −Rmt (lower right
panel) instead increases sharply on impact and remains on that level until output drops.
Comparing the scenario of forward guidance about 4 quarters with that about 8 quarters
reveals that differences in terms of the impact responses of output and the liquidity
premium are small while inflation is slightly higher on impact in case of the longer horizon.
Notably, this observation differs from the critized prediction of the conventional New
Keynesian model without an endogenous liquidity premium that the impact responses
of output and inflation increase with the horizon of the forward guidance (see McKay
et al., 2016). Intuitively, cumulated output effects are more pronounced for the longer
forward-guidance experiment.
Figure 3.2 compares the effects of forward guidance in the model featuring the en-
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Figure 3.2: Comparison with Standard New Keynesian Model
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-30
-20
-10
0
Rmt
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
yˆt
Model w/ Liq. Prem.
Model w/o Liq. Prem.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-60
-40
-20
0
20
Rmt /pit+1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
pˆit
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-60
-40
-20
0
20
RISt /pit+1
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
-10
0
10
20
30
RISt − R
m
t
Notes: Impulse responses to policy rate (Rmt ) reduction of 25 basis points in quarters 1 to 4, an-
nounced before quarter 1: production yˆt, inflation pˆit, real policy rate R
m
t /pit+1, private-sector real
rate RISt /pit+1, liquidity premium R
IS
t − Rmt . Y-axis: Deviations from steady state in percent ( yˆt,
pˆit) or in basis points (else). X-axis: quarters. Black line: Baseline model with endogenous liquidity
premium. Blue circled line: Conventional New Keynesian model.
dogenous liquidity premium with a version of the model without the liquidity premium
(ηt = 0, see 3.27), which corresponds to a conventional New Keynesian model. In both
cases, the central bank announces to reduce the policy rate by 25 basis points for the
next 4 quarters and to return to steady state afterwards. The results for the model with
interest rate spreads are those from the first scenario of Figure 3.1. Output and infla-
tion in the model version without the liquidity premium increase sharply on impact, in
line with the findings by Carlstrom et al. (2015) and others but are too large compared
to the empirical effects of forward guidance (see for example Gertler and Karadi, 2015).
Compared to the model version with the liquidity premium, the responses on impact are
about 10 times higher. In the model version without the liquidity premium, the central
bank can steer the growth rate of consumption directly by adjusting the policy rate. The
real interest rate falls by more on impact than the nominal rate due to the increase in
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inflation and, hence, add to the increase of consumption and output.
Figure 3.3: Forward Guidance in the Standard New Keynesian Model
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Notes: Impulse responses to forward guidance about policy rate Rmt announced before quarter 1 in
standard New Keynesian model without liquidity premia: production yˆt, inflation pˆit, real policy rate
Rmt /pit+1, private-sector real rate R
IS
t /pit+1, liquidity premium R
IS
t − Rmt . Y-axis: Deviations from
steady state in percent ( yˆt, pˆit) or in basis points (else). X-axis: quarters. Black line: Announced
policy rate reduction of 25 basis points in quarters 1 to 4. Blue circled line: Announced policy rate
reduction of 25 basis points in quarters 1 to 8.
Figure 3.8 in the Appendix presents responses to a similar policy, where the central
bank provides forward guidance for four quarters about the real instead of the nominal
policy rate, which we perform for comparability to McKay et al. (2016). The results for
both model versions are similar to the ones presented in Figure 3.1. For this reason, we
continue to consider policies, where guidance is provided in terms of nominal policy rates.
Figure 3.3 shows the two forward-guidance experiments in the model version without
the liquidity premium, which corresponds to a standard New Keynesian model. We see
that the length of the guidance period has a huge impact on the output effect of monetary
policy. Specifically, announcing low interest rates also for quarters 5 through 8 increases
the impact response of output by factor of 5, while there is almost no change in the impact
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Figure 3.4: Effects of Conventional Monetary Policy
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Notes: Impulse responses to conventional monetary policy of 25 basis points on monetary policy
rate (Rmt ) in quarter 1 only: production yˆt, inflation pˆit, real policy rate R
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pˆit) or in basis points (else). X-axis: quarters. Black line: Baseline model with endogenous liquidity
premium. Blue circled line: Conventional New Keynesian model.
response in the model version with the liquidity premium.
Finally, Figure 3.4 shows the responses to a standard unannounced one-time mone-
tary policy shock in the model versions with and without the liquidity premium. The
responses of the two models are very similar, except for the model with the liquidity
premium generating a rise in the premium in line with the evidence presented in Section
3.2. Comparing this standard shock without forward guidance, we see that in the model
without the liquidity premium, the impact output responses to both shocks are similar
while the forward-guidance policy intuitively triggers a longer expansion in output. In
the standard model without the liquidity premium, the shock without forward guidance
triggers an output expansion which is almost ten times smaller than the one induced by
the one-year forward guidance policy.
To sum up, in our model with the liquidity premium, forward guidance prolongs the
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output effects of monetary policy but does not substantially foster the immediate output
effects. By contrast, in a standard New Keynesian model, forward guidance affects the
immediate output responses of monetary policy very strongly.
Our quantitative model evaluations help understanding the VAR results of Gertler
and Karadi (2015). They present three sets of VAR responses to gauge the importance of
forward guidance for the output effects of monetary policy. In particular, they estimate the
responses to unanticipated 25 bp changes in the Federal Funds rate, the return on one-year
government bonds, and the returns on two-year government bonds. These changes include
different degrees of forward guidance with the change in the two-year rate containing the
highest degree of forward guidance and the change in Federal Funds rate the lowest degree
of forward guidance. The results of Gertler and Karadi (2015) show that output responses
to monetary policy shocks are affected by forward guidance only in the medium run and
even slightly weakened on impact. The responses to the change in the two-year rate are
very similar to the ones to the one-year rate suggesting that the length of forward guidance
is not of primary importance for the output effects of monetary policy shocks.
These findings are in line with the predictions of our liquidity-premium model where
forward guidance has strong output effects only with a delay but leaves contemporaneous
output almost unchanged. By contrast, the standard New Keynesian model predicts very
strong impact effects of forward guidance which are rejected by the empirical evidence of
Gertler and Karadi (2015).
3.5 Conclusion
We show empirically that liquidity premia tend to rise after forward guidance announce-
ments. We augment the conventional New Keynesian model by an endogenous liquidity
premium that separates the monetary policy rate from other interest rates that are more
relevant for private-sector transactions. We show both analytically and numerically that
forward guidance is a much less powerful policy tool in this setting. The forward guid-
ance puzzle can be solved in our framework and we provide a theoretical rationale for the
increases in liquidity premia that are present in the data.
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Appendix 3.A Empirical Analysis
3.A.1 The Case Study
The most relevant content of the FOMC press releases on the three events of the case
study in the introduction is the following:
2011-08-09: Economic growth has been ”considerably lower” than expected. The
FFR is unchanged at 0-0.25 percent. ”[...] economic conditions [...] are likely to warrant
exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.”
2012-01-25: The economy has been ”expanding moderately”. The FFR is unchanged
at 0-0.25 percent. ”[...] economic conditions [...] are likely to warrant exceptionally low
levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014.”
2012-09-13: Economic activity has ”continued to expand at a moderate pace”. The
FFR is unchanged at 0-0.25 percent. ”[...] exceptionally low levels for the federal funds
rate are likely to be warranted at least through mid-2015.” Additional purchases of
mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month (”QE3”) are announced.
For the full text of the press releases, see www.federalreserve.gov. See also Table 1
in Del Negro et al. (2015) for further details.
3.A.2 Measurement of Liquidity Premia
In this appendix, we describe the data sources and the construction of all liquidity spreads.
We also provide summary statistics and figures of all our liquidity measures.
We collect daily return data on various assets to construct the spreads that aim at
measuring liquidity premia. All spreads are calculated as the difference in annualized
daily returns between Treasuries as the liquid near-money asset and an illiquid asset of
similar safety and maturity. We use data from FRED (https://fred.stlouisfed.org)
and from Bloomberg. Original mnemonics in the data source are given in square brackets.
• The data for the Treasury rates stems from FRED. We use the ’Treasury Constant
Maturity Rates’ with the mnemonic [DGS’xx’], where ’xx’= {3MO, 6MO, 1, 3, 5, 10}
refers to the maturity in months (MO) or years (else). We collect daily data from
1990-01-02 to 2016-09-16.
• Following Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) as well as Del Negro et al.
(2017), we construct several spreads between the rates on investment grade rated
commercial papers or corporate bonds and Treasuries for different maturities. All
series are taken from FRED.
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As a short-run measure, we use the ’3-Month AA/P1 Nonfinancial Commercial Pa-
per Rate’ with mnemonic [DCPN3M] and we calculate the spread relative to the
series [DGS3MO].
For longer maturities, we employ the following four corporate bond indexes: (1)
The ’Bank of America (BofA) Merrill Lynch US Corporate 1-3 Year Effective Yield’,
mnemonic [BAMLC1A0C13YEY], which is a subset of the ’BofA Merrill Lynch US
Corporate Master Index’ that includes investment grade rated corporate bonds that
were publically issued in the United States. The series that we use includes all se-
curities with a remaining term to maturity between 1 and 3 years. We calculate the
spread as [BAMLC1A0C13YEY] – [DGS3]. (2) The ’BofA Merrill Lynch US Cor-
porate AAA Effective Yield’, mnemonic [BAMLC0A1CAAAEY], which is a subset
of the ’BofA Merrill Lynch US Corporate Master Index’ that covers securities with
an AAA rating. We calculate the spread as [BAMLC0A1CAAAEY] – [DGS5]. (3)
’Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield’, mnemonic [DAAA], which consists
of bonds with an AAA rating and long remaining terms to maturity. We construct
the spread relative to the series [DGS10]. (4) ’Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate
Bond Yield’, mnemonic [DBAA], which consists of US bonds with an BAA rating
and long remaining terms to maturity. We construct the spread relative to the series
[DGS10].
The series on commercial papers and the indexes from BofA Merrill Lynch are avail-
able to us from 1997-01-02 onwards. We collect data on the indexes by Moody’s
beginning on 1990-01-02.
• Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) explain that the spread between the
rates on certificates of deposit (CD) and Treasury bills can only reflect a liquidity
attribute, since the certificates are basically risk-free due to its coverage by the
FDIC. CDs are relatively illiquid, as withdrawals before maturity usually imply
large contractual penalties. We collect the series ’Certificate of Deposit: Secondary
Market Rate’ with maturities of 3 and 6 months from FRED with the mnemonics
[DCD90] and [DCD6M]. We calculate the spreads relative to the Treasury-series
[DGS3MO] and [DGS6MO], respectively. Daily data is available to us from 1990-
01-02 to 2013-06-28.
• Nagel (2016) suggests the spread between the rates on general collateral repurchase
agreements (GC repos, hereafter) and the 3-month T-bill as an excellent measure
of the ”premium for the liquidity services by near-money assets”. He notes that
these repos are very illiquid, as the term loan is locked in until maturity, which is
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also reflected by relatively wide bid-ask spreads. Since GC repos are collateralized
with a portfolio of Treasuries, they are essentially risk-free. We collect data from
Bloomberg with the mnemonic [USRGCGC ICUS Curncy] from 1991-05-21 to 2016-
09-16. We follow Nagel (2016) in calculating averages between bid and ask prices.
We construct the spread relative to the series [DGS3MO].
Figure 3.5 shows the times series of the liquidity premium in equation (3.1). Figures
3.6 and 3.7 provide time series plots of all spreads along with a linear projection of
the common factor and a constant. Summary statistics on all spreads and the liquidity
premium derived from the factor model are given in Table 3.4.
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Figure 3.5: Time Series of the Liquidity Premium
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Notes: Plot of a time series of the liquidity premium in equation (3.1) in basis points using daily
data from 1990-01-2 to 2016-09-16, constructed from a panel of 8 liquidity spreads using principal
component analysis.
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Figure 3.6: Time Series of Liquidity Spreads and Common Factor
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Notes: Figure shows daily time series of liquidity spreads (black lines) along with their linear projec-
tions on the common factor and a constant (blue lines).
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Figure 3.7: Time Series of Liquidity Spreads and Common Factor – Continued
Corporate Bonds BAA 10Y GC Repo 3M
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Notes: Figure shows daily time series of liquidity spreads (black lines) along with their linear projec-
tions on the common factor and a constant (blue lines).
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics of Liquidity Spreads
Spread Time Range Mean Std. Dev.
Commercial Paper 3M 1997-01-02 to 2016-09-16 21.82 24.79
Corporate Bonds 3Y 1997-01-02 to 2016-09-16 110.99 120.10
Corporate Bonds 5Y 1997-01-02 to 2016-09-16 108.89 60.61
Corporate Bonds AAA 10Y 1990-01-02 to 2016-09-16 141.55 47.74
Corporate Bonds BAA 10Y 1990-01-02 to 2016-09-16 238.00 77.47
Certificate of Deposit 3M 1990-01-02 to 2013-06-28 35.69 40.97
Certificate of Deposit 6M 1990-01-02 to 2013-06-28 31.83 37.49
GC Repo 3M 1991-05-21 to 2016-09-16 16.04 16.24
Liquidity Premium (Factor) 1990-01-02 to 2016-09-16 53.47 49.45
Notes: Mean and Standard Deviation (Std. Dev.) given in basis points.
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3.A.3 Estimation of the Target and the Path Factor
In this appendix, we describe the data sources of the federal funds and eurodollar futures
that we use. We explain how futures can be used to extract the surprise component of
monetary policy at FOMC meeting dates and how we derive the target and the path
factor.
Data Sources
All futures data is taken from Quandl (https://www.quandl.com).
• For the federal funds rate, we use the ’30 Day Federal Funds Futures, Continu-
ous Contract’ series for the front month and the next 3 months thereafter. The
mnemonics read [CHRIS/CME FF’X’], where ’X’= {1, 2, 3, 4} is the number of
months until delivery of the contract. The raw data for the continuous contract
calculation is from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, where the futures are traded.
We extract the daily settlement price (series ’settle’), which is given as 100 mi-
nus the average daily federal funds overnight rate for the delivery month, between
1990-01-02 to 2016-09-16.
• For the eurodollars, we use the ’Eurodollar Futures, Continuous Contract’ series
with the mnemonic [CHRIS/CME ED’X’], where ’X’= {6, 9, 12} gives the number
of months until delivery of the contract. The raw data for the continuous contract
calculation is from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, where the futures are traded.
We extract the daily settlement price (series ’settle’), which is given as 100 minus the
3-month London interbank offered rate for spot settlement on the 3rd Wednesday
of the contract month, between 1990-01-02 to 2016-09-16.
Construction of the Monetary Surprise Components
We now explain how the elements of the data matrix X in equation (3.2) are constructed.
The rows correspond to the 237 FOMC meeting dates between January 1990 and Septem-
ber 2016. The five columns of X refer to the different futures contracts. The third to
fith column gives the one-day change of the eurodollar futures contracts with 6, 9, and 12
months until delivery around the FOMC meetings. Due to the spot settlement of these
contracts, this difference directly gives a measure for the change in expectations about in-
terest rates in 6, 9, and 12 months, respectively. The first two columns entail the surprise
changes of expectations using mainly the 1- and the 3-month federal funds futures, whose
calculation is more involved, since these contracts settle on the average federal funds rate
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in the delivery month. The following exposition is based on Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) and
Gu¨rkaynak (2005).
Given the specification of the federal funds future contracts, the current month future
settlement rate at the day before the FOMC meeting in t, ff 1t−∆1, can be written as
ff 1t−∆1 =
d1
m1
rt−∆1 +
m1 − d1
m1
Et−∆1 (rt) +$1t−∆1, (3.37)
where rt−∆1 is the average federal funds rate that has prevailed in this month until the
day before the meeting (i.e. day t − ∆1), Et−∆1 (rt) is the expectation at t − ∆1 about
the federal funds rate for the rest of the month, d1 the day of the FOMC meeting t in the
current month with length m1, and $
1
t−∆1 any potentially present term or risk premia.
Analogously, the settlement rate at the day of the meeting itself reads
ff 1t =
d1
m1
rt−∆1 +
m1 − d1
m1
rt +$
1
t . (3.38)
Defining the surprise change in the target of the federal funds rate after the current
meeting as mp1t ≡ rt − Et−∆1 (rt), allows its calculation according to
mp1t =
(
ff 1t − ff 1t−∆1
) m1
m1 − d1 , (3.39)
which assumes that term and risk premia $1 do not change significantly between t and
t −∆1, which Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005) argue to be in line with empirical evidence. The
change in the futures rates is scaled with the factor m1/ (m1 − d1), since the surprise
change of the federal funds rate only applies to the remaing m1 − d1 days of the month.
For meeting dates very close to the end of the month, the scaling factor becomes relatively
big, which can be problematic when there is too much noise in the data. We therefore
follow Gu¨rkaynak (2005) and use the unscaled change in the futures that are due in the
next month, mp1t =
(
ff 2t − ff 2t−∆1
)
, when the meeting is within the last 7 days of the
month. Another special case are FOMC meetings at the first day of the month. In this
case, the monetary surprise has to be calculated as mp1t =
(
ff 1t − ff 2t−∆1
)
.
In a next step, we determine the change of expectations about the federal funds rate
that will prevail after the second FOMC meeting (t+ 1) from the perspective of t−∆1,
rt+1. These values form the entries in the second column of X. Since there are 8 regularly
scheduled FOMC meetings per year, the next meeting (t+1) will be in j = {1, 2}months.24
24In case of additional unscheduled meetings, the next meeting can also be in the same month. 23 of
the 237 FOMC meetings in our sample are unscheduled intermeeting moves. Most of these observations
occured in the early 1990s and some happened after surprising financial turmoil, e.g. 2001 and 2007/8.
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At date t −∆1, the futures rate that covers the second meeting from now is then given
by
ff 1+jt−∆1 =
d1+j
m1+j
Et−∆1 (rt) +
m1+j − d1+j
m1+j
Et−∆1 (rt+1) +$
1+j
t−∆1, (3.40)
where ff 1+j refers to the futures contract that expires in 1 + j months, while d1+j and
m1+j refer to the day and the length of the month of the second FOMC meeting from
now, respectively. Analogously to the procedure above, we calculate the change in the
expected target of the federal funds rate after the next meeting as
mp1+jt ≡ Et (rt+1)−Et−∆1 (rt+1) =
[(
ff 1+jt − ff 1+jt−∆1
)− d1+j
m1+j
mp1t
]
m1+j
m1+j − d1+j . (3.41)
We apply the same corrections as above in case the meeting t + 1 is on the first day or
within the last week of the month.
Factor Estimation and Transformation
We normalize each column of X to have a zero mean and a unit variance before extracting
the first two principal components. As there is a very small number of missing values for
the 12-month eurodollar future, we apply the method of Stock and Watson (2002). This
gives us the two factors F1 and F2, which we again normalize to have a unit variance.
Next, we determine the elements of the [2× 2] transformation matrix U to obtain F˜1 and
F˜2 in (3.3). The matrix U is given by the four elements
U =
[
a1 b1
a2 b2
]
,
whose identification requires four restrictions that we adopt from Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005).
We normalize the columns of U to unit length, which leads to the conditions
a21 + a
2
2 = 1, (3.42)
b21 + b
2
2 = 1. (3.43)
This assumption implies that the variance of F˜1 and F˜2 is unity. The next restriction
demands that F˜1 and F˜2 remain orthogonal to each other, i.e. E
(
F˜1, F˜2
)
= 0. This can
Following Gu¨rkaynak (2005), we assume that on every FOMC meeting, future intermeeting moves are
assumed to occur with zero probability.
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be shown to imply that the scalar product of the columns of U equals zero,
〈U〉 = a1b1 + a2b2 = 0. (3.44)
The final restriction is that the second factor F˜2 does not affect the current monetary
policy surprise, mp1t , that forms the first column of X. This is implemented as follows.
Starting from F = F˜U−1, we write F1 and F2 as functions of F˜1 and F˜2, which yields
F1 =
1
det (U)
(
b2F˜1 − a2F˜2
)
, (3.45)
F2 =
1
det (U)
(
a1F˜2 − b1F˜1
)
. (3.46)
The current monetary surprise can be written as
mp1t = λ1F1 + λ2F2,
where λ1 and λ2 are elements of the estimated loading matrix Λ in (3.2). Using (3.45)
and (3.46), mp1t can be rearranged to
mp1t =
1
det (U)
[
(λ1b2 − λ2b1) F˜1 + (λ2a1 − λ1a2) F˜2
]
. (3.47)
Setting the coefficient of F˜2 in (3.47) to zero, then implements the restriction as
λ2a1 − λ1a2 = 0. (3.48)
Using (3.42)-(3.44) and (3.48), we can solve for the elements of U to obtain the series
for the target and the path factor, F˜1 and F˜2.
3.A.4 Additional Regression Results
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are the counterparts to Tables 3.2 and 3.3 for the sample 1990-2008.
Results for this sample excluding the recent zero lower bound episode are similar to those
for the total sample.
3.A. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 109
T
ab
le
3.
5:
R
es
p
on
se
of
A
ss
et
R
et
u
rn
s
to
C
h
an
ge
s
in
M
on
et
ar
y
P
ol
ic
y
in
a
S
am
p
le
E
n
d
in
g
20
08
-1
2-
16
T
re
as
u
ri
es
G
C
3M
6M
1Y
3Y
5Y
10
Y
3M
C
h
an
ge
in
F
ed
er
al
F
u
n
d
s
R
at
e( F˜ 1
) 0
.6
5*
**
0.
67
**
*
0.
60
**
*
0.
32
**
*
0.
20
**
*
0.
04
2
0.
31
**
*
(0
.0
80
)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.0
59
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
78
)
C
h
an
ge
in
F
or
w
ar
d
G
u
id
an
ce
( F˜ 2)
0.
18
**
*
0.
35
**
*
0.
48
**
*
0.
74
**
*
0.
77
**
*
0.
66
**
*
-0
.0
01
(0
.0
54
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
58
)
(0
.0
57
)
R
2
0.
55
0.
77
0.
82
0.
82
0.
84
0.
79
0.
24
N
u
m
b
er
of
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
(T
)
17
5
17
5
17
5
17
5
17
5
17
5
15
2
C
om
m
er
ci
al
P
ap
er
/
C
or
p
or
at
e
B
on
d
s
C
D
3M
3Y
5Y
10
Y
(A
)
10
Y
(B
)
3M
6M
C
h
an
ge
in
F
ed
er
al
F
u
n
d
s
R
at
e( F˜ 1
) 0
.2
7*
**
0.
38
**
*
0.
15
**
-0
.0
33
-0
.0
04
7
0.
37
**
*
0.
32
*
(0
.0
97
)
(0
.1
1)
(0
.0
64
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
31
)
(0
.1
4)
(0
.1
7)
C
h
an
ge
in
F
or
w
ar
d
G
u
id
an
ce
( F˜ 2)
-0
.0
03
0.
62
**
*
0.
58
**
*
0.
37
**
*
0.
36
**
*
0.
18
*
0.
22
(0
.1
2)
(0
.1
3)
(0
.0
83
)
(0
.0
46
)
(0
.0
45
)
(0
.1
0)
(0
.1
6)
R
2
0.
11
0.
44
0.
61
0.
53
0.
54
0.
22
0.
12
0
N
u
m
b
er
of
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
(T
)
73
10
3
10
3
17
5
17
5
17
5
17
5
N
o
te
s:
T
ab
le
sh
ow
s
re
sp
on
se
s
of
as
se
t
re
tu
rn
s
to
ch
a
n
g
es
in
th
e
fe
d
er
a
l
fu
n
d
s
ra
te
,
m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
th
e
ta
rg
et
fa
ct
o
r,
a
n
d
to
ch
a
n
g
es
in
fo
rw
ar
d
gu
id
an
ce
,
m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
th
e
p
at
h
fa
ct
or
,
a
t
F
O
M
C
m
ee
ti
n
g
s
b
et
w
ee
n
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
9
0
a
n
d
D
ec
em
b
er
2
0
0
8
.
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
in
cl
u
d
ed
in
al
l
re
gr
es
si
o
n
s.
H
et
er
os
ke
d
as
ti
ci
ty
-r
ob
u
st
(W
h
it
e)
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
A
st
er
is
k
s
m
a
rk
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
1
0
%
(*
),
5
%
(*
*
),
1%
(*
**
).
M
at
u
ri
ty
is
m
ea
su
re
d
ei
th
er
in
m
on
th
s
(M
)
o
r
in
ye
a
rs
(Y
).
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
B
o
n
d
1
0
Y
(A
)
a
n
d
(B
)
re
fe
r
to
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
b
o
n
d
s
w
it
h
A
A
A
an
d
B
A
A
ra
ti
n
g,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
C
D
:
C
er
ti
fi
ca
te
o
f
D
ep
o
si
t;
G
C
:
G
en
er
a
l
C
o
ll
a
te
ra
l
R
ep
o
.
110 CHAPTER 3. INTEREST RATE SPREADS AND FORWARD GUIDANCE
T
ab
le
3.6:
R
esp
on
se
of
L
iq
u
id
ity
S
p
read
s
to
C
h
an
ges
in
M
on
etary
P
olicy
in
a
S
am
p
le
E
n
d
in
g
2008-12-16
L
iq
u
id
ity
P
rem
iu
m
C
om
m
ercial
P
ap
er
/
C
orp
orate
B
on
d
-
S
p
read
(F
actor)
3M
3Y
5Y
10Y
(A
)
10Y
(B
)
C
h
an
ge
in
F
ed
eral
F
u
n
d
s
R
ate (
F˜
1 )
-0.41***
-0.28***
0.154*
0.031
-0.075
-0.047
(0.13)
(0.10)
(0.090)
(0.060)
(0.061)
(0.045)
C
h
an
ge
in
F
orw
ard
G
u
id
an
ce (
F˜
2 )
-0.32***
-0.15
-0.063
-0.14***
-0.29***
-0.30***
(0.081)
(0.12)
(0.076)
(0.047)
(0.042)
(0.034)
R
2
0.30
0.09
0.05
0.10
0.43
0.53
N
u
m
b
er
of
O
b
servation
s
(T
)
175
73
103
103
175
175
G
C
-S
p
read
C
D
-S
p
read
3M
3M
6M
C
h
an
ge
in
F
ed
eral
F
u
n
d
s
R
ate (
F˜
1 )
-0.36**
-0.27*
-0.35*
(0.15)
(0.15)
(0.19)
C
h
an
ge
in
F
orw
ard
G
u
id
an
ce (
F˜
2 )
-0.20**
-0.0014
-0.13
(0.088)
(0.11)
(0.16)
R
2
0.21
0.08
0.10
N
u
m
b
er
of
O
b
servation
s
(T
)
152
175
175
N
o
tes:
T
a
b
le
sh
ow
s
resp
on
ses
o
f
liq
u
id
ity
sp
rea
d
s
to
ch
a
n
g
es
in
th
e
fed
era
l
fu
n
d
s
ra
te,
m
ea
su
red
b
y
th
e
target
factor,
an
d
to
ch
an
ges
in
fo
rw
a
rd
g
u
id
a
n
ce,
m
ea
su
red
b
y
th
e
p
a
th
fa
cto
r,
a
t
F
O
M
C
m
eetin
g
s
b
etw
een
J
a
n
u
a
ry
1
9
9
0
an
d
D
ecem
b
er
2008.
C
on
stan
t
in
clu
d
ed
in
all
reg
ression
s.
H
eterosked
asticity
-rob
u
st
(W
h
ite)
sta
n
d
a
rd
erro
rs
in
p
a
ren
th
eses.
A
sterisk
s
m
ark
sign
ifi
can
ce
at
10%
(*),
5%
(**),
1
%
(*
**).
M
a
tu
rity
is
m
ea
su
red
eith
er
in
m
o
n
th
s
(M
)
o
r
in
yea
rs
(Y
).
C
o
rp
o
ra
te
B
o
n
d
1
0
Y
(A
)
an
d
(B
)
refer
to
lon
g-term
b
on
d
s
w
ith
A
A
A
a
n
d
B
A
A
ra
tin
g
,
resp
ectively.
C
D
:
C
ertifi
ca
te
o
f
D
ep
o
sit;
G
C
:
G
en
era
l
C
o
lla
tera
l
R
ep
o.
A
ll
sp
read
s
are
calcu
lated
relative
to
T
reasu
ries
o
f
th
e
sam
e
m
a
tu
rity.
3.B. DEFINITION OF EQUILIBRIUM 111
Appendix 3.B Definition of Equilibrium
Definition 2. A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences {ct, yt, nt, wt, λt,
mRt , mt, bt, b
T
t , mct, Z1,t, Z2,t, Zt, st, pit, R
IS
t }∞t=0 satisfying
ct = mt +m
R
t , if R
IS
t > 1, or ct ≤ mt +mRt , if RISt = 1, (3.49)
bt−1/ (Rmt pit) = mt −mt−1pi−1t +mRt , if RISt > Rmt , (3.50)
or bt−1/ (Rmt pit) ≥ mt −mt−1pi−1t +mRt , if RISt = Rmt ,
mRt = Ωmt, (3.51)
bt = b
T
t −mt, (3.52)
bTt = Γb
T
t−1/pit, (3.53)
θnσnt = uc,twt/R
IS
t , (3.54)
1/RISt = βEt [uc,t+1/ (uc,tpit+1)] , (3.55)
wt/
(
αnα−1t
)
= mct, (3.56)
λt = βEt [uc,t+1/pit+1] , (3.57)
Z1,t = λtytmct + φβEtpi
ε
t+1Z1,t+1, (3.58)
Z2,t = λtyt + φβEtpi
ε−1
t+1Z2,t+1, (3.59)
Zt = [ε/ (ε− 1)]Z1,t/Z2,t, (3.60)
1 = (1− φ)Z1−εt + φpiε−1t , (3.61)
st = (1− φ)Z−εt + φst−1piεt , (3.62)
yt = n
α
t /st, (3.63)
yt = ct, (3.64)
(where uc,t = ct
−σ), the transversality conditions, a monetary policy {Rmt ≥ 1}∞t=0, Ω > 0,
pi ≥ β, and a fiscal policy Γ ≥ 1, for given initial values M−1 > 0, B−1 > 0, BT−1 > 0,
and s−1 ≥ 1.
Given a rational expectations equilibrium as summarized in Definition 2, the equilibrium
sequences {Rt, RDt , Rqt+1, RLt }∞t=0 can be determined by
Rt = Et[uc,t+1pi
−1
t+1]/[Et
(
Rmt+1
)−1
uc,t+1pi
−1
t+1], (3.65)
λt/R
D
t = βEt[(uc,t+1 + (1− µ)λt+1)/pit+1], (3.66)
1 = βEt
[(
Rqt+1/pit+1
)
(λt+1/λt)
]
, (3.67)
1/RLt = Et
[
1/RISt+1
]
, (3.68)
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If the money supply constraint (3.12) is not binding, which is the case if Rmt = R
IS
t (see
3.27), the model given in Definition 2 reduces to a standard New Keynesian model with
a cash-in-advance constraint, where government liabilities can be determined residually.
Definition 3. A rational expectations equilibrium under a non-binding money supply
constraint (3.12) is a set of sequences {ct, yt, nt, wt, λt, mct, Z1,t, Z2,t, Zt, st, pit, RISt }∞t=0
satisfying RISt = R
m
t , (3.54)-(3.64), the transversality conditions, and a monetary policy
{Rmt ≥ 1}∞t=0, pi ≥ β, for a given initial value s−1 ≥ 1.
Appendix 3.C Details to Section 3.4
3.C.1 Analytical Results
Proof of Proposition 1. To establish the claims made in the proposition, the model given
in Definition 1 for the version with Rmt < R
IS
t , i.e., (3.31)-(3.35), is further simplified by
substituting out R̂ISt and R̂
m
t . Without loss of generality, we restrict ourselves to K = 1
in (3.35):
pit = δEtpit+1 +
(
ĉt + b̂t − ε̂mt+1,t
)
, (3.69)
ĉt = b̂t−1 − (1 + ρpi)pit − ε̂mt,t−1, (3.70)
b̂t = b̂t−1 − pit, (3.71)
where δ = β − χρpi > 0. We now prove the claims of the proposition one after another.
For this, we assume that (3.36) is satisfied, which ensures existence and uniqueness of a
locally stable solution.
1. We begin with analyzing the reduction of the policy rate in period t, i.e. ε̂mt < 0,
by applying the following solution form for the system (3.69)-(3.71):
pit = γpibb̂t−1 + γmpiεε̂
m
t , (3.72)
b̂t = γbb̂t−1 + γmbε ε̂
m
t , (3.73)
ĉt = γcbb̂t−1 + γmcε ε̂
m
t . (3.74)
Substituting out the endogenous variables in (3.69)-(3.71) with generic solutions in (3.72)-
(3.74), leads to the following conditions for γpib, γcb, γb, γ
m
piε, γ
m
cε , and γ
m
bε :
γpib = δγpibγb + χγb + χγcb, 1 = (1 + ρpi) γpib + γcb, 1 = γb + γpib, (3.75)
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γmpiε = (δγpib + χ) γ
m
bε + χγ
m
cε , γ
m
cε = − (1 + ρpi) γmpiε − 1, γmbε = −γmpiε. (3.76)
Using the three conditions in (3.75) and substituting out γpib with γpib = 1 − γb, gives
0 = (δγb − 1) (1− γb) + χγb + χγcb, 1 = (1 + ρpi) (1− γb) + γcb, and further eliminating
γcb, leads to 0 = (δγb − 1) (1− γb) + χγb + χ (1− (1 + ρpi) (1− γb)), which is a quadratic
equation in γb that reads γ
2
b − (δ + χ+ χ (ρpi + 1) + 1) δγb + (ρpiχ+ 1) δ = 0. Condition
(3.36) ensures that there exists exactly one stable and positive solution (see proof of
Lemma 1 in Bredemeier et al., 2017). Assigning the stable root to γb ∈ (0, 1), such that
γpib = 1−γb ∈ (0, 1), we can easily identify the effects of the monetary policy shock ε̂mt on
inflation and consumption in t, i.e. γmpiε and γ
m
cε . Combining the three conditions in (3.76)
yields
γmpiε = −
χ
1 + δγpib + χ (2 + ρpi)
, (3.77)
which is negative since whose sign depends on the sign of denominator since χ, δ, γpib, ρpi >
0 and, hence, γmpiε < 0. Inflation in t, thus, increases in response to an expansionary
conventional monetary policy shock.
The effect on consumption can be obtained by using (3.77) in γmcε = − (1 + ρpi) γmpiε−1,
which gives
γmcε =
χ (1 + ρpi)
1 + δγpib + χ (2 + ρpi)
− 1, (3.78)
where the fraction in (3.78) is less than one such that the total term is negative. Hence,
consumption in t also increases in response to the conventional monetary policy shock,
γmcε < 0.
Next, we show the effects of the monetary policy shock on the liquidity premium
R̂ISt − R̂mt . Using the generic solutions (3.72)-(3.74) in the equilibrium conditions (3.32)
and (3.35), we can write R̂ISt and R̂
m
t as
R̂ISt = [γcb (γb − 1) + γpibγb] b̂t−1 + [γcbγmbε − γmcε + γpibγmbε ] ε̂mt , (3.79)
R̂mt = ρpiγpibb̂t−1 + (1 + ρpiγ
m
piε) ε̂
m
t . (3.80)
Given these solutions, the response of the liquidity premium to the monetary policy shock
reads
∂
(
R̂ISt − R̂mt
)
∂ε̂mt
= (γcbγ
m
bε − γmcε) + γpibγmbε − ρpiγmpiε − 1. (3.81)
Using γmcε = − (1 + ρpi) γmpiε − 1, γmbε = −γmpiε, and 1 = (1 + ρpi) γpib + γcb, we can show that
(3.81) is negative since ρpiγpib ≥ 0 which follows from ρpi ≥ 0 and γpib > 0 (see above).
Hence, the liquidity premium rises in response to the expansionary monetary policy shock.
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2. We now aim at identifying the responses in periods t and t + 1 to a negative
monetary policy shock in t+ 1 that is announced in t, ε̂mt+1,t < 0. This time, we apply the
solution form
pit = γpibb̂t−1 + γpiεε̂mt+1,t + γ
′
piεε̂
m
t,t−1, (3.82)
b̂t = γbb̂t−1 + γbεε̂mt+1,t + γ
′
bεε̂
m
t,t−1, (3.83)
ĉt = γcbb̂t−1 + γcεε̂mt+1,t + γ
′
cεε̂
m
t,t−1 (3.84)
for the system (3.69)-(3.71), where γpiε, γbε, and γcε yield the effects of the announcement
on the endogenous variables in t, while γ′piε, γ
′
bε, and γ
′
cε show the effect in t+1. Following
the procedure from above and substitute for the variables in (3.69)-(3.71) with the generic
solutions in (3.82)-(3.84), leads to the conditions
γpib = δγpibγb + χγb + χγcb, 1 = (1 + ρpi) γpib + γcb, 1 = γb + γpib, (3.85)
γ′piε = (δγpib + χ) γ
′
bε + χγ
′
cε, γ
′
cε = − (1 + ρpi) γ′piε − 1, γ′bε = −γ′piε, (3.86)
γpiε = (δγ
′
piε − χ) + (δγpib + χ) γbε + χγcε, γcε = − (1 + ρpi) γpiε, γbε = −γpiε. (3.87)
First note that lines (3.85) and (3.86) correspond to (3.75) and (3.76) with γ′xε replacing
γmxε for a generic variable x = pi, b, c. The system (3.85), (3.86) contains six conditions
in the six unknown coefficients γ′piε, γ
′
bε, γ
′
cε, γpib, γb, and γcb while (3.75), (3.76) is the
same system of conditions in γmpiε, γ
m
bε , γ
m
cε , γpib, γb, γcb. If follows that γ
′
piε, γ
′
bε, and γ
′
cε,
respectively, equal γmpiε, γ
m
bε , and γ
m
cε , respectively, from step 1 and that γpib,γb,γcb are the
same as in step 1.
We start by identifying the effects of the forward guidance shock on inflation and
consumption in period t, i.e. γpiε and γcε. Combining the three conditions in (3.87) yields
γpiε =
δγ′piε − χ
1 + δγpib + χ (2 + ρpi)
. (3.88)
The denominator is the same as in (3.77) and therefore positive. The sign of the numer-
ator, δγ′piε − χ, which can by using the definitions of δ be rewritten as
−χ (β + χ) + χ (1 + δγpib + χ)
1 + δγpib + χ (2 + ρpi)
< 0
is unambiguously negative, such that γpiε < 0.
The consumption response in period t is easy to determine. With γcε = − (1 + ρpi) γpiε
from (3.87), it follows directly that γcε > 0. In response to the forward guidance shock,
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consumption falls and inflation rises in period t.
Now, we turn to period t+ 1. The total effect on inflation in this period is given by
∂pit+1
∂ε̂mt,t−1
= γ
′
piε + γpibγbε
which we claim to be negative. To prove this claim, we use γ
′
piε = γ
m
piε, 0 < γpib < 1 and
γbε = −γpiε from above such that it is sufficient to show that
γmpiε < γpiε.
Using the results on these two coefficients from above, this is equivalent to
− χ
1 + δγpib + χ (2 + ρpi)
<
δγ′piε − χ
1 + δγpib + χ (2 + ρpi)
.
The common denominator is positive (see above) such that this condition is equivalent to
−χ < δγ′piε − χ.
which is equivalent to
0 < δγ′piε
which is true as δ > 0 and γ′piε < 0.
Now, we consider the total effect on consumption in period t+ 1 which is given by
∂ct+1
∂ε̂mt,t−1
= γ′cε + γcbγbε = γ
′
cε − γcbγpiε
which we claim is negative. Using results on the γ′cε and γpiε from above and γcb =
1− (1 + ρpi) γpib, the claim is equivalent to
χ (1 + ρpi)
1 + δγpib + χ (2 + ρpi)
− 1 < (1− (1 + ρpi) γpib) · δγ
′
piε − χ
1 + δγpib + χ (2 + ρpi)
Again, the common denominatior is positive, hence the condition is equivalent to
χ (1 + ρpi)− (1 + δγpib + χ (2 + ρpi)) < (1− (1 + ρpi) γpib) · (δγ′piε − χ)
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which can be simplified to
1 + δγpib > ρpiγpibδγ
′
piε − ρpiγpibχ− χ.
The left hand side of this condition is positive. All terms on the right hand side are
negative which is obvious for the final two and also holds for the first one as δ > 1 as
γ′piε < 0. This completes the proof of the claim that
∂ct+1
∂ε̂mt,t−1
< 0.
Finally, we consider the responses of the liquidity premium R̂IS − R̂m. Using the
generic solutions (3.82)-(3.84) in the equilibrium conditions as above, we can now write
R̂ISt and R̂
m
t as:
R̂ISt = [γcb (γb − 1) + γpibγb] b̂t−1 + [γcbγbε + γ′cε − γcε + γpibγbε + γ′piε] ε̂mt+1,t
+ [γcbγ
′
bε − γ′cε + γpibγ′bε] ε̂mt,t−1 (3.89)
R̂mt = ρpiγpibb̂t−1 + ρpiγpiεε̂
m
t+1,t + (1 + ρpiγ
′
piε) ε̂
m
t,t−1 (3.90)
In the announcement period, the response of the liquidity premium in t to the forward
guidance shock reads
∂
(
R̂ISt − R̂mt
)
∂ε̂mt+1,t
= γcbγbε + γ
′
cε − γcε + γpibγbε + γ′piε − ρpiγpiε
= [(1 + ρpi)− γpib − (1− (1 + ρpi) γpib)− ρpi] γpiε + γ′cε + γ′piε (3.91)
= ρpiγpibγpiε + γ
′
cε + γ
′
piε,
where we use γcb = 1 − (1 + ρpi) γpib from (3.85) and γcε = − (1 + ρpi) γpiε and γbε = −γpiε
from (3.87) to obtain the second line. Since γpiε, γ
′
piε, and γ
′
cε are all negative and ρpi and
γpib are positive. Hence, the sign of (3.91) is negative and the liquidity premium rises on
impact in response to the negative forward guidance shock.
In period t+ 1, the response of the premium is governed by
∂
(
R̂ISt+1 − R̂mt+1
)
∂ε̂mt+1,t
= [γcbγbε + γ
′
cε − γcε + γpibγbε + γ′piε − (1 + ρpiγ′piε)]
+ [γcb (γb − 1) + γpibγb − ρpiγpib] · ∂b̂t
∂ε̂mt+1,t
= [(γcbγbε + γ
′
cε − γcε) + γpibγbε + γ′piε − (1 + ρpiγ′piε)]
+ [γcb (γb − 1) + γpibγb − ρpiγpib] · γbε.
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Substituting out γbε, γcε, γ
′
cε, γpib, and γcb through the conditions in (3.85), (3.86), and
(3.87) and rearranging, we can simplify this derivative to
∂
(
R̂ISt+1 − R̂mt+1
)
∂ε̂mt+1,t
= −2 (γ′piε + 1) +
(
2− γ2b
)
ρpiγpiε
which is unambiguously negative as γ′piε = − χ1+δγpib+χ(2+ρpi) > −1.
3.C.2 Calculation of Anticipated Monetary Policy Shocks
In this appendix, we describe how to calculate the sequence of current and anticipated
policy shocks εmT+1 =
{
εmT+1, ε
m
T+1+k,T+1
}K
k=1
of length H = K+1, which are announced in
period T +1 for all periods until T +H that yields a desired interest rate path
{
RmT+h
}H
h=1
that we want to study in a policy experiment about forward guidance.
We solve our model using standard perturbation techniques, yielding policy functions
of the type
YT+1 = gc + gpŝT + gεε
m
T+1 (3.92)
for a generic endogenous variable Yt, such as the policy rate, that depends on a constant
(steady state) value gc, a vector of state variables ŝT = sT − s that is formulated in
deviations from steady state s with dimension [S × 1], and the corresponding coefficient
vector gp [1× S]. εmt [H × 1] is a vector of one current and K anticipated policy shocks
for period from T + 1 to T + H with the corresponding coefficients vector gε [1×H].
Analogously, the vector of policy functions for the state variables reads
sT+1 [S × 1] = gsc [S × 1] + gsp [S × S] ŝT [S × 1] + gsε [S ×H] εmT+1 [H × 1] (3.93)
with the coefficient matrices gsc, gsp, and gsε. The coefficient matrices and the steady
state are all known objects. Using (3.92) and (3.93) and assuming that εmT+1 has non-zero
entries only in the initial period T + 1 (i.e. forward guidance is only provided in T + 1
until T + H) allows us to write down solutions for the policy rate for H periods ahead
that depend on the steady state of the state variables (in period T ) and the policy shocks
that are announced in T + 1 only:25
RT+1
(
ŝT , ε
m
T+1
)
= gc + gpŝT + gεε
m
T+1
25The procedure can obviously be applied to any other endogenous variable also, e.g. the policy rate
in real terms.
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RT+2
(
ŝT , ε
m
T+1
)
= gc + gpgspŝT + gpgsεε
m
T+1
. . .
RT+H
(
ŝT , ε
m
T+1
)
= gc + gpg
H−1
sp ŝT + gpg
H−2
sp gsεε
m
T+1.
This constitutes a system of H linear equations in H unknown elements of εmT+1 for a
given sequence
{
RmT+h
}H
h=1
, which can be rewritten as
b = MεmT+1, (3.94)
where
b [H × 1] =

RT+1
RT+2
. . .
RT+H
− gc

1
1
. . .
1
−

gp
gpgsp
. . .
gpg
H−1
sp
 ŝT ,
and
M [H ×H] =

gε
gpgsε
. . .
gpg
H−2
sp gsε
 .
Rearranging (3.94) then allows to back out the H shocks as
εmT+1 = M
−1b.
3.C.3 Additional Numerical Results
Figure 3.8 complements our analysis by repeating the comparison of Figure 3.2, but now
the central bank provides forward guidance about the real instead of the nominal policy
rate. In this case, the real rate is announced to be reduced by 25 basis points for 4
quarters. We conduct this analysis because central banks in the end aim at steering real
rates that are directly relevant for intertemporal consumption decisions. Moreover, we
make our analysis thereby comparable to the analysis of McKay et al. (2016), who focus
solely on real policy rates. It turns out that whether guidance is in terms of the real
instead of the nominal rate does not make much of a difference for the model with the
endogenous liquidity premium. The corresponding responses for output, inflation, and
the liquidity premium in Figures 3.2 and 3.8 line up almost completely. The difference
is larger for the conventional New Keynesian model, as the exacerbating effect via higher
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inflation that endogenously lowers real rates is now absent. The responses of real activity
and inflation are nevertheless still much stronger than in the model with the liquidity
premium.
Figure 3.8: Comparison with Standard New Keynesian Model – Real Policy Rate
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Notes: Impulse responses to real policy rate (Rmt /pit+1) reduction of 25 basis points in quarters 1 to
4, announced before quarter 1: production yˆt, inflation pˆit, policy rate R
m
t , private-sector real rate
RISt /pit+1, liquidity premium R
IS
t −Rmt . Y-axis: Deviations from steady state in percent ( yˆt, pˆit) or in
basis points (else). X-axis: quarters. Black line: Baseline model with endogenous liquidity premium.
Blue circled line: Conventional New Keynesian model.
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Chapter 4
Determinants of Relative Sectoral
Prices: The Role of Demographic
Change
This chapter is based on Groneck and Kaufmann (2017).1
4.1 Introduction
The relative price of non-tradable services to tradable commodities is well-known to be
an important determinant of real exchange rates. According to the famous Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis, which dates back to 1964, movements in these relative sectoral
prices can be attributed to sectoral differences in productivity growth. Empirical studies
tend to find support in favour of the hypothesis.2 Further determinants of the relative price
beyond the Balassa-Samuelson effect operate over the demand-side of the economy. The
literature discusses non-homothetic preferences (Bergstrand, 1991), government demand
(De Gregorio et al., 1994; Galstyan and Lane, 2009) and net foreign assets (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2002, 2004; and Christopoulos et al., 2012).3
In this chapter, we propose a country’s demographic structure as an additional eco-
nomic fundamental for the relative price of non-traded goods and we study this relation-
1We thank Tino Berger, Alexander Ludwig, Øivind Nilsen, Matthias Scho¨n, three anonymous referees,
as well as seminar and conference participants at Cologne, Dortmund, and Paris for helpful comments.
We also thank Julie Graf for excellent research assistance.
2See, amongst others, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1999), Kakkar (2003), Berka, Devereux and Engel
(2014), and Coto-Martinez and Reboredo (2014), where the latter also consider the role of imperfect
competition.
3A synopsizing study is conducted by Ricci, Milesi-Ferretti and Lee (2013).
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ship empirically. Figure 4.1 highlights the importance of this determinant. As a point
of reference, the left panel depicts the cross-sectional relation between changes in rela-
tive prices of non-tradables and productivity growth differentials between tradables and
non-tradables for a set of industrialized countries. The strong positive correlation illus-
trates the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The right panel plots relative-price changes against
the average growth rates of old-age dependency ratios (hereafter named OADR), which
are defined as the fraction of population aged 65+ to the population of age 15-64. This
highlights our proposed channel: changes in the age structure of the population are posi-
tively correlated with the growth rate of the relative price of non-tradables. In particular,
countries with stronger growth of the OADR experience higher growth in the relative
price.
Figure 4.1: Cross-Sectional Correlations of Relative Price Changes
(a) Relative Productivity (b) Old-age Dependency Ratio
Notes: Average annual changes for 15 OECD countries between 1970 and 2009. Abscissa left panel:
productivity in tradable relative to non-tradable sector. Abscissa right panel: old-age dependency
ratio (population aged 65+ divided by population aged 15-64). Details on the construction of all
variables are given in Appendix 4.B. Country codes are explained in Table 4.1.
There are several mechanisms how ageing can lead to higher relative prices. In this
chapter, we focus on the following demand effects. We present evidence that elderly peo-
ple consume more non-traded services relative to people in working age. This implies an
increase in overall demand for those goods due to population ageing. At the same time,
the old-age population has lower saving rates than younger cohorts, such that aggregate
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savings of an ageing society decline (see for instance Higgins 1998 and Yoon et al. 2014),
while aggregate consumption increases. Likewise this rise in spending is also biased to-
wards non-tradable goods. If the additional demand for non-traded services of an ageing
society is not fully met by higher supply, the relative price of non-tradables increases.
We claim that persistent imperfect intersectoral mobility of production factors hampers
a reallocation of factor inputs to the non-tradable sector. Since we are concentrating on
OECD countries with highly developed capital markets and since the production of non-
traded services tends to be labour-intensive, labour market rigidities are – as we show –
most important. The empirical literature supports this reasoning. For instance Wacziarg
and Wallack (2004), Lee and Wolpin (2006), and Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010)
all provide evidence of substantial and long-lasting intersectoral worker immobility in
response to labour demand shocks.4
Demographic change may also influence relative prices by other channels, which our
analysis accounts for but which we argue to be of less importance. Besides its aforemen-
tioned impact on savings, ageing can also influence national investment and, hence, net
foreign asset positions. Changes in the latter may imply relative price shifts due to the
classical transfer effect. For instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 2004) argue that
higher net foreign assets can generate wealth effects, which lower labour supply. The
resulting upward pressure on wages can lead to relative price increases if one sector is rel-
atively labour-intensive, which is usually assumed to be the case for non-tradable services.
Simulation results by Krueger and Ludwig (2007) show that changes in net foreign asset
positions due to demographic change remain small for the United States and Europe,
though. A further consequence of ageing could be an increased scarcity of labour rela-
tive to capital. This may also result in an upward pressure on wages with corresponding
effects on the relative price, given the non-tradable sector is relatively labour-intensive.
According to Krueger and Ludwig (2007), Ludwig, Schelkle and Vogel (2012) and Heijdra
and Reijnders (2012) the impact of demographic change on factor prices is expected to
be limited.5 Nevertheless, our empirical analysis considers these channels as well.
To illustrate the relation between sectoral prices and population ageing and in order
to provide guidance for the subsequent empirical analysis, we construct a stylized small
open economy model with overlapping generations (OLG). We assume two production
4Cardi and Restout (2015) demonstrate the importance of labour market rigidities for the transmission
of the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
5The literature shows that endogenous human capital adjustments, increased labour market partic-
ipation of women, migration, international capital flow adjustments, as well as pay-as-you-go pension
systems financed by payroll taxes all dampen the effect of demographic change on factor prices. In fact,
the number of employees has risen in most countries over the past decades.
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sectors. As is well known at least since Rogoff (1992), a precondition for any demand
effects to matter for relative prices in such a setting is a deviation from full intersectoral
factor mobility.6 Otherwise, supply factors would just shift to the sector that experiences
the increase in demand, leaving relative goods prices unchanged. The majority of the
related literature merely assumes fixed amounts of sectoral production, thereby ruling
out any kind of factor mobility. For instance, Rose, Supaat and Braude (2009) rely in a
related model on the strong assumption of completely inelastic labour supply, both in the
aggregate and between sectors.7 In contrast, our model features an endogenous labour
supply decision of households, and we explicitly allow for different degrees of imperfect
intersectoral mobility of labour. We obtain two testable key results from our model.
First, an increase in the old-age dependency ratio leads to an increase in the relative price
of non-tradables. The reason is that workers do not reallocate their labour as much as
needed to let supply keep up with changing demand. Second, we show that price effects
are more pronounced for higher degrees of labour market rigidity.
The basic econometric specification arises from the theoretical model and shows that
relative prices depend on the old-age dependency ratio, which is the regressor of main
interest. To analyse whether imperfect labour mobility is relevant for the transmission of
the effect, we introduce interactions of indices of labour market rigidity with the OADR.
We construct a panel of 15 OECD countries that are followed from 1970 to 2009. Detailed
sector-specific data is classified into tradables and non-tradables to construct relative
prices and productivities. To quantify labour market immobility we use the index by
Botero, Djankov, Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) that includes measures of
institutional flexibility of the labour market. Our estimation strategy explicitly takes into
account the non-stationarity and cross-sectional dependence of the data. To this end, we
use the method by Pesaran (2006) and Kapetanios et al. (2011), which finds increasing
use in macro panel studies.
Our results indicate a significant link between population ageing and relative sectoral
prices. A one percent increase of the old-age dependency ratio inflates the relative price
of non-tradables by 0.34 percent. This implies that about one fifth of the average increase
in relative prices between 1970 and 2009 can be attributed to the increase of the OADR.
6Instead of assuming imperfect factor mobility, introducing deviations from the assumption of a small
open economy or diminishing returns to scale in at least one sector (see Galstyan and Lane (2009) for an
example) is also sufficient for both supply and demand factors to matter in determining relative prices
and real exchange rates.
7Cantor and Driskill (1999) analyse the effect of a change in death rates on the real exchange rate in
a stylized OLG model and find that the direction of the effect depends on the long-run net foreign asset
position of a country. However, they do not consider non-tradable goods and their model also does not
feature endogenous production.
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The results indicate that the aforementioned demand effects of ageing are predominantly
responsible for this finding. Moreover, we identify labour market rigidity as the driving
force for the transmission of this demand effect. While price effects are close to zero
for countries with very flexible labour markets, they increase monotonically with the
degree of rigidity. Various robustness checks underpin the validity of our findings, and
demonstrate the importance of this transmission mechanism relative to other possible
channels. Further results widen the analysis to the whole population age structure.
We add to the literature that studies the determination of relative sectoral prices and
real exchange rates by proposing a demand effect induced by population ageing. Few
studies have analysed demographic change in this context. Complementary to our study,
Rose et al. (2009) examine the effect of fertility on the real exchange rate arguing that
a higher share of the dependent young population leads to lower savings and a higher
demand for non-tradables. They confirm their theoretical prediction by finding a depre-
ciating effect of declines in fertility on real exchange rates. Bettendorf and Dewachter
(2007) analyse the impact of changes in the whole population age structure on the rela-
tive price of non-tradables, but their empirical findings remain in parts insignificant and
inconclusive. Using a structural model, Aloy and Gente (2009) focus on Japan and find
that declines in population growth are able to explain a large share of the real apprecia-
tion since 1970. Andersson and O¨sterholm (2005, 2006) perform reduced-form regressions
of real exchange rates on the population age structure. They show that using demo-
graphic data can improve forecasts of real exchange rates. For a detailed overview on
this literature, see Hassan, Salim and Bloch (2011). Recently, Yoon, Kim and Lee (2014)
and Juselius and Taka´ts (2015) study the effect of demographic change on inflation using
post-war data with mixed results.
Overall, the above mentioned literature studying demand effects on relative prices
and real exchange rates is silent about the precise mechanism through which changes in
demand translate into price effects.8
Our contribution to the literature is, hence, twofold. First, by making use of recent
advances in statistical methods, we are able to establish population ageing as a demand-
driven determinant of relative sectoral prices. Second, in our empirical specification we
pay particular attention to the theoretical transmission mechanism of the old-age related
8Although the importance of certain transmission channels like non-homothetic preferences, decreasing
returns to scale or production factor immobility is generally acknowledged theoretically, it is usually not
further investigated in the empirical specifications, cf. De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994), Galstyan
and Lane (2009), and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 2004) and Rose et al. (2009), for example. One
exception are Christopoulos, Gente and Leo´n-Ledesma (2012), who explicitly evaluate the importance of
frictions on capital markets in developing countries for real exchange rate determination both theoretically
and empirically.
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demand effects by introducing labour market rigidity. We show that labour market rigidi-
ties are indeed a driving factor for the transmission.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, we present stylized facts
about age-specific consumption patterns of tradable and non-tradable goods. Section 4.3
lays out the theoretical model and derives two testable implications. Section 4.4 translates
the theory into an econometric model, describes the data and explores data properties.
Section 4.5 presents the main results of the paper, while various sensitivity checks are
shown in Section 4.6. We conclude the paper in Section 4.7.
4.2 Ageing and Consumption
The demand effects of demographic change on sectoral prices rely on the premise that
the elderly consume a higher fraction of non-tradable services than the population in
working age does. Micro studies on the United States and some European countries all
detect this age pattern in consumption data. Hobijn and Lagakos (2003), Bo¨rsch-Supan
(2003) as well as van Ewijk and Volkerink (2012) present cross-sectional overviews of
consumption-age profiles of several different expenditure groups for the U.S., Germany
and the Netherlands, respectively. Lu¨hrmann (2005, 2008) investigates consumption-age
profiles by means of panel data from Germany and the U.K. that enable her to control for
all kinds of cohort-, time-, income-, and household-effects. The essence of these studies is
that when people become older, they tend to reduce their expenses on tradable goods cat-
egories like ’transportation’, ’furniture and home electronics’ and ’clothing’, while demand
for non-tradables, such as ’housing’ and ’health care goods and services’ increases. Based
on their findings, Hobijn and Lagakos yet discuss the introduction of an additional CPI
for the elderly in the U.S. that takes into account their differing consumption spending
patterns.
However, household data does not cover the full scope of changes in consumption
patterns at the aggregate level. In particular, it does not take into account the substantial
public spending on health and long-term care. According to OECD data, average health
care spending of member states amounts to about ten percent of GDP in recent years, of
which on average only 30 percent are financed by the private sector. Hagist and Kotlikoff
(2005) estimate age profiles of health care spending for a sample of ten OECD countries
and show that expenditures at old age are a multiple of those in working age. For instance,
average health care expenses already double between the age groups 50-64 and 65-69.
As an illustration we quantify the difference between aggregate tradable and non-
tradable consumption shares at working age and during retirement exemplarily for a spe-
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cific country. We choose the United States in the year 2011. To this end, we combine micro
data of the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) with aggregate data on Medicare
and Medicaid health care spending. First, we map the numerous expenditure categories
in the CE data on the tradable and non-tradable sector, based on sector classifications by
De Gregorio et al. (1994), to obtain expenditures per capita on tradable and non-tradable
goods for young (aged 15-64) and old people (aged 65+).9 Next, we add Medicare and
Medicaid spending per capita, which are classified to be non-tradable, to consumption
expenditures of the two age groups. The resulting share of aggregate non-tradable con-
sumption of the older people (83 percentage points) is on average about eight percentage
points higher than in case of the younger people (75 percentage points). The magnitude
of the difference depends on the chosen country and time period, though. Braude (2000)
and van Ewijk and Volkerink (2012) conduct similar exercises for the United States in
1990 and the Netherlands in 2010 respectively and quantify the difference in shares to be,
even larger, about 20 (70 versus 50) and 13 (70 versus 57) percentage points. In sum,
the available evidence suggests substantial differences in aggregate consumption shares of
tradables and non-tradables over the life cycle. Changes in the age distribution of the
population are therefore expected to induce non-negligible changes in aggregate demand.
4.3 Model
We employ a model with overlapping generations and two production sectors j = {T,N}
to study the effect of population ageing on the relative price of non-tradable goods. Fol-
lowing the literature on structural real exchange rate determination, we assume a small
open economy, where interest rates are taken as given by world markets.
A continuum of households lives for at most two periods, in each period t a young
and an old generation is alive. Every young individual faces a probability pit of growing
old. The population size of the young generation is normalized to unity. Therefore, pit is
the ratio of old relative to young households. It can be interpreted both in an aggregate
perspective as the OADR and in an individual perspective as the life expectancy of the
household in period t for t + 1. In order to capture the observations made in the last
section in an abstract fashion, young households receive utility from the consumption of
tradable commodities CTt and disutility of labour effort Lt, whereas the elderly enjoy the
consumption of non-tradable services CNt .
10 Households maximize lifetime utility given
9Regarding details on data sources, the reader may be referred to Appendix 4.B.
10A generalized setting in which both generations consume both types of goods does not change the
results qualitatively as long as preferences of the elderly are biased in favour of non-tradables.
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by
U
(
CTt , Lt
)
+ βpitU
(
CNt+1
)
, (4.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor. Utility in working age is given by
U
(
CTt , Lt
)
= lnCTt − lnLt, while utility of the elderly is given by U
(
CNt+1
)
= lnCNt+1.
The assumed preference structure is chosen to obtain analytical solutions and implies
both an intertemporal elasticity of substitution and a Frisch-elasticity of one. Labour
supply can be allotted to both sectors of production. Following Horvath (2000) and Cardi
and Restout (2015), households have a preference to work in both sectors, which drives
a wedge between sectoral wages. Total labour in the utility function is defined by the
CES-aggregate
Lt =
[(
LTt
) ρ+1
ρ +
(
LNt
) ρ+1
ρ
] ρ
ρ+1
, (4.2)
where Ljt denotes hours worked in the tradable (j = T ) and non-tradable (j = N) sector
respectively. ρ > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between labour supplies in both
sectors. For ρ → ∞, hours worked are perfect substitutes and workers would devote all
working time to the sector that pays the highest wage, while for ρ < ∞, workers have a
preference to diversify their labour supply and are willing to work in both sectors even in
the presence of wage differentials. Hence, ρ measures the degree of imperfect intersectoral
labour mobility, where small values of ρ imply less mobility. In line with empirical evidence
cited above, this modelling choice generates persistent labour market frictions and shall
be regarded as a short-cut for more comprehensive models of labour market rigidities, in
order to allow for explicit analytical solutions and comparative statics.
Temporal budget constraints are given by
CTt = L
T
t W
T
t + L
N
t W
N
t − St (4.3)
and
Pt+1C
N
t+1 =
(1 +R∗)
Etpit
St. (4.4)
W Tt and W
N
t label wages in the two sectors, St denotes household savings that are in-
vested on international capital markets and that yield an exogenously given return of
R∗, which is the world interest rate. In addition, we assume a perfect annuity market,
where assets of those who deceased are passed to the survivors, so that the return on
savings is (1 +R∗) /pit.11 Finally, we let Pt denote the relative price of non-tradable ser-
11Alternatively, one could enrich the model by a warm-glow bequest motive. This would imply less
dissaving in old age, but at the same time already more savings in young age due to anticipation effects.
In sum, effects on the consumption path of households are limited or even absent.
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vices to tradable commodities and assume the price of tradable goods to be given by
world markets and normalized to unity.12 The first-order conditions of the household’s
maximization problem yields the standard Euler-equation, CNt+1/C
T
t = β (1 +R
∗) /Pt+1,
and an equation on how to optimally supply labour in the two sectors, given by
LTt
LNt
=
(
W Tt
WNt
)ρ
. (4.5)
Condition (4.5) states that relative hours worked depend on the wage ratio
(
W Tt /W
N
t
)
and the elasticity of substitution ρ.
Both in the tradable and the non-tradable sector a homogeneous consumption good
is produced by perfectly-competitive firms using labour Ljt and physical capital K
j
t as
inputs within the Cobb-Douglas technology
Y jt = F
(
Ajt , K
j
t , L
j
t
)
= Ajt
(
Kjt
)αj (
Ljt
)1−αj
, (4.6)
where Y jt and A
j
t are output and productivity in sector j = {T,N} , respectively. Firms
borrow capital on international markets, which is assumed to fully depreciate within one
period. In this small open economy setting, profit maximization and perfect competition
among firms yield that optimal sectoral capital intensities are tied down by productivity
and the world interest rate, while real sectoral wages depend on exogenous parameters
and exogenous stochastic processes for Ajt and pit only.
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is defined as a sequence of prices and quan-
tities such that optimality conditions of all agents hold and markets clear in each period
for a given interest rate R∗, a given price of tradable goods and sectoral productivities Ajt .
All agents operate as price takers. Households choose consumption CTt and C
N
t+1, savings
St and sectoral labour supplies L
j
t , while firms decide on their labour and capital demand(
Ljt , K
j
t
)
in both sectors. Labour markets clear every period. Savings of households are
fully invested at international capital markets and firms borrow all capital from abroad.
Supply of tradable commodities Y Tt has to equal domestic demand C
T
t plus net exports.
The market clearing condition of the non-tradable sector is given by
Y Nt = pitC
N
t . (4.7)
12As discussed repeatedly in the literature (for instance in Froot and Rogoff 1995), the relative price
of non-tradables is directly related to the real exchange rate in such a setting.
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In steady state, the relative price of non-tradables can be shown to evolve according to
P = k
(AT ) 1−αN1−αT
AN
( piκ
1− piκ
) 1−αN
1+ρ
, (4.8)
where k and κ are positive constants and P > 0 as long as 1−piκ > 0.13 Accordingly, P is
driven by two main components in this framework. The first term of (4.8) in parentheses
illustrates the well-known Balassa-Samuelson effect. It states that an increase in produc-
tivity in the tradable sector generates an increase in the relative price of non-tradables
and appreciation of the real exchange rate, while productivity growth in the non-traded
sector yields a decline in the relative price and real depreciation. The second component
of the equation, on which this chapter lays its focus, highlights the effect of population
ageing as well as the role of labour market rigidities in its transmission on the relative
price. In particular, we are able to show the following:
Proposition 2. In steady state, the effect of ageing on the relative price of non-tradables
is positive:
∂P
∂pi
> 0 (4.9)
Proposition 3. In steady state, the effect of ageing on relative prices is the higher, the
lower intersectoral labour mobility,
∂ (∂P/∂pi)
∂ρ
< 0, (4.10)
Formal proofs are given in Appendix 4.A.2.
Increasing the old-age dependency ratio leads to higher demand for non-tradable ser-
vices: Currently young households will consume less tradables and save more for old-age.
Once old, they consume the proceedings of their higher savings in form of more non-
tradable goods. In case of perfect factor mobility (ρ→∞) these demand shifts are fully
met by higher supply as labour moves immediately to the service sector due to positive
wage pressure. Production of services increase until wages are equal in both sectors again,
leaving relative goods prices unchanged. The last term of (4.8) converges to one. In con-
trast, in case of imperfect intersectoral labour mobility (ρ <∞), higher demand in the
non-tradable service sector entails a positive effect on the relative price of non-tradables,
since reallocation of labour is not exhaustive: increased demand is only partly met by
changes in supply and partly by an increase in the relative price.
13A derivation of this equation is given in Appendix 4.A.1.
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4.4 Estimation Procedure and Data
4.4.1 Econometric Model
Propositions 2 and 3 constitute the two main hypotheses we intend to test. To this end,
we set up a reduced form econometric specification based on (4.8), which is given by
ln (pit) = ci + γ1 ln (oadrit) + γ2 ln (oadrit) · lrii + γ′Xit + uit. (4.11)
Sub-indices denote country i and time period t respectively, ci labels country-specific
intercepts and uit is an error term, whose structure will be discussed below. To allow
for a convenient interpretation as (semi-)elasticities, variables are, when sensible, used as
natural logarithms. The dependent variable ln (pit) is the natural log of a measure of the
relative price of non-tradables. The covariate of main interest, ln (oadrit), is the empirical
counterpart of pit and denotes the log of the old-age dependency ratio. According to our
first hypothesis, based on Proposition 2, its coefficient γ1 should possess a positive sign.
Our second hypothesis, deduced from Proposition 3, claims that imperfect labour mobility
leads to higher price effects of ageing. This is tested for by including an interaction term
of ln (oadrit) and a measure of labour market rigidities, lrii, which is considered to be the
empirical counterpart of ρ. For expositional reasons, we begin with using a binary variable,
l˜rii = {0, 1}, for lrii in the interaction term. This binary index takes on a value of one for
countries with an LRI-value above the sample mean (l˜rii = 1lrii≥lrii) and a value of zero
else (l˜rii = 0lrii<lrii). This way the coefficient γ1 can be interpreted as the effect of ageing
for countries with an LRI-value below mean, while γ1 +γ2 indicates the effect for countries
with an LRI-value above mean. In a next step, we estimate the interaction effect by using
the actual country-specific values of lrii. In this case, ∂ ln (pit) /∂ ln (oadrit) = γ1 + γ2lrii
gives the partial effect of ageing for the respective value of lrii. According to Proposition
3, the partial effect of the old-age dependency ratio on the relative price is thus expected
to be positive and to increase for higher degrees of labour market rigidity.
Further explanatory variables are summarized in the vector Xit. Its elements are mo-
tivated by (4.8) and by the related empirical literature. We consider variables, for which
there exists broad consensus on their importance in determining real exchange rates and
relative prices of non-tradables.14 First, we include productivity in the tradables rela-
tive to the non-tradables sector (relative sectoral productivity) to account for the classic
Balassa-Samuelson effect. Next, we add GDP per capita to control for demand-side effects,
14Ricci et al. (2013) provide an overview about which variables may belong to this canonical set of
determinants.
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for instance due to non-homothetic preferences that regard non-tradable services as luxu-
ries and tradable commodities as necessities – an approach proposed first by Bergstrand
(1991). Moreover, GDP per capita is capable of capturing effects of changes in factor
endowments in the spirit of Bhagwati (1984) as GDP is strongly correlated with the
capital-labour ratio of the economy. Higher capital-labour ratios lead to higher wages, in
particular in the labour-intensive non-tradable sector and, thereby, to a higher relative
price. To this extent, GDP per capita also controls for supply-side effects of demographic
change, such as changes in the relative scarcity of labour. In the presence of these ef-
fects, the coefficient of GDP is expected to be positive. The third factor we consider
is government consumption relative to GDP to control for further demand effects, since
public expenditures are known to be biased towards non-tradables. Given this reading,
its coefficient should also be positive. Evidence on this effect is for instance provided by
Ricci et al. (2013) and Galstyan and Lane (2009). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002, 2004)
deal with wealth effects of net foreign asset positions on real exchange rates. According to
their argument, which is related to Keynes’ classical transfer problem, an increase in net
foreign assets induces wealth effects that reduce labour supply. This hits labour-intensive
non-tradable sectors relatively stronger, thereby leading to an increase of the relative price
of non-tradables. To control for this kind of effect, we augment our specifications with a
variable on net foreign assets relative to GDP. As demographic change can influence net
foreign asset positions via its effect on savings, this variable can also capture these indirect
price effects of population ageing. Since net foreign assets can also attain negative values,
it is the only element of Xit, which is not used in logs.
By the inclusion of net foreign assets and GDP per capita, we control for the transfer
and supply-side effects of demographic change that are discussed in the introduction. As
a consequence, the coefficient of the old-age dependency ratio will predominantly capture
the demand effects of ageing on relative prices.
4.4.2 Data Description
The empirical analysis is based upon a new-constructed panel data set of 15 OECD
countries with annual observations beginning earliest in 1970 and ending at the latest
in 2009. No country is followed for less than 30 years. On average we have 36 annual
observations per country. Overall, we command 546 usable observations in the benchmark
model. The choice of countries is restricted by the availability of sufficiently detailed data
on sectoral prices and productivity over sufficiently long time horizons. An overview of the
sample dimensions is given in Table 4.1. All data stems from publicly available sources,
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Table 4.1: Sample Overview
Country Abbrev. Coverage Country Abbrev. Coverage
Austria AUT 1976-2009 Korea KOR 1971-2009
Belgium BEL 1975-2009 Netherlands NLD 1977-2009
Canada CAN 1970-2006 Norway NOR 1970-2009
Denmark DNK 1970-2009 Portugal PRT 1977-2006
Finland FIN 1970-2009 Spain ESP 1980-2009
France FRA 1970-2008 United Kingdom GBR 1971-2007
Italy ITA 1970-2009 United States USA 1977-2009
Japan JPN 1970-2008 Full Sample (avg.) – 1973-2008
Notes: 546 usable observations in the benchmark model.
such as the OECD STAN data base or the Penn World Tables. Details on the sources
and regarding the construction of all variables are shifted to Appendix 4.B. A list of all
variables used throughout the text and summary statistics can be found in Table 4.2.
The relative price of non-tradable goods is constructed as the ratio of price indices of
the non-tradables and the tradables sector. Vice versa, the relative sectoral productivity
refers to the productivity ratio of the tradables relative to the non-tradables sector. As
in Canzoneri et al. (1999) and Ricci et al. (2013), sectoral productivities are measured
as value added per worker. The old-age dependency ratio, which is one of the standard
measures in population economics, is defined as population aged older than 65 divided by
population in working age (15-64). The the old-age population share measures the amount
of the population aged 65+ relative to total population, while the working-age population
share accounts for the ages 15-64 to total population. Similar to the OADR, the young-age
dependency ratio (hereafter named YADR) measures the amount of dependent children
aged 0-14 relative to the population in working age (15-64). The total fertility rate is
defined as the number of children that would be born to a woman during her childbearing
years if she bears children in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates.
Table 4.2 illustrates the magnitude and evolution of the data over time. As most
variables in our sample feature clear upward trends, we present means and standard de-
viations at the beginning and end of the observation period instead of the less meaningful
overall sample statistics.
The labour market rigidity index, LRI, in the main results is taken from Botero et
al. (2004). This measure is widely used both in academia and by institutions such as the
World Bank. It is defined as the average of four other indices, namely alternative em-
ployment contracts, cost of increasing hours worked, cost of firing workers, and dismissal
procedures. This composite index can attain values between zero and one, where higher
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
1970 2009 Average
Unit Mean Std. Mean Std. Annual
Dev. Dev. Changea
Relative Price on Non-Tradables Index 63.80 17.28 121.86 18.82 1.86
Old-Age Dependency Ratio % 15.04 5.25 23.51 4.30 1.06
Old-Age Population Share % of Pop. 9.57 3.37 15.82 2.63 1.24
Working-Age Population Share % of Pop. 63.14 4.16 67.29 2.01 0.17
Young-Age Dependency Ratio % 43.95 1.41 25.12 0.30 -1.37
Total Fertility Rate % 2.54 0.83 1.65 0.27 -0.84
Labour Market Rigidity Index, LRI [0,1] 0.53 0.22 0.58 0.17 –
Labour Market Rigidity Index, LRIEPI [0,6] 2.33b 1.19b 2.14 0.72 -0.36
Capital Openness, KAOPEN [0,1] 0.39 0.28 0.96 0.13 3.70
Economic Freedom, EconFree [0,100] 69.18c 6.21c 73.26 5.36 0.53
Labour Market Freedom, LabFree [0,100] 67.83d 17.97d 65.64 20.06 -0.13
Relative Sectoral Productivity Index 52.86 21.73 148.75 42.01 2.65
GDP per capita 2005 Int$ 14,242 4943 34,650 7425 2.31
Government Consumption % of GDP 7.36 1.35 7.20 1.18 -0.01
Net Foreign Assets % of GDP -1.94 34.85 -1.39 48.94 0.12
Notes: a Cross-sectional mean of average annual growth rates in percent. bMean and Std. Dev. in
1985 instead of 1970 due to data limitations. c Mean and Std.Dev. in 1995. dMean and Std.Dev. in
2005. The relative price of non-tradables is defined relative to the price of tradables, whereas relative
sectoral productivity is defined as productivity in the tradables relative to the non-tradables sector.
values represent larger rigidities. Table 4.3 reveals a wide variation of the index in our
sample. As one would expect, the index takes on substantially lower values for Anglo-
American than for continental European countries (e.g. United States 0.22 versus France
0.74). Yet, a drawback of this measure is that it does not reflect changes of these rigidities
over time, since it is merely a fixed number per country. This issue is addressed by the
OECD Indicators of Employment Protection. These contain a time-variant measure of
the strictness of employment protection for years following 1985. We denote this index
as LRIEPI and use it for a robustness check. This alternative index is on a scale from
0 (least rigid) to 6 (most rigid). As Table 4.3 reveals, means per country of the LRIEPI
yield a similar ranking as the index by Botero et al. (2004). Further indices that measure
other economic and legal characteristics (see KAOPEN, EconFree, LabFree in Table 4.2)
will be described within the sensitivity analysis.
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Table 4.3: Labour Market Rigidity per Country
Country LRI Mean(LRIEPI)Country LRI Mean(LRIEPI)
Austria 0.50 2.64 Korea 0.45 2.64
Belgium 0.51 1.78 Netherlands 0.73 2.93
Canada 0.26 0.92 Norway 0.69 2.33
Denmark 0.57 2.15 Portugal 0.81 4.68
Finland 0.74 2.43 Spain 0.74 2.83
France 0.74 2.39 United Kingdom 0.28 1.01
Italy 0.65 2.76 United States 0.22 0.26
Japan 0.16 1.67 Full Sample (avg.) 0.54 2.23
Notes: LRI denotes Labour Market Rigidity Index and has a range of [0,1], see Botero et al. (2004).
LRIEPI has a range of [0,6], see OECD Indicators of Employment Protection. For both indices lower
values mean lower degrees of rigidity.
4.4.3 Non-Stationarity and Cross-Sectional Dependence
In order to determine the appropriate estimation techniques, we test the data for cross-
sectional correlation and its trend behaviour. Macroeconomic variables are notoriously
affected by these two issues, which can seriously distort inference and consistency of
estimations.15
To check for cross-sectional dependencies, Table 4.4 presents average (absolute) cross-
sectional correlation coefficients and results of Pesaran’s (2004) CDP test statistic, which
is N (0, 1)-distributed under the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence. The
CDP statistics rejects cross-sectional independence for all variables and the computed
average correlation coefficients reveal strong cross-sectional correlations for all variables,
except for government consumption and net foreign assets. Altogether, the results leave
no doubt that cross-sectional correlation is indeed a problem in this data set.
The trend behaviour of the data is explored by means of three different panel unit
root tests. We apply the tests by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS), Maddala and Wu
(1999) (MW), and by Pesaran (2007) (CIPS). The latter is a panel unit root test of the
second generation that can account for cross-sectional correlations, which is important as
tests that neglect this issue can have non-negligible size distortions. Results are shown
in Table 4.5. Under the null hypothesis of all three tests, the variable in question entails
a unit root, while under the alternative hypothesis at least one series of the panel is
stationary. All three tests are based on standard augmented Dickey-Fuller regressions on
15As shown, for instance, by O’Connell (1998) in the context of tests for purchasing power parity,
disregarding cross-sectional dependence can come at high costs and may even revert outcomes of empirical
studies.
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Table 4.4: Cross-Sectional Dependence Tests
CDP avg. (rij) avg. (|rij|)
Relative Price on Non-Tradables 51.03*** 0.86 0.86
Old-Age Dependency Ratio 37.90*** 0.64 0.70
Old-Age Population Share 45.73*** 0.77 0.78
Working-Age Population Share 27.34*** 0.46 0.56
Young-Age Dependency Ratio 51.87*** 0.87 0.87
Total Fertility Rate 14.05*** 0.23 0.60
Relative Sectoral Productivity 57.92*** 0.97 0.97
GDP per capita 58.17*** 0.98 0.98
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 10.34*** 0.17 0.52
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) -2.48** -0.041 0.58
Notes: All variables except net foreign assets are measured in logs. CDP denotes Pesaran (2004)
cross-sectional dependence test statistic. Asterisks indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of cross-
sectional independence at 10%(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). avg. (rij) and avg. (|rij |) denote average
and average absolute cross-sectional correlation coefficients.
the individual time series, but in case of the CIPS these are extended by cross-sectional
averages in lagged levels and first-differences of the variable in question to address issues of
cross-sectional correlation. In order to control for serial correlation, all tests can include
various autoregressive lags. The optimal lag length for each variable is determined by
the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria searching between 0 and 4 lags. As Table
4.5 reveals all variables but the working-age population share, the YADR, (and fertility)
are found to be non-stationary. It is, therefore, important to examine the time series
properties of the regression residuals as well in order to rule out spurious regression
results.
4.4.4 Econometric Methodology
Given the presence of cross-sectional correlation in the data, we follow Pesaran (2006) in
assuming an error term of multi-factorial structure for our panel regression model (4.11).
We describe the error term, uit, by
uit = δ
′
ift + εit, εit ∼ i.i.d. N
(
0, σ2
)
, (4.12)
where ft is a vector of unobserved, potentially non-stationary common factors, which
represent events that appear to influence all countries at the same time. By the vector of
individual-specific factor loadings δ′i, different countries are still allowed to react differently
to these common effects. The covariates xit ∈ (oadrit, Xit) in (4.11) can be correlated with
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Table 4.5: Panel Unit Root Tests
CIPS IPS MW
Relative Price on Non-Tradables 1.27 1.46 24.35
Old-Age Dependency Ratio 5.17 1.94 35.67
Old-Age Population Share 1.11 1.19 34.88
Working-Age Population Share -4.32*** -2.35*** 61.96***
Young-Age Dependency Ratio -6.68*** -7.70*** 49.05**
Total Fertility Rate 1.66 -2.34*** 81.66***
Relative Sectoral Productivity 0.46 2.85 25.20
GDP per capita -0.37 -0.28 22.81
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 1.19 0.032 19.07
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) 6.24 5.19 11.30
Notes: All variables except net foreign assets are measured in logs. Results of CIPS (Pesaran 2007),
IPS (Im et al. 2003), and MW (Maddala and Wu 1999) panel unit root test statistics. Asterisks
indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at 10%(*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Optimal lag
length determined by Akaike and Bayesian information criteria searching between 0 and 4 lags.
the same unobserved factors ft as uit, and may be described as a process of the type
xit = ai + η
′
ift + vit, (4.13)
which is assumed to depend on a fixed effect ai, the factors ft with country-specific factor
loadings η′i and a random component vit. In case of economic macro variables, examples
for the factors ft are common business cycles, the world financial crisis, or the effects of
globalization. In case of demographic variables, one may think of changes in working
environments, habits, or medical innovations that increase longevity or reduce birth rates
such as the contraceptive pill. If common factors are present in uit, but uit and xit are
uncorrelated (δi 6= 0, ηi = 0), error terms in (4.11) will be cross-sectionally correlated and
the use of conventional estimators will yield inefficient standard errors. If uit and xit are
correlated additionally (δi 6= 0, ηi 6= 0), coefficient estimates itself are biased due to a type
of omitted variable bias.
A promising approach to remedy the problem is to apply the Common Correlated Ef-
fects Pooled (referred to as CCEP) estimator developed by Pesaran (2006). This estimator
is practically computed as an ordinary least squares regression, augmented with a set of
additional regressors that consists of the cross-sectional averages of the dependent and
independent variables, which are interacted with country dummies. As the data are found
to be non-stationary, it is likely that at least some components of ft are integrated of order
one. Kapetanios et al. (2011) show that the CCEP estimator is consistent in presence of
unit roots in the unobservable factors. Using Monte Carlo studies, they demonstrate the
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superiority of the CCEP estimator over other commonly used ones, even in small samples
as ours. A further appealing feature of the estimator is that by controlling for the po-
tentially non-stationary common factors the approach helps to deal with the problems of
non-stationary data, such as biased inference that can lead to spurious regressions. Given
these issues, estimations of (4.11) are conducted by means of Pesaran’s CCEP approach
and, for comparison reasons, using the DOLS procedure (see Stock and Watson 1993, Kao
and Chiang 2000), which is a widely used methodology for non-stationary panels. It is
calculated as a two-way fixed effects model that employs additional leads and lags of first
differences of the independent variables.
In order to rule out spurious regressions, we control for stationarity of the regression
residuals, again taking into account the possibility of cross-sectional dependence. To this
end, we again apply the CIPS test.16 As is well known, we cannot directly use the critical
values from Pesaran (2007) that were constructed for the case of raw data, since regression
residuals are calculated as to minimize the sum of their squares. Instead, we generate
critical values directly from our sample by applying the Continuous-Path Block Bootstrap
method developed by Paparoditis and Politis (2000, 2003), assuming a fixed block length
of 10 percent of the overall observation period.17 This method is explicitly designed to
preserve non-stationarity and cross-sectional dependence of the data. We generate 500
bootstrap redraws of the estimated regression residuals. For each redraw we compute the
CIPS statistic and thereby generate a distribution of the test statistic.
4.5 Results
In this section, we provide evidence for the two hypotheses deduced from Propositions
2 and 3. Table 4.6 presents results of model (4.11) without (columns I, II) and with
(columns III, IV) the interaction term using the CCEP and the DOLS approach.
4.5.1 Ageing and the Relative Price of Non-Tradables
The coefficient of the old-age dependency ratio using the CCEP estimator, cf. column (I),
implies that an increase in the OADR by one percent leads to an increase in the relative
price of non-tradables of 0.34 percent. The estimate is statistically significant at the 1
percent level and constitutes good evidence for our first hypothesis – population ageing
16For instance, Holly, Pesaran and Yamagata (2010) use it for the same purpose.
17We adopt and modify code by Fachin (2007), such that it can be used for an unbalanced panel as
ours.
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Table 4.6: Main Regressions
Dependent Variable: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Relative Price of Non-Tradables CCEP DOLS CCEP DOLS
Old-Age Dependency Ratio (OADR) 0.34*** 0.20*** 0.15 0.20***
(0.093) (0.040) (0.111) (0.040)
OADR × Labour Market Rigidity (LRI) 0.54*** 0.16**
(0.175) (0.065)
Relative Sectoral Productivity 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.55***
(0.046) (0.034) (0.045) (0.038)
GDP per capita 0.41*** -0.054 0.32*** -0.018
(0.072) (0.040) (0.076) (0.041)
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 0.11** -0.055 0.073 -0.10**
(0.051) (0.039) (0.051) (0.043)
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) -0.00083*** -0.0022*** -0.00081*** -0.0020***
(0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00020)
Residual diagnostics
CDP -2.08** -3.26*** -2.51** -3.33***
CIPS -7.095*** -0.20 -7.21*** 0.014
F (OADR,Interaction= 0) 11.91*** 16.19***
Observations 546 501 546 501
Notes: All variables except net foreign assets are measured in logs. Regressions based on (4.11).
In regressions (III) & (IV) , OADR is interacted with a binary variable with value one in case of
labour market rigidity above average (l˜rii = 1lrii≥lrii) and zero else (l˜rii = 0lrii<lrii). Country
dummies included in all regressions, time dummies in (II) and (IV). Standard errors in parentheses.
Asterisks mark significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Residual diagnostics: CDP cross-sectional
dependence test statistic by Pesaran (2004), Residual stationarity tested by Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test
using bootstrapped critical values. F (OADR,Interaction= 0) denotes F-test about joint significance
of OADR and the interaction term.
leads to a higher relative price of non-tradables. Since our regression model controls for
the transfer and supply-side effects of demographic change, we infer that this finding is
mainly driven by changes in demand. Our results complement the empirical finding by
Rose et al. (2009), who find that increases in fertility lead to appreciated real exchange
rates.
All of the control variables enter the regression significantly, most of them with both
qualitatively and quantitatively reasonable coefficients. An increase in relative sectoral
productivity by one percent leads to an increase in the relative price by 0.59 percent,
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thereby offering evidence in favour of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The effect of GDP per
capita is positive also, which indicates the presence of price effects due to non-homothetic
preferences (Bergstrand 1991) or relative factor endowments (Bhagwati 1984), as discussed
in Section 4.4.1. Because of the latter, the variable also captures supply-side effects of
demographic change, such as changes in the size of the labour force relative to the capital
stock. In line with the related literature, rises in government spending inflate the relative
price, though its coefficient is relatively small. As opposed to the intuition given in
Section 4.4.1, the effect of an increase in net foreign assets tends to reduce relative prices,
though at a very low rate. An increase in net foreign assets over GDP by one percentage
point lowers the relative price by 0.083 percent only. However, according to the findings of
Christopoulos et al. (2012), transfer effects are generally negligible for developed countries
and only gain importance in case of capital-constraint developing countries, which are not
included in our sample. This result also implies that the effects of demographic change
on relative prices that operate over the transfer channel are very small. This finding is
also in line with simulation results by Krueger and Ludwig (2007).
As diagnostic tests of the regressions, we provide cross-sectional dependence and sta-
tionarity tests of the residuals. Cross-sectional independence is rejected at the 5 percent
level in column (I), which implies that it is important to consider this type of correlations
when testing for residual stationarity. According to the bootstrapped critical values of
the CIPS test, a unit root in the residuals can be rejected at the 1 percent level, so that
we can rely on the inference of the estimated effects.
In column (II), the CCEP results are contrasted with the same regression using a
DOLS estimator.18 Our finding regarding the effect of ageing on the relative price re-
mains qualitatively unchanged. An increase of the OADR by one percent raises the
relative price of non-tradables by 0.20 percent, which is slightly smaller than the CCEP
estimate. Turning to the control variables, the effects of relative productivity and net
foreign assets can be found close to the CCEP estimates, while the effects of GDP per
capita and government consumption turn insignificant. However, in reference to the resid-
ual diagnostics, regression (II) appears to be spurious as we are not able to reject the null
hypothesis of non-stationarity in the residuals. Though this does not need to imply in-
consistent estimates of the coefficients (see Phillips and Moon 1999), inference can be
highly misleading and should not be relied on. This difference between the two estima-
tion approaches underlines vividly the capabilities of the CCEP estimator to filter out
unobservable non-stationary components of the data.
18Due to the limited sample length, we use one lead and lag.
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4.5.2 The Importance of Labour Market Rigidities
Columns (III) and (IV) in Table 4.6 show results for the regressions augmented with an
interaction term of the OADR and the binary variable l˜rii that indicates rigid labour
markets. It is constructed with the index by Botero et al. (2004), which is a standard
measure in the labour economics literature. In line with our prediction in Proposition
3, the effect of ageing indeed depends on labour market rigidities. In column (III), the
coefficient of the OADR now gives the effect of ageing on relative prices for the less
rigid countries, where lrii < lrii. For these countries a one percent increase of the
OADR implies an increase of the relative price by 0.15 percent, which is less than half the
size of the effect in column (I). Statistically this effect is not significantly different from
zero. Such findings regularly occur in models with interaction effects due to the inherent
multicollinearity between the interaction and its basis variable. The coefficient of the
interaction itself is positive and highly significant as theory predicts. The effect of a one
percent increase of the OADR for the rigid countries reads 0.15+0.54=0.69 percent. An
F-test implies joint significance of the OADR-coefficient and the interaction term at the
1 percent level. In sum, the estimates imply that ageing has a small insignificant effect
in less rigid countries, while the effect is strong and positive for rigid countries. In the
DOLS model in column (IV) the results are qualitatively similar, though the coefficients
are again slightly different from the CCEP estimation. For the countries with less rigid
labour markets, the effect of ageing reads 0.20 percent and for those with rigid labour
markets it rises to 0.36 percent. In terms of control variables and residual diagnostics
both regressions behave similarly to their counterparts in (I) and (II). Again, inference in
the DOLS regression has to be questioned due to a rejection of residual stationarity.
To further investigate the effect of the interaction, we reestimate model (4.11) us-
ing the untransformed country-specific values of the labour market rigidity index and
the CCEP estimator. By means of this model, we calculate the partial effect of ageing
∂ ln (pit) /∂ ln (oadrit) = γ1 + γ2lrii for the LRI-values of each country in the sample. The
resulting effects of the old-age dependency ratio for each country along with their 95 per-
cent confidence band are plotted in Figure 4.2.19 Confirming the theoretical predictions
of Proposition 3, the countries with the most flexible labour markets, appearing on the
19In order to compute significance levels of the partial effect ∂ ln (pit) /∂ ln (oadrit) , the standard
approach is to reparameterize model (4.11) by subtracting the respective value of the rigidity in-
dex for country j before using it in the interaction term. Model (4.11) is then given by ln (pit) =
ci + γ˜1 ln (oadrit) + γ2 ln (oadrit) · (lrii − lrij) + γ′Xit + uit. The coefficient of OADR can then be shown
to be the partial effect of OADR for country j, i.e. γ˜1 = γ1 + γ2lrij . This way standard errors can be
directly read out to evaluate statistical significance of the partial effect at the respective rigidity value of
country j.
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Figure 4.2: Visualisation of Interaction Effects
Notes: Partial effects of OADR, ∂ ln (pit) /∂ ln (oadrit) = γ1 + γ2lrii, and corresponding 95% con-
fidence band evaluated at the country-specific LRI-value using model (4.11). For the underlying
regression, see Table 4.12 in Appendix 4.C. Country codes are explained in Table 4.1 in the text, LRI
values for each country depicted on the abscissa.
left side of the figure, undergo small price effects of ageing, while countries with higher
degrees of rigidity experience larger effects. In particular, for LRI-values up to 0.3 that are
related with Anglo-American countries, price effects are estimated to be not statistically
different from zero. In case of LRI-values about 0.7 - 0.8, which correspond to (South-
ern) European countries as France, Spain and Portugal, relative price effects rise up to
nearly 0.60 percent. These findings underpin the empirical relevance of Proposition 3 and
support the validity of the proposed transmission via imperfect labour market mobility.
4.5.3 The Economic Significance of Ageing
In terms of economic significance, the estimate of our main regression in column (I) of
Table 4.6 implies the following. As the average old-age dependency ratio in our sample
increased from a value of 15 to 23.5 (see Table 4.2) by about 56 percent between 1970
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Figure 4.3: Fitted Values and Counterfactual Experiments
Notes: Fitted and counterfactual values of the relative price of non-tradables, based on model (4.11),
for two groups of countries. Left panel (a): Austria, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Korea, United Kingdom,
United States. Right panel (b): Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain.
and 2009, the coefficient of the OADR of 0.34 percent implies a surge of relative prices
due to demographic change of about 19 percent. As in the same time period the relative
price increased on average by 91 percent, about one fifth of the price movements can be
attributed to population ageing. Hence, the effect of ageing appears to be of reasonable
and non-negligible magnitude.
Economic significance is further studied by means of a set of counterfactual exper-
iments, presented in Figure 4.3. The figure provides fitted values (solid lines) of the
relative price of non-tradables, as implied by model (4.11), and compares these to a coun-
terfactual scenario, where the OADR is kept constant at its 1970 value (dashed lines).
The difference between the solid and the dashed line can be interpreted as the ceteris
paribus effect of ageing on the relative price over the sample period. This is done for two
groups of countries. In Panel (a) of Figure 4.3 the average LRI-value of countries whose
LRI is below sample mean are used for calculating fitted values and the counterfactual
simulation, while Panel (b) employs the average of countries with LRI values above mean.
The figure confirms the relative importance of population ageing and the transmission via
labour market frictions. While in both groups relative price effects would be dampened
in case of a constant age structure, the difference between actual and counterfactual lines
is by far more pronounced for countries with a high degree of labour market rigidity. In
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numbers, in Panel (a) the difference in the increase of the solid (57 percent) and the
dashed line (45 percent) sums up to about 12 percentage points between 1970 and 2009,
while in Panel (b) the difference is about 31 percentage points. Simulations for the whole
sample and all individual countries can be found in Section 4.C.1 of the appendix. They
also support the relevance of ageing for relative prices.
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis
To provide further evidence of the importance of demographic change for sectoral prices
and the proposed channel via labour market rigidities, we analyze various alternative
specifications. First, we evaluate the effect of changes in the whole demographic structure
on relative prices instead of using the aggregated old-age dependency ratio. Second, we
provide robustness checks for our proposed transmission mechanism. To this end, we use
an alternative labour market rigidity index, as well as indices that account for further
economic and legal factors. The result of the latter exercise is that other potential trans-
mission mechanisms do not have the same empirical support as labour market rigidities
do.
4.6.1 Disentangled Age Effects
To complement the finding of an appreciating effect of young cohorts on the real exchange
rate by Rose et al. (2009), we test for the effect of the young-age dependency ratio (the
fraction of population aged 0-14 to the population of age 15-64) on the relative price of
non-tradables. The intuition for a higher share of the population at young-age is analogue
to the impact of the OADR: the young dependent population consumes a higher share
of non-tradable goods – such as education – with an upward effect on relative prices.
Column (I) of Table 4.7 shows the results using the CCEP estimator. Consistent with the
intuition provided by Rose et al. (2009) for real exchange rates, the young-age dependency
ratio is also found to increase the relative price of non-tradables. A 1 percent increase of
YADR inflates the relative price by 0.19 percent.20
The old-age dependency ratio as the explanatory variable of main interest in Sec-
tion 4.5 subsumes two opposing effects. Being defined as the ratio of the retired to the
20We also successively added two different demographic measures of young cohorts, the YADR and the
fertility rate, to our main model in column (I) of Table 4.6. The effect of OADR on relative prices remains
qualitatively the same in all cases. The coefficient of the YADR also stays close to the one estimated in
Table 4.7. The fertility rate, however, is not found to have a significant effect on relative prices. Full
results on these checks can be found in Section 4.C.2 of the appendix.
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working-age population, this variable simultaneously captures the effect of changes in two
population shares. According to our hypothesis both age groups should yield opposite ef-
fects on relative sectoral prices: A higher share of the working-age population is expected
to generate a negative impact due to a relatively lower demand for non-tradables.21 On
the contrary, a higher share of the elderly relative to total population should have a pos-
itive impact. To study the impact of a countries’ demographic structure on the relative
sectoral price in more detail, we decompose the old-age dependency ratio in its compo-
nents, and use the share of population in working age (15-64) and the old-age population
share (65+) relative to total population instead of the OADR.
Columns (II) and (III) of Table 4.7 present results of using the two alternative demo-
graphic variables. In line with theory, the working-age population share has a negative
and significant coefficient in column (II). A 1 percent increase leads to a decline of rel-
ative prices by 1.62 percent. Column (II) shows – similar to the results in Table 4.6 –
that population ageing significantly inflates relative prices. An increase of the old-age
population share by 1 percent increases relative prices by 0.26 percent. The quantitative
importance of the relatively high coefficient of the working-age population share is put
into perspective by the fact that changes in the working-age share are far less pronounced
than in the old-age population share (see Table 4.2).
The coefficients of the control variables in all three columns are close to those estimated
in our main regression in Section 4.5. Inference of the regressions is valid, since non-
stationarity of the residuals can be rejected. The CDP test indicates presence of cross-
sectional correlations in (I) and (II), but not in (III). Regression results using the DOLS
estimator are again close to CCEP estimates, but residual stationarity has to be rejected
following bootstrapped critical values to the CIPS test. Therefore, all results using the
DOLS methodology are relegated to Section 4.C.2 of the appendix.
Having established the opposing effects of the different age groups, we now investigate
the effect of the demographic structure in more detail. To this end, we group the pop-
ulation in smaller bins. In particular, we construct L = 14 population groups of 5-year
intervals starting at age 15 until age 80+, where the last age bin covers all households
at ages 80 and older. For each country i and time period t we compute the fraction of
the age interval relative to the total population at ages 15 onwards. The age variables
enter the estimation equation as
∑L
l=1 νl · agelit, where agelit is the population share of
age bin l in country i at period t and νl is the corresponding coefficient. Because of our
relatively small sample we approximate this detailed demographic information by an age
polynomial as it is done by Fair and Dominguez (1991) and Higgins (1998). In particular,
21In the model of Section 4.3 this would imply a decline in pit.
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Figure 4.4: Approximated Coefficients for 5-year Age-Bins
Notes: Coefficients νl for 5-year age bins approximated with the cubic age polynomial according to
equations (4.14) and (4.15). Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence band. The inverted S-shape
implies negative coefficients for the working-age population and positive coefficients for older ages.
we assume that the coefficients νl lie along a cubic polynomial
22
νl = ω0 + ω1l + ω2l
2 + ω3l
3. (4.14)
We can estimate ω1, ω2 and ω3 by introducing auxiliary age variables Zit in an estimation
model related to (4.11) as follows:23
ln (pit) = ci +
3∑
k=1
ωkZkit + γ
′Xit + uit, (4.15)
22We have to approximate the demographic structure by a polynomial in order to mimimize the losses
of degrees of fredom. For each additional explanatory variable the CCEP estimator involves interaction
terms of cross-sectional averages with all country dummies. Hence, three addional variables that are
required for a cubic polynomial already imply 48 additional variables in the estimation.
23Imposing a zero-sum restriction for νl,
∑L
l=1 νl = 0, implies ω0 =
− 1L
[
ω1
∑L
l=1 l + ω2
∑L
l=1 l
2 + ω3
∑L
l=1 l
3
]
. This removes the perfect colinearity between the con-
stant and the age shares in the regression.
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where the Zkit are defined as
Zkit =
L∑
l=1
lk · agelit − 1L
L∑
l=1
lk
L∑
l=1
agelit with k = 1, 2, 3;
and Xit is again a vector of additional control variables. Once the coefficients ω1, ω2 and ω3
are estimated, we can approximate the coefficients νl for each age bin l by equation (4.14).
Since the age bin coefficients νl are linear transformations of our estimated coefficients
ωk, we can employ the delta method to compute standard errors and confidence bands
for νl. The results of our estimation are depicted in Figure 4.4. A full set of results from
regression (4.15) including coefficients for the auxiliary demographic variables Zkit and
residual diagnostics are relegated to Section 4.C.2 of the appendix.
The approximated coefficients νl of the age bins are in line with our theory. Coefficients
for age bins during working age are negative from ages 40 onwards. At older ages past
70, the coefficients turn positive. Overall, 5 out of 14 age bins are significant at the 5
percent level.24 A test for joint significance of all Zkit reveals that demography is jointly
significant at the 1 percent level. To evaluate the economic significance, we employ the
same counterfactual experiment as in Section 4.5 and thus keep the whole age structure
constant at their values in 1970. We find that demographic changes can account for 17
percentage points of the increase in the relative price between 1970 and 2009, which is of
the same order of magnitude as in our main specification.
24We also tried different degrees for the polynomials. A quadratic polynomial yields similar results
with respect to the shape (u-shaped) and significance of the coefficients. 4th and 5th order polynomials
yield a similar shape but mostly insignificant coefficients for the age bins. As explained before, this might
be due to the loss of too many degrees of freedom associated with the inclusion of additional variables.
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Table 4.7: Alternative Demographic Variables
Dependent Variable: (I) (II) (III)
Relative Price of Non-Tradables
Young-Age Dependency Ratio 0.19**
(0.10)
Working-Age Population Share -1.62***
(0.34)
Old-Age Population Share 0.26***
(0.096)
Relative Sectoral Productivity 0.56*** 0.50*** 0.63***
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
GDP per capita 0.40*** 0.51*** 0.30***
(0.067) (0.071) (0.067)
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.099*
(0.049) (0.048) (0.052)
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0008***
(0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00018)
Residual diagnostics
CDP -2.39** -3.00*** -1.19
CIPS -8.958*** -8.48*** -7.43***
Observations 546 546 546
Notes: All variables except net foreign assets are measured in logs. Method of estimation: CCEP.
Regressions based on (4.11) without interaction term using alternative demographic variables. Country
dummies included in all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks mark significance at
10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Residual diagnostics: CDP cross-sectional dependence test statistic by
Pesaran (2004), Residual stationarity tested by Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test using bootstrapped critical
values.
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Table 4.8: Alternative LRI and Sample Split
Dependent Variable: (I) (II) (III)
Relative Price of Non-Tradables Alternative Variable Sample Split
LRI < LRI LRI ≥ LRI
Old-Age Dependency Ratio 0.42** 0.17* 0.53***
(0.17) (0.090) (0.10)
OADR × Labour Market Rigidity (LRIEPI) 0.016**
(0.0079)
Relative Sectoral Productivity 0.27*** 0.36*** 0.75***
(0.081) (0.077) (0.058)
GDP per capita 0.45*** 0.039 0.19**
(0.11) (0.083) (0.088)
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 0.22*** 0.086 -0.0067
(0.065) (0.061) (0.075)
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) -0.000086 -0.0012*** -0.00093***
(0.00020) (0.00039) (0.00019)
Residual diagnostics
CDP -1.52 -2.95*** 1.11
CIPS -6.26** -4.49*** -5.46***
F (OADR,Interaction= 0) 4.45**
Observations (countries) 360 254 (7) 292 (8)
Notes: All variables except net foreign assets are measured in logs. Method of estimation: CCEP.
Regressions based on (4.11). Country dummies included in all regressions. Interpretation of inter-
action in column (I): Partial effect of ageing is given by 0.42+0.016·lriEPIit . The low rigidity set
(column II) contains Austria, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Korea, United Kingdom, and United States,
while the high rigidity set (column III) covers Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, and Spain. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks mark significance at 10% (*),
5% (**), 1% (***). Residual diagnostics: CDP cross-sectional dependence test statistic by Pesaran
(2004), Residual stationarity tested by Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test using bootstrapped critical values.
F (OADR,Interaction= 0) denotes F-test about joint significance of OADR and the interaction term.
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4.6.2 Robustness of the Transmission Mechanism
To further validate our proposed transmission channel we present results of a further set
of robustness analyses. First, in our main regression, we constructed the interaction term
using the old-age dependency ratio and the labour market rigidity index by Botero et al.
(2004) to study the transmission mechanism of demand effects. Although widely used in
the literature, a shortcoming of this index is that it is constant over time and therefore
cannot reflect changes in these rigidities due to, e.g., labour market reforms. In this
section, we employ the time-varying labour market rigidity index by the OECD, denoted
by LRIEPI , instead. In a second exercise, we perform a different estimation strategy
to test for the influence of labour market rigidities. We split the sample into countries
with high and low degrees of rigidity, using the measure of Botero et al. (2004) again,
and run separate regressions on the subsamples. We assign countries to the low rigidity
sample, whose index value is below the sample mean, LRI, and to the high rigidity sample
else. A third group of results aims at testing whether other factors besides labour market
rigidities, such as capital market frictions or imperfect competition, could also drive or be
confounded with the transmission of the age effects.
Results on the first two points are shown in Table 4.8 where the CCEP estimator is
used for all regressions, while results from the DOLS method are relegated to Section
4.C.2 of the appendix. Column (I) shows results of using the time-varying labour market
rigidity index. Due to limited data availability for the LRIEPI , the sample size is reduced
by about one third to 360 observations. Both the coefficient of the OADR and of the
interaction term enter the regression statistically significant. The coefficients can now be
interpreted as follows. The partial effect of the OADR on the relative price is given by
∂ ln (pit) /∂ ln (oadrit) = 0.42 + 0.016 · lriEPIit . For instance at the sample mean of the
rigidity index (lri
EPI
= 2.23), the partial effect is 0.46 percent, which is of the same order
of magnitude as the result shown in Figure 4.2 (0.37 percent). Evaluating the effect of
the OADR at different points of LRIEPI also yields qualitatively analogue outcomes to
those shown in Figure 4.2, albeit the differences between countries are smaller.
Columns (II) and (III) show results for the two subsamples with high and low rigidities,
respectively. As hypothesized, the effect of ageing is very marked for the rigid countries,
LRI≥ LRI, and about 50 percent larger than the effect found for the full sample in Table
4.6. For the subsample with lower degrees of rigidity, LRI< LRI, the coefficient of the
old-age dependency ratio is about half the size of the coefficient in Table 4.6. The effects of
the controls are in all cases broadly comparable to those found earlier, though government
consumption enters the regressions insignificantly when splitting the sample. In terms of
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residual diagnostics, non-stationarity is again rejected at high rates for all regressions.
Table 4.9: Tests for other Transmission Mechanisms
Dependent Variable: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Relative Price of Non-Tradables Capital Market Economic Labor-Market All
Openness Freedom Freedom Interactions
Old-Age Dependency Ratio 0.31*** 0.37*** 0.51*** 0.54***
(0.09) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16)
OADR × KAOPEN -0.0036 -0.0041
(0.0032) (0.0032)
OADR × EconFree w/o Labour -0.044 -0.097
(0.18) (0.18)
OADR × LabFree -0.36** -0.38**
(0.17) (0.18)
Relative Sectoral Productivity 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.55*** 0.57***
(0.047) (0.045) (0.05) (0.051)
GDP per capita 0.36*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.35***
(0.074) (0.08) (0.071) (0.081)
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 0.091* 0.10** 0.09* 0.074
(0.051) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) -0.00078*** -0.00082*** -0.00079*** -0.00075***
(0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00017)
Residual diagnostics
CDP -2.33** -2.12** -2.36** -2.68***
CIPS -7.33** -7.10*** -6.82*** -7.07***
F (OADR,Interactions= 0) 5.79*** 6.88*** 9.10*** 4.10***
Observations 542 546 546 542
Notes: Method of estimation: CCEP. All variables except net foreign assets are measured in logs.
Regressions based on (4.11). In each column OADR is interacted with binary variables with value
one in case the respective index value is above average and zero else. Country dummies included
in all regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks mark significance at 10% (*), 5%
(**), 1% (***). Residual diagnostics: CDP cross-sectional dependence test statistic by Pesaran
(2004), Residual stationarity tested by Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test using bootstrapped critical values.
F (OADR,Interaction= 0) denotes F-test about joint significance of OADR and the interaction terms.
In Table 4.9 we evaluate if other factors besides labour market rigidities are also
relevant for the size of the price effects of population ageing.
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Similar to our proposed mechanism via labour market rigidities, capital market fric-
tions could impair intersectoral and international adjustments of inputs after demand
shifts due to population ageing. To test for the relevance of this channel, we re-estimate
our main result from Table 4.6 using the index of capital market openness (KAOPEN) by
Chinn and Ito (2006) instead of the LRI. The KAOPEN index measures restrictions on
cross-border financial transactions on a scale from 0 to 1, where higher values imply more
open capital markets. Results using the index can be found in column (I) of Table 4.9. As
with the LRI, the interaction is constructed with a binary variable that takes on a value
of one in case of capital market openness above average and zero else. The coefficient of
OADR is highly significant and of the same size as in our main regressions. The effect
of ageing does not change for different degrees of capital market rigidities though: the
interaction term is insignificant and close to zero.
In presence of imperfect competition, demand shifts could lead to relative price changes,
even with completely elastic supply. To test for such a mechanism and to cover a broad
set of potential other factors, we employ the Index of Economic Freedom (EconFree) by
Miller and Kim (2015) next. This index is based on 4 categories, each consisting of several
sub-dimensions. The categories are: rule of law (including items like property rights and
corruption), limited government (taxation, government spending), regulatory efficiency
(business, market entry, and labour market regulation; monetary policy), and open mar-
kets (trade policy, banking and investment regulation). Each sub-dimension is graded on
a scale of 0 to 100, where higher values mean more economic freedom. The index itself
is an unweighted average of all sub-dimensions. To avoid confounding effects with labour
market rigidities, we construct a sub-index with all components of the EconFree excluding
labour market regulation. Regression results using a binary interaction term are shown
in column (II) of Table 4.9. The OADR is found to be highly significant and of similar
size as in the benchmark results, while the interaction with the Economic Freedom index
remains small and insignificant. Countries with less general regulation do not experience
significantly different price effects of ageing. In opposition, using an interaction between
the labour market regulation component (LabFree) of the EconFree in column (III) con-
firms our previous finding of a significant effect of the OADR that decreases in case of
less labour market regulation (note that the interaction effect is now negative since higher
values mean less regulation for the LabFree). Adding all 3 interaction terms – LabFree,
EconFree, and KAOPEN – jointly in column (IV) does not alter these findings. In Ap-
pendix 4.C.2 we show that our baseline result from column (III) in Table 4.6, i.e. using
the labour market rigidity index from Botero et al. (2004) instead of LabFree, is also not
affected by the inclusion of interaction terms with additional rigidity indices.
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We value this as further evidence for our proposed transmission mechanism: higher
labour market rigidity implies stronger effects of population ageing on the relative price of
non-tradables, even after controlling for frictions and regulations on other markets, which
on itself do not play any apparent role.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the impact of demographic change on the relative price of non-
tradable services to tradable commodities. We illustrate by means of a simple model how
changes in demand induced by population ageing can affect relative prices. Imperfect
labour market mobility is key for the transmission of changes in demand in this setup.
We test these hypotheses empirically for a panel of 15 OECD countries. By making use
of the CCEP estimator, we account for non-stationary and cross-sectional dependence,
which is present in our data. Our results indicate a statistically and economically signif-
icant relation of reasonable size between the old-age dependency ratio and the relative
price of non-tradables, which implies an appreciation of the real exchange rate in case of
population ageing. Our model predicts that about one fifth of relative price movements
between 1970 and 2009 can be attributed to demographic change. We further find support
for our proposed transmission mechanism through labour market rigidities. In particu-
lar, Southern European countries like Portugal, Spain and France with more rigid labour
markets experience stronger price effects due to population ageing than Anglo-American
countries that feature lower degrees of rigidity.
This chapter extends the literature on structural real exchange rate determination
by offering the demographic structure of the population as a further complementary ex-
planation for international inflation differentials apart from existing ones like relative
productivities or government spending. Furthermore, we stress the role of labour market
imperfections for the transmission of effects on relative prices and real exchange rates. As
trends in population ageing for the countries of our sample are forecasted to exacerbate
in the upcoming decades, one can expect considerable price changes due to demographic
change.
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Appendix 4.A Details to the Model
4.A.1 Derivation of Equation 4.8
From the market clearing condition for non-tradables in period t, Y Nt = pitC
N
t , and the
first-order conditions of households and firms, we obtain a dynamic implicit function of
the relative price of non-tradables given by
Φ (Pt, Pt−1) = LNt
WNt
Pt (1− αN) − pit
β (1 +R∗)
Pt
WNt−1L
N
t−1
[
1 +
(
W Tt−1
WNt−1
)1+ρ]
= 0, (4.16)
where wages in both sectors are given by
W Tt = (1− αT )
(αT
R∗
) αT
1−αT (ATt ) 11−αT (4.17)
WNt = (1− αN)
(αN
R∗
) αN
1−αN (PtANt ) 11−αN . (4.18)
We evaluate Φ at steady state. Time indices may be omitted now and (4.16) simplifies
to
Φ (P ) =
1
(1− αN) piβ (1 +R∗) − 1−
(
W T
WN
)1+ρ
= 0 (4.19)
Inserting wages, (4.17) and (4.18), and solving for P immediately yields (8)
P = k
(AT ) 1−αN1−αT
AN
( piκ
1− piκ
) 1−αN
1+ρ
, (4.20)
where
k =
 (1− αT )α αT1−αTT
(1− αN)α
αN
1−αN
N
1−αN (R∗)αN−αT1−αT ,
κ = (1− αN) β (1 +R∗) .
To rule out negative prices, it must hold that
1− piκ > 0, (4.21)
which is the case even for extreme parameter constellations and which we hence assume
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to be fulfilled continuously.25
4.A.2 Proofs of Proposition 2 and 3
To assess the effect of an increase in the OADR pi on the relative price P in steady state
and to prove Proposition 2, we differentiate (4.8) with respect to pi :
∂P
∂pi
= k
(AT ) 1−αN1−αT
AN
 1− αN
1 + ρ
(
piκ
1− piκ
) 1−αN
1+ρ
−1 κ (1− piκ) + piκκ
(1− piκ)2
= P
1− αN
1 + ρ
1
pi (1− piκ) , (4.22)
which is greater than zero as long as (4.21) holds. 
In order to prove Proposition 3, we take the derivative of (4.22) with respect to ρ :
∂
(
∂P
∂pi
)
∂ρ
= −K
(
piκ
1− piκ
) 1−αN
1+ρ 1− αN
(1 + ρ)2
[
ln
(
piκ
1− piκ
)
1− αN
1 + ρ
+ 1
]
, (4.23)
where
K = k
(AT ) 1−αN1−αT
AN
 1
pi (1− piκ) .
This expression is less than zero (i.e. Proposition 3 is fulfilled) if
ln
(
piκ
1− piκ
)
> − 1 + ρ
1− αN
ln
(
piκ
1− piκ
)
> 0
where the last step followed since ρ > 0 and 0 < αN < 1. The only restriction for this to
be case is again that (4.21) has to hold. 
25As an example consider the following values in the upper range of the parameters involved: A capital
share in the non-tradables sector of 20% (αN = 0.2), an annual real interest rate of 4% and an annual
discount factor of 0.99 with a length of a generation of 30 years (1 + R∗ = 1.0430, β = 0.9930) yield
κ = 1.92. The highest value of the OADR in our sample is about 0.35, such that piκ = 0.672 < 1.
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Appendix 4.B Data Sources and Construction
An overview of all data sources is given in Table 4.11. In case of all variables but relative
prices and productivities no further data transformations (except for taking logarithms)
are needed. In case of these two exemptions, the variables have to be constructed by
hand from raw data. Below, we describe the procedure to construct the relative price
and productivity measures, which is based on De Gregorio et al. (1994). The Structural
Analysis (STAN) database by the OECD publishes detailed production data of some of
its member states, where total value added is decomposed into nine standardized sectors.
Series are provided both in current and constant prices using the base year 2000, allowing
the calculation of sectoral deflators. In order to classify sectors to be tradable or non-
tradable, De Gregorio et al. compute average ratios of exports to production for each
sector. If this measure exceeds a given threshold, they use 10 percent, a sector is marked
as tradable. These classifications are still used frequently, for instance by Ricci et al.
(2013), and we also stick to it. An overview of all sectors with their original notation by
the OECD and their classification of tradability are given in Table 4.10. Accordingly, five
sectors, accountable for 65 percent of total value added in the year 2000, are classified as
non-tradable, the four remaining sectors as tradable. As one can see, all service sectors
except for ’Transport, Storage and Communications ’ that is accountable for only 6.7
percent of total value added, are marked as non-tradable.
Table 4.10: Sector Classifcations
Sector Share of Value Added Classification
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 3.2 T
Mining and quarrying 0.3 T
Manufacturing 24.8 T
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.0 N
Construction 7.0 N
Wholesale and retail trade - restaurants and hotels 15.0 N
Transport, storage and communications 6.7 T
Finance, insurance, real estate and business services 22.9 N
Community, social and personal services 17.1 N
Notes: Share of Value Added in % based on own calculations, defined as unweighted cross-sectional
average over whole sample in 2000 using data in constant prices. N and T denote non-tradability and
tradability, respectively. Classifications are taken from De Gregorio et al. (1994).
To obtain the relative price of non-tradables, we first compute separate price indices
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for non-tradable services and tradable commodities using the following formula:
pj =
∑
s∈j V ALU
s∑
s∈j V ALK
s
for j = {T,N} , (4.24)
where s is an index running over all sub-sectors in sector j, and V ALU and V ALK denote
value added in current and constant prices, respectively. Subsequently, the deflator of
non-tradables is divided by its counterpart of tradable goods to obtain the relative price
pit = p
N
it /p
T
it, which is – after taking logs – employed in the regressions. Data on relative
productivity, which we compute as value added per worker, also stems from the STAN
database. First, productivity measures for both the non-tradable and the tradable sector
are calculated by dividing sectoral value added at constant prices (V ALK) by sectoral
total employment (EMPN):
sprj =
V ALKj
EMPN j
for j = {T,N} (4.25)
Relative sectoral productivity, rprit, as used in the regression analysis is then constructed
by rprit = spr
T
it/spr
N
it and taking logs of the result.
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Appendix 4.C Additional Results
Table 4.12: Continuous Interaction Effects
Dependent Variable: (I)
Relative Price of Non-Tradables
Old-Age Dependency Ratio -0.020
(0.25)
OADR × Labour Market Rigidity(continuous) 0.73
(0.47)
Relative Sectoral Productivity 0.58***
(0.046)
GDP per capita 0.37***
(0.076)
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 0.091*
(0.052)
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) -0.00082***
(0.00017)
Residual diagnostics
CDP -2.51**
CIPS -7.028***
F (OADR,Interaction= 0) 8.13***
Observations (countries) 546
Notes: Table provides underlying regression to Figure 4.2. All variables except net foreign assets
are measured in logs. Method of estimation: CCEP. Regressions based on (4.11). Country dummies
included. Standard errors in parentheses. Interpretation of interaction: Partial effect of ageing is
given by -0.02+0.73·lrii. Standard error of the partial effect is obtained as described in footnote 18.
Asterisks mark significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Residual diagnostics: CDP cross-sectional
dependence test statistic by Pesaran (2004), Residual stationarity tested by Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test
using bootstrapped critical values. F (OADR,Interaction= 0) denotes F-test about joint significance
of OADR and the interaction term.
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4.C.1 Fitted Values and Counterfactual Simulation
Figure 4.5: Full Sample and Individual Countries
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Figure 4.5 (continued): Full Sample and Individual Countries
Notes: Fitted values and counterfactual values of the relative price of non-tradables for whole sample
and all individual countries. All graphs are derived from regression (4.11) using the continuous LRI
and the CCEP estimator.
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4.C.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Additional Results to Section 4.6.1
Table 4.13: Alternative Demographic Variables - DOLS
Dependent Variable: (I) (II) (III)
Relative Price of Non-Tradables
Young-Age Dependency Ratio -0.087
(0.054)
Working-Age Population Share -0.81***
(0.25)
Old-Age Population Share 0.19***
(0.041)
Relative Sectoral Productivity 0.57*** 0.55*** 0.58***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035)
GDP per capita -0.038 0.16*** -0.076*
(0.050) (0.052) (0.043)
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 0.015 0.054 -0.059
(0.041) (0.035) (0.040)
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) -0.0021*** -0.0023*** -0.0021***
(0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00017)
Residual diagnostics
CDP -3.19*** -3.04*** -3.24***
CIPS -0.25 -1.34 0.13
Observations 501 501 501
Notes: All variables except net foreign assets are measured in logs. Method of estimation: DOLS.
Regressions based on (4.11) without interaction term using alternative demographic variables. Country
and time dummies included in both regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks mark
significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Residual diagnostics: CDP cross-sectional dependence
test statistic by Pesaran (2004), Residual stationarity tested by Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test using
bootstrapped critical values.
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Table 4.14: Alternative Demographic Variables - Joint Effects
Dependent Variable: (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Relative Price of Non-Tradables CCEP DOLS CCEP DOLS
Young-Age Dependency Ratio 0.24*** 0.023
(0.092) (0.061)
Fertility Rate 0.023 -0.049
(0.057) (0.055)
Old-Age Dependency Ratio 0.45*** 0.19*** 0.23** 0.17***
(0.12) (0.044) (0.10) (0.042)
Relative Sectoral Productivity 0.47*** 0.57*** 0.34*** 0.57***
(0.056) (0.035) (0.049) (0.035)
GDP per capita 0.52*** -0.046 0.24*** -0.056
(0.087) (0.049) (0.070) (0.050)
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 0.17*** -0.048 0.083* -0.042
(0.056) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043)
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) -0.00057*** -0.0022*** -0.00029* -0.0022***
(0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00016) (0.00017)
Residual diagnostics
CDP -3.10*** -3.14*** -2.97*** -3.33***
CIPS -10.01*** -0.48 -9.92*** -0.40
Observations 546 501 546 501
Notes: All variables except net foreign assets are measured in logs. Method of estimation: DOLS.
Regressions based on (4.11) without interaction term using alternative demographic variables. Country
dummies included in all regressions, time dummies in (II) and (IV). Standard errors in parentheses.
Asterisks mark significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Residual diagnostics: CDP cross-sectional
dependence test statistic by Pesaran (2004), Residual stationarity tested by Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS
test using bootstrapped critical values.
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Table 4.15: Age Polynomial
Dependent Variable:
Relative Price of Non-Tradables CCEP
Auxiliary Demographic Variable Z1it 0.035***
(0.0091)
Auxiliary Demographic Variable Z2it -0.0071***
(0.0019)
Auxiliary Demographic Variable Z3it 0.00037***
(0.000098)
Relative Sectoral Productivity 0.28***
(0.056)
GDP per capita 0.38***
(0.073)
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 0.10**
(0.052)
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) -0.00052***
(0.00020)
Residual diagnostics
CDP -2.68***
CIPS -12.391***
F (Z1it, Z2it, Z3it = 0) 5.04***
N 546
Notes: Relative Sectoral Productivity, GDP per capita and Government Consumption are measured
in logs. Method of estimation: CCEP. Regression based on (4.15). Country dummies included.
Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks mark significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Residual
diagnostics: CDP cross-sectional dependence test statistic by Pesaran (2004), Residual stationarity
tested by Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test using bootstrapped critical values. F (Z1it, Z2it, Z3it = 0) denotes
F-test about joint significance of all Zkit variables.
The coefficients ωk of the auxiliary demographic variables are highly significant. The control variables
behave similar to those in the main regressions. Non-stationarity of residuals can be rejected.
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Table 4.16: Approximated Coefficients of the Age Bins
Age Bin Coefficient νl Standard Errors
15− 19 -0.009 0.0074
20− 24 0.006 0.012
25− 29 0.012 0.014
30− 34 0.011 0.014
35− 39 0.004 0.014
40− 44 -0.005 0.013
45− 49 -0.016 0.012
50− 54 -0.025** 0.011
55− 59 -0.030*** 0.011
60− 64 -0.030*** 0.011
65− 69 -0.021** 0.011
70− 74 -0.002 0.0013
74− 79 0.029 0.020
80+ 0.076** 0.031
Notes: The table shows the approximated coefficients νl and standard errors of the age bins agelit,
on which Figure 4.4 is based. Coefficients on age bins agelit extracted from the regression in Table
4.15 according to the procedure in (4.14). Asterisks mark significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***).
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Additional Results to Section 4.6.2
Table 4.17: Alternative LRI and Sample Split - DOLS
Dependent Variable: (I) (II) (III)
Relative Price of Non-Tradables Alternative Variable Sample split
LRI < LRI LRI ≥ LRI
Old-Age Dependency Ratio 0.12 -0.060 0.49***
(0.079) (0.057) (0.096)
OADR × Labour Market Rigidity (LRIEPI) 0.00032
(0.0083)
Relative Sectoral Productivity 0.66*** 0.49*** 0.72***
(0.064) (0.061) (0.060)
GDP per capita -0.14 0.20*** -0.22*
(0.10) (0.063) (0.11)
Government Consumption (% of GDP) -0.17** 0.23*** 0.088
(0.070) (0.085) (0.070)
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) -0.0018*** -0.0027*** -0.0014***
(0.00021) (0.00038) (0.00028)
Residual diagnostics
CDP -2.28** 1.76* -0.08
CIPS -0.033 -0.11 -0.69
F (OADR,Interaction= 0) 1.29
Observations (countries) 315 233 (7) 268 (8)
Notes: All variables except net foreign assets are measured in logs. Method of estimation: DOLS.
Regressions based on (4.11). Country and time dummies included in all regressions. The low rigidity
set (column II) contains Austria, Belgium, Canada, Japan, Korea, United Kingdom, and United
States, while the high rigidity set (column III) covers Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, and Spain. Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks mark significance at 10% (*),
5% (**), 1% (***). Residual diagnostics: CDP cross-sectional dependence test statistic by Pesaran
(2004), Residual stationarity tested by Pesaran’s (2007) CIPS test using bootstrapped critical values.
F (OADR,Interaction= 0) denotes F-test about joint significance of OADR and the interaction term.
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Table 4.18: Tests for other Transmission Mechanisms
Dependent Variable: (I) (II)
Relative Price of Non-Tradables All
Benchmark Interactions
Old-Age Dependency Ratio 0.15 -0.38*
(0.111) (0.21)
OADR × LRI (Botero et al. 2004) 0.54*** 1.01***
(0.175) (0.22)
OADR × KAOPEN -0.0039
(0.0031)
OADR × EconFree w/o Labour 0.57**
(0.225)
Relative Sectoral Productivity 0.58*** 0.59***
(0.045) (0.046)
GDP per capita 0.32*** 0.33***
(0.076) (0.08)
Government Consumption (% of GDP) 0.073 0.062
(0.051) (0.051)
Net Foreign Assets (% of GDP) -0.00081*** -0.0008***
(0.00017) (0.00017)
Residual diagnostics
CDP -2.51** -2.52**
CIPS -7.21*** -7.34***
F (OADR,Interactions= 0) 11.91*** 8.15***
Observations 546 542
Notes: Method of estimation: CCEP. All variables except net foreign assets are measured in logs.
Regressions based on (4.11). In each column OADR is interacted with binary variable(s) with value
one in case the respective index value is above average and zero else. Column (I) repeats benchmark
result from Table 6 in the paper. Country dummies included in all regressions. Standard errors in
parentheses. Asterisks mark significance at 10% (*), 5% (**), 1% (***). Residual diagnostics: CDP
cross-sectional dependence test statistic by Pesaran (2004), Residual stationarity tested by Pesaran’s
(2007) CIPS test using bootstrapped critical values. F (OADR,Interaction= 0) denotes F-test about
joint significance of OADR and the interaction terms.
Table 4.18 shows that the benchmark result of the chapter (repeated in column I)
continues to hold when further interactions of the OADR with indices of capital market
frictions and general economic freedom are added (column II). The negative coefficient
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of the OADR results from a change in interpretation because of the inclusion of the
additional indices. The coefficient now gives the effect of OADR for observations where
all 3 binary dummies adopt a value of 0 simultaneously, which applies to 28 data points
in our sample only. Confirming the main result, countries with labour markets that are
more rigid than the sample mean experience signifcantly stronger price effects of ageing.
The coefficient for those countries reads -0.38+1.01=0.63, which is close to the benchmark
result of 0.15+0.54=0.69 in column (I). Capital market frictions do not affect the size of
the price effect of ageing. As opposed to Table 4.9, the interaction between OADR and
the EconFree index is significant. The size of the coefficient is, however, still rather low.
Countries with an EconFree index value above mean experience a relative price effect of
-0.38+0.57=0.19.
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